Important CVSS 7 EPSS 0.00234 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-06 archive

Executive Summary

Use after free in Windows Bluetooth Port Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Jun 9 2026
Last Updated Jun 9 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00234 — 0.14389 percentile
NVD CVSS 7 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
High
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.1

EPSS Score

0.00234
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.14389 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

18 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5093998 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5093998 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5094126 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5094126 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5094126 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5094126 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems 5095051 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems 5095051 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5094128 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5094128 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5094125 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5094125 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

6 patches
Article Type Restart
5094127 Security Update Yes
5093998 Security Update Yes
5094126 Security Update Yes
5095051 Security Update Yes
5094128 Security Update Yes
5094125 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · bthport.sys (KB5094126)

Use-after-free / double-free race (CWE-416) in the Windows Bluetooth port driver bthport.sys, local EoP. HciLELegacyAdvertisingRequestCoordinator::MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew iterates pending LE legacy advertising requests and re-sets each IRP's cancellation routine (ClearRequestCancellationRoutine then SetRequestCancellationRoutine). ClearRequestCancellationRoutine fails when the IRP's cancellation is already in progress (the cancel callback is already completing/freeing that IRP). PRE: on a Clear failure the code fell through to LAB_0 and set the per-request error flag (*(lVar1+8) |= 4), marking the IRP as MarkAll's own cleanup/error-handling target even though the cancel callback owns it - so a single IRP could be completed and freed on two paths at once (double free / UAF). IN-HOUSE ghidriff of bthport.sys 10.0.26100.8524 -> .8655 (Jun 9 2026, KB5094126) confirms the fix: MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew is the only code-changed function; gated behind CFR flag Feature_697033018, a Clear failure now sets no error flag and exits (the cancel callback alone owns the IRP), and only the Clear-succeeded-but-Set-failed case sets the error flag for genuine cleanup. Removes the race between the cancellation callback and MarkAll. Note: our x64 24H2 diff shows flag Feature_697033018, differing from the circulated screenshots' Feature_965468474 (build/arch difference); we ship what our diff shows.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.8524 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.8655 Download
Loading diff…
Select a function to see its diff.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2026-45640 — Windows Bluetooth Port Driver bthport.sys Use-After-Free in HciLELegacyAdvertisingRequestCoordinator::MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew


Summary

Product Windows — bthport.sys (Bluetooth Port Driver; LE legacy advertising request coordinator)
CVE ID CVE-2026-45640
Impact Elevation of Privilege
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.0 / 6.1 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-416: Use After Free (double-free / UAF race)
Delivery Local — race against the IRP cancellation callback (AC:H reflects the timing window)
KB / Fixed build KB5094126 — bthport.sys 10.0.26100.8655 (Win11 24H2 x64)
Patch Date June 9, 2026 (2026-Jun)
Pre-patch binary bthport.sys 10.0.26100.8524 — SHA256 107eac1b5892ded9e589ce4eed7950b51ca79299076a6bdb72a3de763d8e9810
Post-patch binary bthport.sys 10.0.26100.8655 — SHA256 0c71fbf4b3469b3f61acdd9e4b922a7d969fa618aae82c43bbb71e348e93a797
Feature flag Feature_697033018 — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Product Description

bthport.sys is the Windows Bluetooth port driver. Its HciLELegacyAdvertisingRequestCoordinator manages pending Bluetooth LE legacy advertising requests, each backed by an IRP with a cancellation routine — the function the I/O manager invokes when the IRP is cancelled, to complete and clean up (and free) the request. Because the driver runs in kernel and the advertising surface is reachable by a local, low-privileged caller, a lifetime bug in its IRP handling is a local elevation vector.


Vulnerability Summary

MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew iterates the pending advertising requests and re-sets each request’s IRP cancellation routine: it first calls ClearRequestCancellationRoutine (to detach the current routine), then SetRequestCancellationRoutine (to install the new one). ClearRequestCancellationRoutine fails when the IRP’s cancellation is already in progress — i.e. the cancellation callback is already completing/freeing that same IRP.

Pre-patch, a Clear failure still fell through to the error path and set the per-request error flag (| 4), marking the IRP as a target for MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew’s own error-handling/cleanup — even though the cancellation callback was concurrently processing (and about to free) that IRP:

// MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew (10.0.26100.8524) — PRE-PATCH, from our diff
this_00 = this;
bVar2 = ClearRequestCancellationRoutine(this, irp);
if (bVar2) {                              // Clear succeeded
    bVar2 = SetRequestCancellationRoutine(this_00, irp, in_R8);
    if (!bVar2) goto LAB_0;               // Set failed -> error flag
}
else {                                    // *** Clear FAILED (cancel already in progress) ***
LAB_0:
    *(uint *)(lVar1 + 8) |= 4;            // *** error flag set anyway -> IRP double-owned ***
}
local_res8 = local_res8 & -(ulonglong)((*(byte *)(lVar1 + 8) & 4) != 0);  // mark for error handling

A single IRP can therefore be completed and freed on two paths at once — the in-flight cancellation callback and MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew’s error handling — a double free / use-after-free (CWE-416).


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, low-privileged (PR:L, AV:L). The attacker drives LE advertising request churn and races IRP cancellation.
  • AC:H: the bug is a race — it triggers only in the narrow window where ClearRequestCancellationRoutine fails because the cancellation callback is already processing the same IRP.
  • Success yields a kernel double-free / UAF and, via heap grooming, elevation.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew treated a ClearRequestCancellationRoutine failure as an ordinary error and set the request’s error flag, claiming the IRP for its own cleanup. But a Clear failure specifically means the IRP is already owned by the cancellation callback, which will complete and free it. Both paths then act on the same IRP — the race that produces the double free / UAF.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .8524 → .8655)

Gated behind Feature_697033018, the coordinator changes the failure handling so that a Clear failure is not treated as an error to be handled here:

// MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew (10.0.26100.8655) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch
iVar4 = Feature_697033018__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();
if (iVar4 == 0) {
    /* ...original (feature-disabled) behaviour still ships... */
}
else {                                    // *** patched path ***
    pHVar5 = this;
    bVar3 = ClearRequestCancellationRoutine(this, irp);
    if (bVar3) {                          // Clear succeeded
        bVar3 = SetRequestCancellationRoutine(pHVar5, irp, in_R8);
        if (bVar3) goto LAB_1;            // Set succeeded -> OK, no error flag
        *(uint *)(lVar2 + 8) |= 4;        // *** only Clear-OK + Set-FAIL sets the error flag ***
    }
    // *** Clear FAILED -> do NOTHING, no error flag -> exit; the cancel callback owns the IRP ***
}

Now:

  • Clear fails → the function sets no error flag and exits, so the IRP that is already being cancelled is completed/freed only by the cancellation callback.
  • Clear succeeds but Set fails → the IRP is genuinely orphaned (no cancellation routine installed), so the error flag is set and this function cleans it up.

This removes the race in which the cancellation callback and MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew could both complete and free the same IRP.

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_697033018. The corrected handling runs only when the flag is enabled; the original (racy) iVar4 == 0 branch still ships in .8655. Patch state is not determined by file version alone — the runtime-gated pattern seen across this corpus. Verify Feature_697033018 is enabled to confirm the fixed path is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. Local processes driving rapid LE advertising register/cancel churn to force ClearRequestCancellationRoutine failures during MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew.

Crash signature. Kernel double-free / pool-corruption bugchecks (BAD_POOL_CALLER / UAF) in bthport!...MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew / ...OnPendingAdvertisementRequestCancelThunk under advertising cancellation.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_697033018 is enabled so the non-racy handling is active.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-45640 (Windows Bluetooth Port Driver Elevation of Privilege), released 2026-06-09, KB5094126.
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/bthport_sys-cve-2026-45640-ghidriff.md
  • Related bthport.sys bug: CVE-2022-35820 (BthCreateKeyEx).

Attack Path

MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew error-flags an IRP whose cancellation is already in flight, so both paths free it

Attack path for CVE-2026-45640 MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew error-flags an IRP whose cancellation is already in flight, so both paths free it 01 — ENTRY Local low-priv process drives LE advertising register/cancel churn bthport.sys (kernel) manages pending LE legacy advertising IRPs. A local caller can force many requests and race their cancellation - AC:H reflects the timing window. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT An advertising IRP's cancellation is already in progress The I/O manager has invoked the request's cancellation callback, which will complete and free that IRP. 03 — PATH MarkAllAdvertisingRequestAsNew re-sets each request's cancellation routine It calls ClearRequestCancellationRoutine then SetRequestCancellationRoutine on each pending IRP. Clear FAILS for the IRP whose cancellation is already in progress. 04 — MISSING CHECK On Clear-failure it still sets the error flag (| 4), claiming the IRP for cleanup Pre-patch, a Clear failure falls to LAB_0 and sets *(req+8) |= 4, so MarkAll treats the in-flight IRP as its own error-handling/cleanup target (CWE-416). 05 — PRIMITIVE Same IRP completed & freed on two paths -> double free / UAF -> EoP The cancellation callback and MarkAll both free the one IRP, corrupting kernel pool for elevation. The Jun 2026 fix (Feature_697033018) makes Clear-fail set no flag and exit, leaving the callback as sole owner.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

hazard