Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.00326 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-05 archive

Executive Summary

Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Application Identity (AppID) Subsystem allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released May 12 2026
Last Updated May 12 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00326 — 0.25371 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00326
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.25371 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

23 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5087537 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5087537 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5087538 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5087538 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5087544 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5087544 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5087544 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5094127 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5087420 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5093998 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5089549 (Security Update) 5089466 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5082063 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8457 10.0.26100.8390 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5089549 (Security Update) 5089466 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5082063 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8457 10.0.26100.8390 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5089549 (Security Update) 5089466 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5083769 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8457 10.0.26200.8390 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5089549 (Security Update) 5089466 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5083769 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8457 10.0.26200.8390 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems 5089548 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems 5089548 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 5087470 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5087470 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5087471 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5087471 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5087537 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5087537 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5087538 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5087538 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5087545 (Security Update) 5087424 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5082142 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.5139 10.0.20348.5074 Yes None Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5087545 (Security Update) 5087424 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5082142 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.5139 10.0.20348.5074 Yes None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5087541 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

10 patches
Article Type Restart
5087537 Security Update Yes
5087538 Security Update Yes
5087544 Security Update Yes
5094127 Security Update Yes
5087420 Security Update Yes
5093998 Security Update Yes
5089548 Security Update Yes
5087470 Monthly Rollup Yes
5087471 Monthly Rollup Yes
5087541 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · appid.sys (KB5089549)

Integer-truncation heap buffer overflow (CWE-122) in the Windows Application Identity subsystem appid.sys (also srpapi.dll/appidapi.dll) AiConvertFullImagePathToMacroFormat, local EoP. The function rewrites a path prefix with macros (%OSDRIVE%/%REMOVABLE%/%HOT%). It computes the result length as a2->Length + prefix_len - matched_len where all three are USHORT UNICODE_STRING.Length fields; the 32-bit arithmetic result is stored back into a USHORT DestinationString.Length (explicit (unsigned __int16) cast in appid.sys), truncating to 16 bits. The truncated length is passed to AiAlloc as the buffer size, so a buffer far smaller than needed is allocated, while the subsequent memmove/memcpy copy uses the original non-truncated size -> heap/pool overflow (e.g. Length=65000, prefix=1000, matched=10 needs 65990 bytes but allocates 470 -> ~64520-byte overflow). The bug exists in two loops (macro-prefix array and the global ::P linked list). Diff of appid.sys 10.0.26100.8246 -> .8457 (May 12 2026, KB5089549) confirms the fix: gated behind CFR flag Feature_3858697530, a 32-bit intermediate length plus an explicit `> 0xFFFE` bound check are added before storing to the 16-bit field / allocating; over-length aborts with STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG (0xC0000106). Applied to both loops; the global-list error path also frees P[1] only when independently allocated (P[1] != i[6]). Note: our diff shows Feature_3858697530 (build/arch); the >0xFFFE check and 32-bit widening are as described.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.8246 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.8457 Download
Function Address Change Note
AiConvertFullImagePathToMacroFormat code change code (32-bit length + >0xFFFE bound check, CFR-gated) Pre: DestinationString.Length = (USHORT)(a2->Length + prefix_len - matched_len) truncates >0xFFFF lengths; AiAlloc sized to the truncated value while memmove/memcpy use the real size -> overflow. Post (Feature_3858697530): 32-bit intermediate; if 0xfffe < len return 0xC0000106 (STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG) in both the macro-prefix loop and the global-list loop; conditional cleanup of P[1] (only if P[1] != i[6]).
Feature_3858697530 gate added (CFR gate) CFR flag gating the widened length + >0xFFFE bound; original truncating path still ships when disabled.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2026-34343 — Windows AppID appid.sys Integer Truncation in AiConvertFullImagePathToMacroFormat → Heap Overflow


Summary

Product Windows — appid.sys (Application Identity subsystem; also srpapi.dll / appidapi.dll)
CVE ID CVE-2026-34343
Impact Elevation of Privilege
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.8 / 6.8 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow (root cause: 16-bit length truncation)
Delivery Local — a crafted (long) image path converted to macro format
KB / Fixed build KB5089549 — appid.sys 10.0.26100.8457 (Win11 24H2 x64)
Patch Date May 12, 2026 (2026-May)
Pre-patch binary appid.sys 10.0.26100.8246 — SHA256 3fa168fc585376dfd4223579c6cd9c4b6e107be0bc645e78297296ddbac7b06f
Post-patch binary appid.sys 10.0.26100.8457 — SHA256 e0d3b96d2be59e5fe931d543a5e2457b82a50756e7a9224868c7372ad5aaa540
Feature flag Feature_3858697530 — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Product Description

AiConvertFullImagePathToMacroFormat (present in the kernel driver appid.sys and the user-mode srpapi.dll / appidapi.dll) rewrites the prefix of a file path with macro placeholders such as %OSDRIVE%, %REMOVABLE%, %HOT% for AppLocker / Application Identity policy evaluation.


Vulnerability Summary

The converted string length is computed as a2->Length + prefix_len - matched_len. All three operands are USHORT (16-bit) UNICODE_STRING.Length fields. Although C integer promotion performs the arithmetic at 32 bits, the result is stored back into DestinationString.Length — again a USHORT — so it is truncated to the low 16 bits (in appid.sys an explicit (unsigned __int16) cast makes this visible).

That truncated length is then passed to AiAlloc as the buffer size, so a buffer far smaller than required can be allocated, while the following memmove / memcpy copy based on the original (non-truncated) size — a heap/pool overflow. E.g. a2->Length = 65000, prefix_len = 1000, matched_len = 10 needs 65,990 bytes, but truncation to 16 bits allocates only 470 bytes → a ~64,520-byte overflow. The defect exists in two loops: the macro-prefix array loop and the global linked-list (::P) loop.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, low-privileged (PR:L, AV:L, AC:L): drive conversion of a crafted, very long image path (so a2->Length + prefix_len - matched_len exceeds 0xFFFF).
  • The truncated length under-sizes the AiAlloc buffer while the copy uses the real length → kernel-pool / heap overflow.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The length was validated/stored only at 16-bit width, so a genuinely >0xFFFF length wrapped to a small value used for allocation, while the copy used the full length.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .8246 → .8457)

Gated behind Feature_3858697530, the fix introduces a 32-bit intermediate length and adds an explicit > 0xFFFE bound check before the length is stored into the 16-bit field / used for allocation; if exceeded, conversion aborts with STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG (0xC0000106). 0xFFFE is the maximum valid UNICODE_STRING.Length:

// AiConvertFullImagePathToMacroFormat (10.0.26100.8457) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch (from our diff)
if (Feature_3858697530__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsage()) {
    uVar3 = a2->Length + prefix_len - matched_len;     // 32-bit intermediate
    if (0xfffe < uVar3) return 0xc0000106;             // *** STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG ***
    DestinationString.Length = (USHORT)uVar3;
}
// ... and identically in the global-list loop:
if (0xfffe < uVar8) return 0xc0000106;

The check is applied in both the macro-prefix-array loop and the global-list loop, so an over-length value is blocked before it is truncated into the 16-bit Length. The global-list error path also adds conditional cleanup: P[1] is freed only when it was independently allocated (P[1] != i[6]), avoiding list-node corruption.

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_3858697530. The 32-bit-validated bound runs only when the flag is enabled; the original truncating path still ships when disabled. Verify Feature_3858697530 is enabled to confirm the fix is live. (The same function in srpapi.dll / appidapi.dll receives the corresponding user-mode fix.)


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. AppLocker / AppID path-to-macro conversion of unusually long image paths; kernel-pool / heap-corruption crashes in appid!AiConvertFullImagePathToMacroFormat after AiAlloc on unpatched/flag-disabled builds; conversions now returning STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG for over-length paths once the fix is active.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_3858697530 is enabled.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-34343 (Windows Application Identity (AppID) Subsystem Elevation of Privilege), released 2026-05-12, KB5089549.
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/appid_sys-cve-2026-34343-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

A very long image path truncates to a 16-bit length that under-sizes the AiAlloc buffer, overflowed by the full-size copy

Attack path for CVE-2026-34343 A very long image path truncates to a 16-bit length that under-sizes the AiAlloc buffer, overflowed by the full-size copy 01 — ENTRY Local caller drives AppID path-to-macro conversion of a crafted long image path appid.sys AiConvertFullImagePathToMacroFormat rewrites the path prefix with macros for AppLocker/AppID policy. AV:L/PR:L. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Path chosen so a2->Length + prefix_len - matched_len exceeds 0xFFFF e.g. Length=65000, prefix=1000, matched=10 -> 65990 bytes required. 03 — MISSING CHECK The length is stored in a 16-bit USHORT field and truncated (CWE-122 root: truncation) 65990 & 0xFFFF = 470; AiAlloc allocates only 470 bytes while the copy uses the real 65990-byte size. 04 — PRIMITIVE memmove/memcpy overflow the under-sized kernel-pool buffer -> EoP ~64520 bytes are written past the allocation. The May 2026 fix (Feature_3858697530) widens the length to 32 bits and rejects >0xFFFE with STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG in both loops.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments