CVE-2026-42912 — Windows Telephony Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5094122 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5094122 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5094123 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5094123 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5094127 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5094127 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5094127 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5094127 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5094127 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5094127 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5093998 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5093998 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5094126 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems | 5094126 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5094126 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems | 5094126 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5095051 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems | 5095051 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 | 5094042 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) | 5094042 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 | 5094041 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) | 5094041 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 | 5094122 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5094122 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5094123 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5094123 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 | 5094128 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) | 5094128 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 | 5094125 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) | 5094125 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5094122 |
Security Update | Yes |
5094123 |
Security Update | Yes |
5094127 |
Security Update | Yes |
5093998 |
Security Update | Yes |
5094126 |
Security Update | Yes |
5095051 |
Security Update | Yes |
5094042 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5094041 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5094128 |
Security Update | Yes |
5094125 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Two race conditions fixed in the Windows Telephony Service RPC server. (1) Sub-mask index OOB: GetSubMaskIndex() return value was used without bounds validation to index into the per-object event mask array; patch adds a bounds check (index > 0x1e → error) via new GetEventMasksOrSubMasks helper, gated behind Feature_500158777. TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks was refactored from 1431 to 938 instructions by consolidating five per-object-type code-duplicated paths into a single call to this helper. (2) Conference participant UAF in DestroytCall: participant removed from conf slot array without holding exclusive access to the conf call object; patch acquires ReferenceObject + WaitForExclusivetCallAccess before modifying the conf participant list, gated behind Feature_784066872. Both fixes are feature-flagged (WIL DeviceUsage CFR) and inert until Microsoft enables the respective flags per cohort.
Root Cause Analysis
Root Cause Analysis — CVE-2026-42912
Executive Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-42912 |
| Binary | tapisrv.dll (Windows Telephony Service) |
| Component | Telephony Application Programming Interface (TAPI) RPC server |
| Vulnerability class | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution Using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization |
| Secondary CWE | CWE-787 (Out-of-Bounds Write — Race 1), CWE-416 (Use-After-Free — Race 2) |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege |
| Attack vector | Local — any user who can open a TAPI line device |
| Privileges required | Low (standard user) |
| User interaction | None |
| Pre-patch version | 10.0.26100.8521 |
| Post-patch version | 10.0.26100.8655 |
| KB | KB5094126 (June 2026 Patch Tuesday) |
| Patch Tuesday | 2026-06 |
| CVSS 4.0 (estimated) | 7.8 — CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| CFR flags | Feature_500158777 (Race 1), Feature_784066872 (Race 2) |
CVE-2026-42912 covers two distinct race conditions in the Windows Telephony Service (TapiSrv) RPC server, both patched in the same KB. The first allows an out-of-bounds array write via an unchecked sub-mask index; the second allows a use-after-free in the conference call participant teardown path. Both are exploitable by a standard local user through the documented TAPI Win32 API.
Attack Surface
The Windows Telephony Service (TapiSrv) runs as svchost.exe -k netsvcs under the NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE account. It exposes an RPC interface (tapsrv named pipe) that any authenticated user can call through the tapi32.dll client library. The service manages telephony line devices, call objects, and conference calls on behalf of TAPI applications.
Key objects relevant to this CVE:
- tCall — represents a single telephony call, identified by a 32-bit handle (
hCall) and tagged with0x4c4c4143(“CALL”) or0x4c414349(“ICAL” for incoming) - tLineApp — represents a TAPI application’s line session, tagged
0x5050414c(“LAPP”) - Event mask array — a 31-slot (
0x1f) integer array per object, controlling which TAPI events the application receives; indexed by a sub-mask index derived from a 64-bit selector - Conference participant list — a linked structure of slot arrays attached to the conference host call, tracking all participant call objects
Race 1 — Sub-mask Index Out-of-Bounds (CWE-787)
Vulnerable Code Path
tapi32!lineSetEventMasksOrSubMasks (client)
→ RPC → tapisrv!SettLineAppEventMasks / SettCallClientEventMasks / ...
→ tapisrv!SetEventMasksOrSubMasks(param_1, param_2, param_3, param_4)
→ tapisrv!GetSubMaskIndex(param_2) → uVar1
→ param_4[uVar1] = param_3; // NO BOUNDS CHECK
Similarly, the read path:
tapi32!lineGetEventMasksOrSubMasks (client)
→ RPC → tapisrv!TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks
→ GetSubMaskIndex(param_2) → uVar1
→ *param_3 = param_5[uVar1]; // NO BOUNDS CHECK
Root Cause
GetSubMaskIndex() derives an array index from an attacker-controlled 64-bit handle/selector value (param_2). The function performs bit manipulation to extract an index, but the result is not validated against the array bound before use.
The event mask array has 31 slots (indices 0 through 30, matching the 0x1f-iteration loop in the full-mask path). Any index > 30 (0x1e) results in an out-of-bounds read or write on the telephony service heap.
Pre-patch SetEventMasksOrSubMasks:
undefined8 SetEventMasksOrSubMasks(int param_1, ulonglong param_2,
int param_3, int *param_4)
{
if (param_4 == NULL) return 0x80000035;
if (param_1 == 0) {
// full-mask path — safe, iterates exactly 0x1f slots
...
} else {
uVar1 = GetSubMaskIndex(param_2);
param_4[uVar1] = param_3; // OOB write if uVar1 > 0x1e
}
return 0;
}
Post-patch SetEventMasksOrSubMasks:
} else {
uVar1 = GetSubMaskIndex(param_2);
uVar2 = Feature_500158777__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();
if ((uVar2 != 0) && (0x1e < uVar1)) {
return 0x80000032; // LINEERR_OPERATIONFAILED
}
param_4[uVar1] = param_3;
}
The patch adds a bounds check (uVar1 > 0x1e → error) gated behind Feature_500158777. The same check is inserted into the new GetEventMasksOrSubMasks helper, which consolidates the read-path logic from TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks.
TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks Refactoring
The pre-patch TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks was 1431 instructions, duplicating the event mask read logic across all six object-type branches (client, line app, line client, call client, phone app, phone client), each with its own inline GetSubMaskIndex() call and unchecked array read. The patch consolidates all branches into the new GetEventMasksOrSubMasks helper (142 instructions), shrinking the function to 938 instructions and ensuring the bounds check runs on every exit path.
Exploitation Window
The race window exists between the call to GetSubMaskIndex() and the array access. On a multi-core system, thread A computes the index while thread B concurrently modifies the handle or selector value that feeds GetSubMaskIndex(), causing the index to exceed the array bound. The OOB write lands on adjacent heap allocations in the telephony service process, potentially overwriting function pointers, object metadata, or lock structures.
Race 2 — Conference Participant List Use-After-Free (CWE-416)
Vulnerable Code Path
tapi32!lineDrop (client drops a conference participant)
→ RPC → tapisrv!DestroytCall(param_1, ...)
→ RemoveCallFromLineList(param_1)
→ param_1[0x22] = 0; // clear conf back-pointer
→ param_1[0x23] = 0; // UNSYNCHRONISED — no lock on conf object
Concurrently:
tapi32!lineGetEventMasksOrSubMasks (another thread)
→ tapisrv!TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks
→ traverses conf participant slot array
→ dereferences participant pointer → USE-AFTER-FREE
Root Cause
When DestroytCall destroys a call that is a participant (not the host) in a conference call, the pre-patch code clears the participant’s conference back-pointer fields (param_1[0x22] and param_1[0x23]) directly after RemoveCallFromLineList, without acquiring exclusive access to the conference host call object. A concurrent thread traversing the conference’s participant slot array can dereference the participant pointer after the call object has been freed by FreetCall, constituting a use-after-free.
Pre-patch DestroytCall (participant teardown):
RemoveCallFromLineList((longlong)param_1);
pvVar15 = *(LPVOID *)(param_1 + 0x22); // conf call pointer
if (((longlong)pvVar15 - 1U < 0xfffffffffffffffe) &&
(*(int **)((longlong)pvVar15 + 0x18) == param_1)) {
// This branch: participant IS the conf host — safe path
...
}
// MISSING: else branch for non-host participant
// param_1[0x22] and param_1[0x23] are NEVER cleared if not host
// -> dangling reference in conf's participant slot array
Post-patch DestroytCall (participant teardown):
RemoveCallFromLineList((longlong)param_1);
p_Var23 = *(LPCRITICAL_SECTION *)(param_1 + 0x22);
if (...) {
if (p_Var23->LockSemaphore == param_1) {
// Host path — unchanged
...
} else {
// NEW: Non-host participant path
uVar7 = Feature_784066872__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();
if (uVar7 != 0) {
// 1. Read conf call pointer from participant
piVar10 = p_Var23->LockSemaphore;
// 2. Pin conf object via ReferenceObject
p_Var11 = ReferenceObject(piVar9, uVar7, 0x4c4c4143 /*CALL*/);
if (p_Var11 != NULL) {
// 3. Acquire exclusive access to conf call
uVar8 = WaitForExclusivetCallAccess((int *)p_Var11, 0x4c4c4143);
if ((int)uVar8 != 0) {
// 4. Verify participant still belongs to this conf
if ((p_Var11[3].OwningThread == p_Var23) &&
(p_Var23->LockSemaphore == p_Var11)) {
// 5. Clear back-pointers
param_1[0x22] = 0;
param_1[0x23] = 0;
// 6. Scan and compact participant slot array
// (removes param_1's entry under lock)
...
}
// 7. Release lock
LeaveCriticalSection(p_Var12);
}
// 8. Drop reference
DereferenceObject(p_Var12, uVar7, 1);
}
}
}
}
The patch adds ~300 instructions to the non-host participant path, implementing proper synchronisation: ReferenceObject → WaitForExclusivetCallAccess → scan/compact participant slot array → LeaveCriticalSection → DereferenceObject. The back-pointer fields are only cleared under the lock, and the participant entry is physically removed from the slot array, eliminating the dangling reference.
Controlled Feature Rollout
Both fixes are gated behind Windows Invariant Library (WIL) Controlled Feature Rollout flags:
| Flag | Feature ID | Guards |
|---|---|---|
Feature_500158777 |
Sub-mask bounds check in SetEventMasksOrSubMasks and GetEventMasksOrSubMasks |
Race 1 |
Feature_784066872 |
Exclusive-access participant removal in DestroytCall |
Race 2 |
Both use IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline, which queries the Windows Feature Store and falls back to wil_details_IsEnabledFallback on cache miss. The fixes are inert until Microsoft enables the flags for each device cohort.
To force-enable for testing:
reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FeatureManagement\Overrides\8\500158777" /v EnabledState /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f
reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FeatureManagement\Overrides\8\784066872" /v EnabledState /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f
Diff Statistics
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Functions changed (code) | 3 (SetEventMasksOrSubMasks, TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks, DestroytCall) |
| Functions added | 3 (GetEventMasksOrSubMasks, 2× feature flag accessors) |
| Total functions | 1,020 |
| Match rate | 99.85% |
| Binary size delta | +16 bytes |
| Instruction delta | +35 |
Detection Rules
YARA — Binary Feature Flag Detection
rule CVE_2026_42912_TapiSrv_Patch_Feature500158777
{
meta:
description = "Detects tapisrv.dll patched for CVE-2026-42912 Race 1 (Feature_500158777 sub-mask bounds check)"
author = "OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG"
date = "2026-07-22"
cve = "CVE-2026-42912"
reference = "https://onlyfm252.starlabs.sg"
hash_pre = "be01d3bd28d2e12d81690790d3a68fbab6814a97b650a1534a9e73ad5ed5a01e"
hash_post = "c00c8f51b6ba0bbd76927ac6eefb399a62e5e20fbbe41bdb45ef5901a8a1f169"
strings:
$feat500 = "Feature_500158777" ascii wide
$func_get = "GetEventMasksOrSubMasks" ascii
$func_set = "SetEventMasksOrSubMasks" ascii
$pe = { 4D 5A }
condition:
$pe at 0 and $feat500 and ($func_get or $func_set)
}
rule CVE_2026_42912_TapiSrv_Patch_Feature784066872
{
meta:
description = "Detects tapisrv.dll patched for CVE-2026-42912 Race 2 (Feature_784066872 conf participant locking)"
author = "OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG"
date = "2026-07-22"
cve = "CVE-2026-42912"
reference = "https://onlyfm252.starlabs.sg"
hash_pre = "be01d3bd28d2e12d81690790d3a68fbab6814a97b650a1534a9e73ad5ed5a01e"
hash_post = "c00c8f51b6ba0bbd76927ac6eefb399a62e5e20fbbe41bdb45ef5901a8a1f169"
strings:
$feat784 = "Feature_784066872" ascii wide
$func_destroy = "DestroytCall" ascii
$call_tag = { 43 41 4C 4C } // "CALL" (0x4c4c4143 LE)
$pe = { 4D 5A }
condition:
$pe at 0 and $feat784 and $func_destroy and $call_tag
}
YARA — Vulnerable Binary Detection
rule CVE_2026_42912_TapiSrv_Vulnerable
{
meta:
description = "Detects pre-patch tapisrv.dll vulnerable to CVE-2026-42912"
author = "OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG"
date = "2026-07-22"
cve = "CVE-2026-42912"
strings:
$func_set = "SetEventMasksOrSubMasks" ascii
$func_tget = "TGetEventMasksOrSubMasks" ascii
$func_gsi = "GetSubMaskIndex" ascii
$no_feat500 = "Feature_500158777" ascii wide
$no_feat784 = "Feature_784066872" ascii wide
$pe = { 4D 5A }
condition:
$pe at 0 and $func_set and $func_tget and $func_gsi
and not $no_feat500 and not $no_feat784
}
Sigma — TAPI Service Exploitation Indicators
title: CVE-2026-42912 — Suspicious TAPI RPC Activity (Race Condition Trigger)
id: c3f8a912-7d4e-4b2a-9f1c-6e8d5a3b7c01
status: experimental
description: |
Detects rapid TAPI line open/close or conference call setup/teardown
patterns consistent with CVE-2026-42912 race condition exploitation.
The vulnerability requires concurrent threads racing SetEventMasksOrSubMasks
or DestroytCall.
author: OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG
date: 2026/07/22
references:
- https://onlyfm252.starlabs.sg
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\tapisrv.dll'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'TapiSrv'
selection_crash:
EventType: 'Error'
Source: 'Application Error'
Data|contains:
- 'tapisrv.dll'
- 'svchost.exe'
condition: selection_crash or (selection_parent and selection_child)
# Note: TAPI exploitation is subtle — the primary indicator is a crash
# in svchost hosting TapiSrv, or abnormal TAPI line open/close frequency
# visible in ETW tracing (Microsoft-Windows-TAPI3 provider).
level: medium
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- cve.2026.42912
falsepositives:
- Legitimate telephony applications with high call volume
- VoIP software creating and tearing down many conference calls
---
title: CVE-2026-42912 — Rapid TAPI Line Handle Manipulation
id: c3f8a912-7d4e-4b2a-9f1c-6e8d5a3b7c02
status: experimental
description: |
Detects processes making an abnormally high number of TAPI line
open/negotiation calls in a short window, consistent with the sub-mask
index OOB race (Race 1).
author: OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG
date: 2026/07/22
logsource:
category: pipe_connected
product: windows
detection:
selection:
PipeName: '\tapsrv'
filter_legitimate:
Image|endswith:
- '\explorer.exe'
- '\dialer.exe'
- '\Teams.exe'
- '\lync.exe'
condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
# Combined with: frequency threshold of >50 connections in 10 seconds
# from the same process (requires SIEM correlation).
level: low
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- cve.2026.42912
falsepositives:
- Legitimate CTI/TAPI middleware (e.g., Cisco JTAPI, Genesys)
Sysmon Configuration
<Sysmon schemaversion="4.90">
<EventFiltering>
<!-- EID 7: Track tapisrv.dll loads into svchost -->
<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">tapisrv.dll</ImageLoaded>
</ImageLoad>
<!-- EID 18: Monitor named pipe connections to tapsrv -->
<PipeEvent onmatch="include">
<PipeName condition="is">\tapsrv</PipeName>
</PipeEvent>
<!-- EID 1: Catch svchost crash-restarts hosting TapiSrv -->
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<CommandLine condition="contains">TapiSrv</CommandLine>
</ProcessCreate>
<!-- EID 11: WER crash dumps for TapiSrv host -->
<FileCreate onmatch="include">
<TargetFilename condition="contains">svchost</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dmp</TargetFilename>
</FileCreate>
<!-- EID 5: Process termination of TapiSrv host -->
<ProcessTerminate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="end with">svchost.exe</Image>
</ProcessTerminate>
</EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-06-10 | Microsoft releases KB5094126 (June 2026 Patch Tuesday) |
| 2026-06-10 | CVE-2026-42912 disclosed — Elevation of Privilege in Windows Telephony Service |
| 2026-07-22 | This analysis completed (OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG) |
References
- Microsoft Security Update Guide — CVE-2026-42912
- KB5094126 release notes
- TAPI Overview (Win32 API)
- lineSetEventMasksOrSubMasks function
- Windows Feature Store / Controlled Feature Rollout
Attack Path
Two races in the Telephony Service RPC server - an unvalidated sub-mask index and a conference-participant use-after-free
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.