CVE-2026-62728 — Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Common Log File System Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5120418 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5120418 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5120238 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5120238 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5120249 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5120249 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5120249 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5120249 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5120249 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5120249 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5120240 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5120240 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5120994 (Security Hotpatch Update) 5121003 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5101650 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.9106 10.0.26100.9168 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5121003 (Security Update) 5120994 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5101650 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.9168 10.0.26000.9106 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5121003 (Security Update) 5120994 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5101650 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.9168 10.0.26100.9106 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5121003 (Security Update) 5120994 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5101650 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.9168 10.0.26100.9106 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5121000 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems | 5121000 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 | 5120386 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) | 5120386 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 | 5120385 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) | 5120385 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 | 5120418 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5120418 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5120238 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5120238 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5120418 |
Security Update | Yes |
5120238 |
Security Update | Yes |
5120249 |
Security Update | Yes |
5120240 |
Security Update | Yes |
5121000 |
Security Update | Yes |
5120386 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5120385 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
Patch Diff
Double-fetch (CWE-367) of the log block sector count in clfs.sys ClfsValidateBlock. The bounds check param_3 < count << 9 used one read of *(ushort *)(param_2 + 4), but the sector-walk loop re-read the same attacker-controlled header field on every iteration for its termination condition. If the field changes between check and walk, the loop indexes param_2[i * 0x200 + 0x1fe] past the validated extent. Reached from CreateLogFile -> ReadLogBlock -> CompleteAsyncReadBlock -> ValidateLogBlock -> ClfsValidateBlock; the async completion path is what makes a mid-validation mutation conceivable. Patch captures the count once into a local and uses it for both the bound and the loop, and refactors per-sector flag checks into ClfsValidateSector. Gated behind Feature_344697147, so the double-fetch path still ships and runs when the flag is off. ReadLogBlock also changed here, but gated by the SAME Feature_344697147 - part of this fix, not a re-fix of CVE-2026-40407 (whose Feature_748929339 is absent from the 26100 branch). Investigated and ruled out as a variant pair.
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2026-62728 — Windows CLFS clfs.sys Elevation of Privilege via Double-Fetch of the Block Sector Count in ClfsValidateBlock
Summary
| Product | Microsoft Windows — clfs.sys (Common Log File System Driver) |
|---|---|
| Vendor | Microsoft Corporation |
| Severity | Important |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege |
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-62728 |
| CVSS (MSRC) | 7.0 |
| CWE | CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition — double fetch |
| Patch Date | August 11, 2026 |
| Pre-patch binary | clfs.sys 10.0.26100.8972 (2026-07-28) — SHA256 0a784dad4648caf108f7fe98… |
| Post-patch binary | clfs.sys 10.0.26100.9168 (2026-08-11) — SHA256 5880c90802c71110794d4be2… |
| Feature flag | Feature_344697147 — fix is CFR-gated |
Product Description
CLFS is the kernel logging layer that NTFS, the registry, KTM and MSDTC build on.
It operates on Base Log Files (.blf) whose on-disk structure is parsed directly
by the kernel. A log can be created by any standard user in any user-writable
directory via CreateLogFile, which makes every field in that file attacker
input — the reason CLFS has produced a long run of kernel EoP bugs
(CVE-2022-24521, CVE-2022-37969, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2026-40397, CVE-2026-40407,
CVE-2026-44809, CVE-2026-50697).
Each log block carries a header whose +0x4 field is the block’s sector
count. Validation multiplies it by 512 to check the block fits the buffer that
was read, then walks each 512-byte sector checking its trailing signature and
flag bytes at +0x1fe / +0x1ff.
Vulnerability Summary
ClfsValidateBlock read the sector count twice from the same attacker-supplied
buffer: once for the bounds check, and again on every iteration of the
sector-walk loop.
// ClfsValidateBlock — VULNERABLE (10.0.26100.8972)
if (param_3 < (uint)uVar2 << 9) // uVar2 read earlier from *(ushort*)(param_2 + 4)
return -0x3fe5fffc; // bounds check against THAT read
uVar8 = 1;
while (true) {
*param_6 = uVar8;
if (*(ushort *)(param_2 + 4) - 1 <= uVar8) break; // ← RE-READ every iteration
_Var1 = param_2[(ulonglong)uVar8 * 0x200 + 0x1fe]; // indexed access
if ((char)_Var1 < '\0') return -0x3fe5fffd;
if (param_2[uVar8 * 0x200 + 0x1ff] != param_4) return -0x3fe5fffe;
/* flag checks */
uVar8 = uVar8 + 1;
}
The bounds check proves the block fits the buffer for the value it read. The
loop then trusts a fresh read of the same field for its termination
condition. If that field changes between the two, the loop iterates further than
the check licensed, and param_2[uVar8 * 0x200 + 0x1fe] walks past the end of
the validated region.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local authenticated session (standard user; no administrative rights)
- CLFS is a core kernel component — always present, no optional feature required
.blffiles can be created in any user-writable directory viaCreateLogFile- The attacker must be able to change the header’s
+0x4field after the bounds check and during the sector walk
That last condition is the whole exploitability question. The buffer is the block
just read from the log file, and ClfsValidateBlock is reached from
CompleteAsyncReadBlock — an asynchronous read completion path. Establishing
whether a second thread, a mapped section, or in-flight DMA can mutate the buffer
inside that window is what separates a bugcheck from a controlled OOB access.
This analysis does not establish it. The patch’s shape shows Microsoft treated
the double fetch itself as the defect.
Vulnerability Details
Call Chain
User mode:
CreateLogFile() → unprivileged, any writable directory
log read / flush activity
↓
Kernel mode (clfs.sys):
CClfsLogFcbPhysical::ReadLogBlock
→ CClfsLogFcbPhysical::CompleteAsyncReadBlock [async completion, multi-block walk]
→ CClfsLogFcbPhysical::ValidateLogBlock
→ ClfsValidateBlock [*** VULNERABLE ***]
→ ClfsValidateSector
CClfsLogFcbPhysical::IsEof is also modified in this patch and participates in
the same read path.
The patch
The fix captures the count once and uses that single value for both the bounds check and the loop bound:
// ClfsValidateBlock — PATCHED (10.0.26100.9168), feature-enabled branch
uVar2 = *(ushort *)(param_2 + 4); // read ONCE into a local
if (param_3 < (uint)uVar2 << 9)
return -0x3fe5fffc; // bound checked against the capture
uVar5 = 1; uVar6 = 1; *param_6 = 1;
if (1 < uVar2 - 1) {
do {
_Var1 = param_2[uVar5 * 0x200 + 0x1fe];
...
uVar6 = uVar6 + 1;
uVar5 = (ulonglong)uVar6;
*param_6 = uVar6;
} while (uVar6 < uVar2 - 1); // loop bound uses the SAME capture
}
The patch also restructures the per-sector flag validation into ClfsValidateSector
calls at entry (param_5 | 0x40) and exit (param_5 | 0x20), which is why the
function’s similarity score against the pre-patch build is low.
Patch Completeness Assessment
The fix is gated behind a Controlled Feature Rollout flag. Both branches ship
in 10.0.26100.9168:
uVar5 = Feature_344697147__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();
if ((int)uVar5 == 0) {
/* ORIGINAL DOUBLE-FETCH — re-reads *(ushort *)(param_2 + 4) in the loop */
} else {
/* FIXED — single capture */
}
With the flag disabled, the double fetch still executes on a fully patched machine. Patch state cannot be inferred from file version alone.
This is the fifth August-window CVE in our set where the fix is CFR-gated,
alongside CVE-2026-59125 (Feature_3417294137, Feature_1070577979),
CVE-2026-42980 (Feature_1045423416), CVE-2026-44809 (Feature_3035089211) and
CVE-2026-42912 (Feature_500158777).
Investigated and ruled out: is this a re-fix of CVE-2026-40407?
CClfsLogFcbPhysical::ReadLogBlock is modified in both the May 2026 patch
(CVE-2026-40407) and this one, which looked like an incomplete-fix pair. It is
not. Two pieces of evidence, both from the August 24H2 binary:
1. The August ReadLogBlock change is part of this fix. Feature_344697147
is called from four functions, ReadLogBlock among them:
ValidateLogBlock @ 14000f907 x1
ClfsValidateBlock @ 14000e0d2 x1
ReadLogBlock @ 14000f6ba, 14000f717 x2
CompleteAsyncReadBlock @ 140078c42 ... 14007943b x9
All thirteen call sites gate the same double-fetch remediation across the whole
block-read path. ReadLogBlock appears because it is central to that path, not
because August revisited May’s defect.
2. CVE-2026-40407’s flag is not in this branch. Feature_748929339 — which
gates the May LSN/owner-page bounds check — does not exist anywhere in
clfs.sys 10.0.26100.9168. That fix was diffed on the 10.0.28000.x (Server)
branch; this CVE is 10.0.26100.x (24H2). Different servicing branches,
different flags, different defects.
Conclusion: not a variant pair. Two distinct bugs that happen to share a function on a hot path. Recorded here because the surface-level signal — same binary, same function, four months apart — is exactly the kind of thing that becomes a wrong claim if not checked.
Feature-flag inventory (August 24H2 clfs.sys)
The binary carries fourteen concurrent CFR flags, so flag count alone does not map to fix count — only flags added by the diff do. Several are named rather than numeric, and the names leak provenance:
| Flag | What the name reveals |
|---|---|
Feature_Servicing_MSRC97927 |
an MSRC case number embedded in the binary |
Feature_Servicing_CLFSFuzzerBugInvalidContainerID |
found by fuzzing, and what it hit |
Feature_ClfsFixCpfHeaderLeak |
an information-leak fix |
Feature_ClfsContainerMemberInitFixes |
uninitialised member fixes |
Feature_ClfsHashNodeReturnCode |
error-handling fix |
Feature_CLFS_Signing, Feature_CLFS_EventLog |
feature work, not fixes |
Feature_Servicing_CLFS_AuthenticationExemptions |
auth-path servicing |
344697147, 326875449, 950255931, 1403240762, 3236415803, 3650604346 |
opaque |
Only Feature_344697147 is new in this diff.
Detection Guidance
Crash signature. Bugchecks inside clfs!ClfsValidateBlock or
clfs!CClfsLogFcbPhysical::CompleteAsyncReadBlock, typically 0x50
(PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA), on systems with .blf activity from
non-administrative users. Driver Verifier with Special Pool on clfs.sys makes
the overrun far more observable.
Behavioural. Creation of .blf files in user-writable directories by
non-system processes, particularly with repeated open/read cycles against the same
log — a double fetch has to be raced, so the trigger pattern is repetition rather
than a single malformed file.
Sysmon. File-create events with TargetFilename ending .blf outside
%SystemRoot%, correlated by process. Long-standing CLFS detection guidance for
CVE-2022-37969 and CVE-2023-28252 applies unchanged.
Config note. Because the fix is CFR-gated, verifying Feature_344697147 is
enabled is the only way to confirm the corrected path is live. File version alone
is insufficient.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-62728, August 2026
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/clfs_sys-cve-2026-62728-ghidriff.md - Related: CVE-2026-40407 (
ReadLogBlock, May 2026), CVE-2026-44809, CVE-2026-50697
Attack Path
Double-fetch of the block sector count: validation and the sector walk read the same attacker-controlled header field separately
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
Daejin Lee
sweetchip
Kentaro Kawane with GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc.