CVE-2026-33824 — Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Double free in Windows IKE Extension allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5082198 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5082198 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5082123 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5082123 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5082200 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5082200 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5082200 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5082200 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5082200 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5082200 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5082052 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5082052 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5083769 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems | 5083769 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5083769 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems | 5083769 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5083768 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems | 5083768 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 | 5082198 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5082198 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5082123 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5082123 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 | 5082142 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) | 5082142 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) | 5082060 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 | 5082063 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) | 5082063 (Security Update) |
Critical | Remote Code Execution | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5082198 |
Security Update | Yes |
5082123 |
Security Update | Yes |
5082200 |
Security Update | Yes |
5082052 |
Security Update | Yes |
5083769 |
Security Update | Yes |
5083768 |
Security Update | Yes |
5082142 |
Security Update | Yes |
5082060 |
Security Update | Yes |
5082063 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Remote, pre-auth double free (CWE-415) in the Windows IKE Extension service (ikeext.dll), reachable on UDP/500 and UDP/4500 with no authentication. During an IKE_SA_INIT exchange a Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID payload makes IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId allocate a heap blob and store the pointer in the MMSA (Main Mode SA) at offset 0x208. When a fragmented IKE_AUTH message is reassembled, IkeReinjectReassembledPacket copies MMSA fields 0x178-0x21F (including the 0x208 blob pointer) into a stack struct, and IkeQueueRecvRequest shallow-copies it into a heap work item - so work_item+0xC8 ALIASES MMSA+0x208 (the reassembly buffer at 0x10 is deep-copied, but the blob pointer is not). Thread-pool processing calls IkeDestroyPacketContext -> WfpMemFree(work_item+0xC8) = FIRST free; later MMSA teardown (IkeCleanupMMNegotiation -> IkeDerefMMSA -> IkeFreeMMSA) frees MMSA+0x208 = SECOND free of the same allocation. Attacker sends IKE_SA_INIT (with the Security Realm Vendor ID) then >=2 SKF fragment payloads (type 0x35) carrying an invalid IKE_AUTH. Service runs as SYSTEM. IN-HOUSE ghidriff diff of 10.0.26100.7920 -> .8246 confirms the fix: IkeReinjectReassembledPacket now deep-copies the blob via IkeCopyBlob into a local and frees the COPY (not the aliased original), and IkeFreeMMSA/IkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2 gain the same pattern - all GATED behind CFR flag Feature_3844326713, so both the aliasing and deep-copy paths ship in .8246. Credit: WARP & MORSE team at Microsoft; public analysis Richard Chen & Lucas Miller (TrendAI/ZDI).
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
IkeReinjectReassembledPacket |
78% match |
code (deep-copy of Security Realm blob added, CFR-gated) | Pre: blob pointer at param_3[0x12] copied directly into the stack struct (local_50 = param_3[0x12]); only the reassembly buffer (local_108) was freed. Post (Feature_3844326713 enabled): local_50 zeroed, and if param_3[0x12] != 0 the blob is deep-copied via IkeCopyBlob into &uStack_58; at exit, when the feature is on and the queue request succeeded, WfpMemFree(&local_50) frees the COPY. Removes the alias between work_item+0xC8 and MMSA+0x208. |
IkeFreeMMSA |
98% match |
code (feature-gated free of MMSA+0x208) | Updated with the same feature-gate pattern so MMSA+0x208 is only freed when the work item does not own a separate copy, preventing the second free. |
IkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2 |
25% match |
code (same deep-copy pattern for the rekey path) | Adds IkeCopyBlob + WfpMemFree under Feature_3844326713 for the IKEv2 rekey path. |
IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId |
|
source (allocation site) | Allocates the Security Realm blob during IKE_SA_INIT and stores the pointer at MMSA+0x208 - the allocation that ends up double-freed. |
Root Cause Analysis
RCA — CVE-2026-33824 (ikeext.dll double-free)
- Binary:
ikeext.dll(Windows IKE Extension, hosted in svchost as IKEEXT service) - Patch: KB5083769 (April 2026),
10.0.26100.7920→10.0.26100.8246 - Class: CWE-415 double-free | Impact: RCE (SYSTEM) | ITW: no
- Diff:
ghidriff/CVE-2026-33824/output/ikeext-10.0.26100.7920.dll-ikeext-10.0.26100.8246.dll.ghidriff.md
Component
The Windows IKE Extension service (ikeext.dll) implements IKEv1 and IKEv2 key exchange for IPsec VPNs. It listens on UDP/500 (IKE) and UDP/4500 (NAT-T). The bug is in the IKEv2 fragment reassembly path, which is reachable from any remote host that can send UDP packets to these ports — no authentication required.
Root cause
During an IKE_SA_INIT exchange, a Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID payload causes IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId() to allocate a heap blob and store the pointer in the Main Mode Security Association (MMSA) structure at offset 0x208.
When a fragmented IKE_AUTH message arrives, IkeReinjectReassembledPacket() copies a slice of the MMSA — offsets 0x178 through 0x21F — into a local stack struct. This slice includes the blob pointer at 0x208. The struct is then passed to IkeQueueRecvRequest(), which shallow-copies it into a heap-allocated work item. While the reassembly buffer at offset 0x10 is deep-copied, the Security Realm blob pointer at offset 0xC8 remains an alias of MMSA+0x208.
Later, when the thread pool processes the work item:
IkeDestroyPacketContext()frees the blob at work-item offset0xC8viaWfpMemFree→ first free.- When the MMSA is torn down,
IkeCleanupMMNegotiation()→IkeDerefMMSA()→IkeFreeMMSA()frees the blob atMMSA+0x208→ second free (same allocation).
IKE_SA_INIT (Security Realm Vendor ID)
IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId()
WfpMemAlloc(blob) → MMSA+0x208
IKE_AUTH fragments (SKF)
IkeReinjectReassembledPacket()
memcpy(stack_struct, MMSA+0x178, 0xA8) // includes blob ptr at 0x208
IkeQueueRecvRequest(stack_struct)
shallow-copy into heap work-item
// work-item+0xC8 now aliases MMSA+0x208
Thread-pool processes work item
IkeDestroyPacketContext()
WfpMemFree(work_item+0xC8) // FIRST FREE
MMSA cleanup
IkeFreeMMSA()
WfpMemFree(MMSA+0x208) // SECOND FREE (same pointer)
Patch
Microsoft added feature gate Feature_3844326713 that enables a deep-copy of the Security Realm blob instead of aliasing the original pointer.
IkeReinjectReassembledPacket (78% match)
Before: The blob pointer at param_3[0x12] was copied directly into the stack struct (local_50 = param_3[0x12]). After IkeQueueRecvRequest, only the reassembly buffer (local_108) was freed.
After: When the feature is enabled:
local_50is zeroed anduStack_58is masked.- If
param_3[0x12]is non-null,IkeCopyBlob()deep-copies the blob into&uStack_58. - At function exit, if the feature is enabled and the queue request succeeded,
WfpMemFree(&local_50)frees the copy — not the original.
+ if (uVar1 != 0) { // Feature_3844326713 enabled
+ local_50 = 0;
+ uStack_58 = uStack_58 & 0xffffffff00000000;
+ if (param_3[0x12] != 0) {
+ puVar4 = &uStack_58;
+ lVar3 = IkeCopyBlob((uint *)(param_3 + 0x11), (uint *)puVar4, _Size);
+ ...
+ }
+ }
...
+ if ((uVar1 != 0) && (lVar3 != 0)) {
+ WfpMemFree(&local_50); // frees the COPY
+ }
WfpMemFree(&local_108);
IkeFreeMMSA (98% match)
The function was also updated with the feature-gate pattern. The old path freed MMSA+0x208 directly; the new path ensures the field is only freed when the work item does not own a copy.
IkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2 (25% match)
Same pattern: added IkeCopyBlob + WfpMemFree under the feature gate for the rekey path.
Added
Feature_3844326713__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline— feature gate callable fromIkeReinjectReassembledPacket,IkePostAcquire, andIkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2.
Reaching the bug (network recipe)
| Requirement | Detail |
|---|---|
| Network | UDP/500 (IKE) or UDP/4500 (NAT-T) reachable to the target |
| Auth | None — unauthenticated |
| Packet 1 | IKE_SA_INIT request carrying the Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID payload. Vendor ID bytes: 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8 |
| Packet 2+ | IKE_AUTH request split into two or more Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payloads. At UDP payload offset 16: 35 20 23 08 (SKF type 0x35, IKEv2 ver 0x20, IKE_AUTH 0x23, Initiator 0x08). At offset 20: 00 00 00 01 (fragment number 1). |
| Endian | All multi-byte values are big endian |
| NAT-T | On port 4500, IKE packets are prepended with a 4-byte non-ESP marker (\x00\x00\x00\x00), shifting all offsets by +4 |
Call flow
Attacker UDP/500 or UDP/4500
IKE_SA_INIT (Security Realm Vendor ID)
ikeext!IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId
WfpMemAlloc → MMSA+0x208
IKE_AUTH fragments (SKF x2+)
ikeext!IkeInsertFragEntry
ikeext!IkeReinjectReassembledPacket
memcpy(stack_struct, MMSA+0x178, 0xA8) // aliases blob ptr
ikeext!IkeQueueRecvRequest
shallow-copy to heap work-item
Thread pool callback
ikeext!IkeDestroyPacketContext
WfpMemFree(work_item+0xC8) // FIRST FREE
MMSA teardown
ikeext!IkeCleanupMMNegotiation
ikeext!IkeDerefMMSA
ikeext!IkeFreeMMSA
WfpMemFree(MMSA+0x208) // SECOND FREE (double-free)
Detection notes (blue team)
-
Network detection: Monitor UDP/500 and UDP/4500. Correlation rule:
- IKE_SA_INIT from source IP with Vendor ID
68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8(offset 17+:20 22 08for IKEv2 + IKE_SA_INIT + Initiator flag). - Followed by IKE_AUTH SKF fragments from same source with
35 20 23 08at offset 16 and00 00 00 01at offset 20. - On port 4500, add +4 to all offsets for the non-ESP marker.
- IKE_SA_INIT from source IP with Vendor ID
-
Crash signature: Heap corruption or double-free crash in
ikeext!IkeFreeMMSAorikeext!WfpMemFree. The service runs as SYSTEM in svchost, so a crash may manifest as a service restart (Event ID 7034) rather than a full bugcheck. -
Behavioral tell: A remote host sending IKEv2 fragments with SKF payloads to a Windows VPN/gateway role that does not normally expect fragmented IKE_AUTH. Legitimate IKEv2 fragment reassembly is rare in most enterprise environments.
-
ETW:
Microsoft-Windows-IKEEXTprovider may log anomalous fragment reassembly events; correlate with the network signature above.
Attack Path
A Security Realm blob pointer is shallow-copied during IKEv2 fragment reassembly, aliasing the MMSA field and getting freed twice
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
2 public PoCsUnverified third-party code
Public proof-of-concept repositories aggregated from PoC-in-GitHub. They are not reviewed and may be incomplete, non-functional, or malicious — inspect the code before running anything.
| Repository | Stars | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EpSiLoNPoInTOrI/IKEV2-POC | 6 | 2026-05-18 | IKEv2, ikeext.dll, CVE-2026-33824, double free, heap grooming, ROP, SKF fragmentation, Windows exploit, anti-debug, obfuscation, API hooking, shellcode, reverse shell |
| kaleth4/CVE-2026-33824 | 1 | 2026-04-21 |
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
WARP & MORSE team at Microsoft