CVE-2026-88230 — Windows LUA File Virtualization Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows LUAFV allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
No EPSS score available for this CVE.
View on FIRST.orgAffected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5131291 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5131291 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5131085 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5131085 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5131096 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5131096 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5131096 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5131096 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5131096 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5131096 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5131087 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5131087 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5132061 (Security Update) 5132043 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5127648 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.9974 10.0.26100.9911 Yes No None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5132061 (Security Update) 5132043 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5127648 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.9974 10.0.26100.9911 Yes No None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5132061 (Security Update) 5132043 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5127648 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.9974 10.0.26200.9911 Yes No None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5132061 (Security Update) 5132043 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5127648 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.9974 10.0.26200.9911 Yes No None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5132059 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems | 5132059 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 26H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5132061 (Security Update) 5132043 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5127648 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26300.9974 10.0.26300.9911 Yes No None Windows 11 Version 26H2 for x64-based Systems 5132061 (Security Update) 5132043 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5127648 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26300.9974 10.0.26300.9911 Yes No None Windows Server 2016 | 5131291 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5131291 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5131085 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5131085 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 | 5131090 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) | 5131090 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5131291 |
Security Update | Yes |
5131085 |
Security Update | Yes |
5131096 |
Security Update | Yes |
5131087 |
Security Update | Yes |
5132059 |
Security Update | Yes |
5131090 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow in luafv.sys — fixed (velocity-gated behind Feature_605700410) in LuafvSupplyFullPath. Elevation of Privilege.
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2026-88230 — A 16-bit length truncation in Windows LUAFV path virtualization
Root-cause analysis from the November 2026 patch diff of luafv.sys (10.0.26100.9818 → .9974, KB5132061).
Summary
luafv.sys, the LUA File Virtualization minifilter, reconstructs virtualized file paths by concatenating two
UNICODE_STRINGs whose Length fields are 16-bit byte counts, and it computes the destination allocation size
by adding those 16-bit lengths in 16-bit arithmetic. A local, low-privileged attacker who can make the sum
of a device-name prefix plus a caller-supplied path exceed 0xFFFF wraps the size to a small value,
LuafvAllocatePool returns an undersized paged-pool buffer, and the subsequent memmove +
RtlAppendUnicodeStringToString copy the full, un-truncated data past the end — a controlled-length,
controlled-content pool overflow and a clean primitive for elevation to SYSTEM. Microsoft rates it Important,
CVSS 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N), Exploitation More Likely. The fix lives in LuafvSupplyFullPath and is
gated behind Feature_605700410; two sibling name-builders were hardened in the same update.
The vulnerability
LUAFV sits in the filter stack to give legacy, non-elevated code a private view of protected directories: a
write under %ProgramFiles% or %WinDir% is transparently redirected into a per-user virtual store. To do
that it must repeatedly rebuild fully-qualified paths, and LuafvSupplyFullPath(param_1, param_2) is the helper
that does so. param_2 is a packed { USHORT Length; PWSTR Buffer; } pair (the decompiler renders the length
as (ushort)*param_2 and the buffer as param_2[1]) carrying the caller’s path; param_1 is the callback
data whose instance object hangs at +0x10.
The function builds the result from one of two string sources, and each is a sink with the same defect.
The first sink takes the file object’s own name. After LuafvGetNameFileObject fills a local UNICODE_STRING
(local_28 length, psStack_20 buffer), the size is formed as:
uVar4 = (ushort)local_28 + 2 + (ushort)*param_2; // underlying_len + sep + caller_len, all 16-bit
puStack_30 = LuafvAllocatePool(1,(uint)uVar4,'\x02'); // paged pool
memmove(puStack_30,_Src,(ulonglong)uVar9); // copy underlying name (uVar9 = full length)
RtlAppendUnicodeStringToString(&local_38,param_2); // then append the caller path
The second sink takes the instance-context device-name prefix. FltGetInstanceContext yields a context whose
prefix UNICODE_STRING lives at offset +0x18 → +0x38 (length) and +0x40 (buffer):
lVar1 = *(longlong *)(local_res10 + 0x18); // instance context
uVar6 = (ushort)*param_2 + *(short *)(lVar1 + 0x38); // caller_len + prefix_len, 16-bit
puStack_30 = LuafvAllocatePool(1,(uint)uVar6,'\x02'); // paged pool
memmove(puStack_30,*(void **)(lVar1 + 0x40),*(ushort *)(lVar1 + 0x38)); // copy prefix
RtlAppendUnicodeStringToString(&local_38,param_2); // then append the caller path
The defect is a type error. UNICODE_STRING.Length is a USHORT — a byte count capped at 0xFFFF. Summing
two of them (plus a two-byte separator) in 16-bit arithmetic can carry out of the 16-bit range and wrap:
0xFF00 + 0x0200 = 0x10100, truncated to 0x0100. The allocation is then sized to the wrapped value while the
memmove and the append copy the real lengths, writing hundreds of bytes beyond a ~256-byte buffer. Both the
overflow length and its contents derive from attacker-reachable strings (the caller path, and a device/underlying
name that long paths can inflate), so this is a fully controlled out-of-bounds write, not a blind corruption.
A note on confidence: in the diffed pre build, LuafvSupplyFullPath is a feature-gated stub that simply
return '\0';, so the vulnerable body is not present on the old side — it ran on the pre-existing ungated code
path that the diff does not contain. The root cause above is therefore reconstructed from the checks the patch
adds: each new bound is, by definition, a bound the vulnerable path lacked. CWE-122 is MSRC’s classification and
is consistent with the alloc-sizing guards below. The 16-bit wrap mechanism is proven by the code; the exact
pre-patch call sequence is inferred.
The patch
The fixed function adds three bounds, all behind Feature_605700410__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline():
// (1) clamp the caller length at entry, before any arithmetic
if (((int)uVar5 != 0) && (param_2 != NULL) && (0x200 < (ushort)*param_2))
*(undefined2 *)param_2 = 0x200; // caller path capped at 0x200 bytes
// (2) bound the underlying name in sink 1
if (((1 < uVar9) && (*psStack_20 == 0x5c)) && ((ushort)local_28 < 0x1001)) { ... } // <= 0x1000
// (3) unsigned-overflow check in sink 2
uVar6 = (ushort)*param_2 + *(short *)(lVar1 + 0x38);
if (uVar6 < (ushort)*param_2) { FltReleaseContext(); return '\0'; } // sum went down => it wrapped
Check (1) caps one operand at 0x200 globally; (2) caps the other at 0x1000 in the first sink; (3) is the
textbook unsigned-wrap test — if adding a non-negative prefix made the total smaller, it overflowed — guarding
the second sink. Together they close both allocation sites. The clamps are also telling: 0x200 and 0x1000
are the intended maxima, which means the pre-patch path accepted lengths an order of magnitude larger. Because
the fix is velocity-gated, a fully-patched build with Feature_605700410 disabled still executes the unguarded
arithmetic — patch presence is necessary but not sufficient.
Variant analysis
This is a bug class in the LUAFV name-construction family, not a lone function. The same diff modified two sibling builders with the identical alloc-sizing / bounded-copy signature:
LuafvBuildTableNodeName— decompiled size dropped 1035 → 746 bytes, flaggedalloc-sizing, bounded-copy; a substantial rewrite of another name-assembly routine.LuafvBuildTableNodeName2— 732 → 753 bytes, same signals.
And within LuafvSupplyFullPath itself there were two independent sinks (object-name and instance-prefix),
each needing its own guard — a reviewer who patched only one would have left the other exploitable. The takeaway
for anyone auditing this component: every place LUAFV sums UNICODE_STRING.Length values to size an allocation
is a candidate, and the fix should be verified to cover all of them (entry clamp + per-sink guard), not just the
function MSRC happened to name. Worth checking in adjacent minifilters that mirror this pattern (wcifs, bindflt,
cldflt all do similar path reconstruction).
Exploitation assessment
The primitive is a controlled-length, controlled-content linear overflow in paged pool (LuafvAllocatePool
with pool-type argument '\x02'). The attacker chooses the wrapped allocation’s size class by tuning the real
combined length, and controls the overflowing bytes (the appended caller path), which is close to ideal for pool
feng-shui: spray to normalise the paged-pool layout, free holes of the target size, let the undersized LUAFV
buffer land in a hole with a chosen victim object immediately after it, and overflow into that object’s header or
an embedded pointer/size field — the standard route to a relative or arbitrary write and ultimately a _TOKEN
privilege swap or a _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES edit. No race is required (AC:L), and the trigger is a plain file
operation that LUAFV virtualizes, which is why MSRC marks it More Likely.
What the static diff does not establish, and an exploit developer would need to confirm dynamically: which
concrete I/O paths let an unprivileged caller drive param_2->Length past the wrap threshold (and whether any
earlier layer clamps the path first), how the reachable device/underlying name can be stretched to supply the
second operand, the precise paged-pool size class and a reliable adjacent victim, and whether KASLR/pool-header
cookies demand an info leak first. Treat the SYSTEM EoP as credible and well-supported by the primitive, but not
proven end-to-end from the diff alone.
Detection & hunting
- Crash signatures. Paged-pool corruption bugchecks —
BAD_POOL_HEADER(0x19),DRIVER_CORRUPTED_EXPOOL(0xC5), orPAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA(0x50) — withluafv!LuafvSupplyFullPath,luafv!LuafvBuildTableNodeName, or theLuafvAllocatePool/append frames on the stack, especially while virtualizing unusually long paths. - Deterministic repro aid. Driver Verifier → Special Pool on
luafv.sysforces the OOB write to fault at the page boundary at the moment of overflow, turning a probabilistic corruption into a clean, attributable crash. - Telemetry. ETW-TI pool-allocation events where a
LuafvAllocatePoolsize is immediately followed by a copy of a larger length is a high-fidelity (low-volume) signal. For triggering activity, pivot on Sysmon FileCreate under the LUAFV virtual store (…\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\…) with abnormally long path components from medium/low-IL processes. - Patch state. Confirm 24H2
luafv.sys10.0.26100.9974 / KB5132061 (and the equivalent 25H2/26H2 builds) and thatFeature_605700410is enabled — a patched-but-flag-off host is still vulnerable.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-88230, Windows LUAFV Elevation of Privilege, 2026-11-10, KB5132061.
- Diffed builds (ghidriff,
--no-bsim):- Pre
luafv.sys10.0.26100.9818 — SHA-2564ba14a254e86fc39e3a26c39246a78c24d31eaea2cd7f6428af293756d697bc1https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols/luafv.sys/7722129834000/luafv.sys - Post
luafv.sys10.0.26100.9974 — SHA-256c7ae649fce3726920736452ed63d22c891a7caf01e48dc681bbffcd6564a6de9https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols/luafv.sys/CFC71A3D34000/luafv.sys - Both live at
%SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\luafv.syson a 24H2 (26100) host.
- Pre
- Fix:
LuafvSupplyFullPath(two sinks), with sibling hardening inLuafvBuildTableNodeName/LuafvBuildTableNodeName2; all gated byFeature_605700410. CWE-122. Signals: alloc-sizing, bounded-copy, overflow-guard, length-clamp.
Attack Path
Windows LUA File Virtualization Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.