Critical CVSS 9.8 EPSS 0.5585 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-04 archive

Executive Summary

Double free in Windows IKE Extension allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.

Overview

9.8
CVSS CRITICAL
Critical
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Remote Code Execution
Released Apr 14 2026
Last Updated Apr 14 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Listed (added 2026-08-18)
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.5585 — 0.98954 percentile
NVD CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Network
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
None
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 8.5

EPSS Score

0.5585
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.98954 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

27 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5082198 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5082198 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5082123 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5082123 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5082052 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5082052 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems 5083768 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems 5083768 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2016 5082198 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5082198 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2019 5082123 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5082123 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2022 5082142 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5082142 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5082060 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2025 5082063 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5082063 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes

Patches

9 patches
Article Type Restart
5082198 Security Update Yes
5082123 Security Update Yes
5082200 Security Update Yes
5082052 Security Update Yes
5083769 Security Update Yes
5083768 Security Update Yes
5082142 Security Update Yes
5082060 Security Update Yes
5082063 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · ikeext.dll (KB5083769)

Remote, pre-auth double free (CWE-415) in the Windows IKE Extension service (ikeext.dll), reachable on UDP/500 and UDP/4500 with no authentication. During an IKE_SA_INIT exchange a Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID payload makes IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId allocate a heap blob and store the pointer in the MMSA (Main Mode SA) at offset 0x208. When a fragmented IKE_AUTH message is reassembled, IkeReinjectReassembledPacket copies MMSA fields 0x178-0x21F (including the 0x208 blob pointer) into a stack struct, and IkeQueueRecvRequest shallow-copies it into a heap work item - so work_item+0xC8 ALIASES MMSA+0x208 (the reassembly buffer at 0x10 is deep-copied, but the blob pointer is not). Thread-pool processing calls IkeDestroyPacketContext -> WfpMemFree(work_item+0xC8) = FIRST free; later MMSA teardown (IkeCleanupMMNegotiation -> IkeDerefMMSA -> IkeFreeMMSA) frees MMSA+0x208 = SECOND free of the same allocation. Attacker sends IKE_SA_INIT (with the Security Realm Vendor ID) then >=2 SKF fragment payloads (type 0x35) carrying an invalid IKE_AUTH. Service runs as SYSTEM. IN-HOUSE ghidriff diff of 10.0.26100.7920 -> .8246 confirms the fix: IkeReinjectReassembledPacket now deep-copies the blob via IkeCopyBlob into a local and frees the COPY (not the aliased original), and IkeFreeMMSA/IkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2 gain the same pattern - all GATED behind CFR flag Feature_3844326713, so both the aliasing and deep-copy paths ship in .8246. Credit: WARP & MORSE team at Microsoft; public analysis Richard Chen & Lucas Miller (TrendAI/ZDI).

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7920 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.8246 Download
Function Address Change Note
IkeReinjectReassembledPacket 78% match code (deep-copy of Security Realm blob added, CFR-gated) Pre: blob pointer at param_3[0x12] copied directly into the stack struct (local_50 = param_3[0x12]); only the reassembly buffer (local_108) was freed. Post (Feature_3844326713 enabled): local_50 zeroed, and if param_3[0x12] != 0 the blob is deep-copied via IkeCopyBlob into &uStack_58; at exit, when the feature is on and the queue request succeeded, WfpMemFree(&local_50) frees the COPY. Removes the alias between work_item+0xC8 and MMSA+0x208.
IkeFreeMMSA 98% match code (feature-gated free of MMSA+0x208) Updated with the same feature-gate pattern so MMSA+0x208 is only freed when the work item does not own a separate copy, preventing the second free.
IkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2 25% match code (same deep-copy pattern for the rekey path) Adds IkeCopyBlob + WfpMemFree under Feature_3844326713 for the IKEv2 rekey path.
IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId source (allocation site) Allocates the Security Realm blob during IKE_SA_INIT and stores the pointer at MMSA+0x208 - the allocation that ends up double-freed.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

RCA — CVE-2026-33824 (ikeext.dll double-free)

  • Binary: ikeext.dll (Windows IKE Extension, hosted in svchost as IKEEXT service)
  • Patch: KB5083769 (April 2026), 10.0.26100.7920 → 10.0.26100.8246
  • Class: CWE-415 double-free | Impact: RCE (SYSTEM) | ITW: no
  • Diff: ghidriff/CVE-2026-33824/output/ikeext-10.0.26100.7920.dll-ikeext-10.0.26100.8246.dll.ghidriff.md

Component

The Windows IKE Extension service (ikeext.dll) implements IKEv1 and IKEv2 key exchange for IPsec VPNs. It listens on UDP/500 (IKE) and UDP/4500 (NAT-T). The bug is in the IKEv2 fragment reassembly path, which is reachable from any remote host that can send UDP packets to these ports — no authentication required.

Root cause

During an IKE_SA_INIT exchange, a Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID payload causes IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId() to allocate a heap blob and store the pointer in the Main Mode Security Association (MMSA) structure at offset 0x208.

When a fragmented IKE_AUTH message arrives, IkeReinjectReassembledPacket() copies a slice of the MMSA — offsets 0x178 through 0x21F — into a local stack struct. This slice includes the blob pointer at 0x208. The struct is then passed to IkeQueueRecvRequest(), which shallow-copies it into a heap-allocated work item. While the reassembly buffer at offset 0x10 is deep-copied, the Security Realm blob pointer at offset 0xC8 remains an alias of MMSA+0x208.

Later, when the thread pool processes the work item:

  1. IkeDestroyPacketContext() frees the blob at work-item offset 0xC8 via WfpMemFree → first free.
  2. When the MMSA is torn down, IkeCleanupMMNegotiation() → IkeDerefMMSA() → IkeFreeMMSA() frees the blob at MMSA+0x208 → second free (same allocation).
IKE_SA_INIT (Security Realm Vendor ID)
  IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId()
    WfpMemAlloc(blob) → MMSA+0x208

IKE_AUTH fragments (SKF)
  IkeReinjectReassembledPacket()
    memcpy(stack_struct, MMSA+0x178, 0xA8)   // includes blob ptr at 0x208
    IkeQueueRecvRequest(stack_struct)
      shallow-copy into heap work-item
      // work-item+0xC8 now aliases MMSA+0x208

Thread-pool processes work item
  IkeDestroyPacketContext()
    WfpMemFree(work_item+0xC8)   // FIRST FREE

MMSA cleanup
  IkeFreeMMSA()
    WfpMemFree(MMSA+0x208)       // SECOND FREE (same pointer)

Patch

Microsoft added feature gate Feature_3844326713 that enables a deep-copy of the Security Realm blob instead of aliasing the original pointer.

IkeReinjectReassembledPacket (78% match)

Before: The blob pointer at param_3[0x12] was copied directly into the stack struct (local_50 = param_3[0x12]). After IkeQueueRecvRequest, only the reassembly buffer (local_108) was freed.

After: When the feature is enabled:

  1. local_50 is zeroed and uStack_58 is masked.
  2. If param_3[0x12] is non-null, IkeCopyBlob() deep-copies the blob into &uStack_58.
  3. At function exit, if the feature is enabled and the queue request succeeded, WfpMemFree(&local_50) frees the copy — not the original.
+    if (uVar1 != 0) {          // Feature_3844326713 enabled
+      local_50 = 0;
+      uStack_58 = uStack_58 & 0xffffffff00000000;
+      if (param_3[0x12] != 0) {
+        puVar4 = &uStack_58;
+        lVar3 = IkeCopyBlob((uint *)(param_3 + 0x11), (uint *)puVar4, _Size);
+        ...
+      }
+    }
     ...
+  if ((uVar1 != 0) && (lVar3 != 0)) {
+    WfpMemFree(&local_50);     // frees the COPY
+  }
   WfpMemFree(&local_108);

IkeFreeMMSA (98% match)

The function was also updated with the feature-gate pattern. The old path freed MMSA+0x208 directly; the new path ensures the field is only freed when the work item does not own a copy.

IkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2 (25% match)

Same pattern: added IkeCopyBlob + WfpMemFree under the feature gate for the rekey path.

Added

  • Feature_3844326713__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline — feature gate callable from IkeReinjectReassembledPacket, IkePostAcquire, and IkeBeginLifeExpireInplaceRekeyIkeV2.

Reaching the bug (network recipe)

Requirement Detail
Network UDP/500 (IKE) or UDP/4500 (NAT-T) reachable to the target
Auth None — unauthenticated
Packet 1 IKE_SA_INIT request carrying the Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID payload. Vendor ID bytes: 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8
Packet 2+ IKE_AUTH request split into two or more Encrypted Fragment (SKF) payloads. At UDP payload offset 16: 35 20 23 08 (SKF type 0x35, IKEv2 ver 0x20, IKE_AUTH 0x23, Initiator 0x08). At offset 20: 00 00 00 01 (fragment number 1).
Endian All multi-byte values are big endian
NAT-T On port 4500, IKE packets are prepended with a 4-byte non-ESP marker (\x00\x00\x00\x00), shifting all offsets by +4

Call flow

Attacker UDP/500 or UDP/4500
  IKE_SA_INIT (Security Realm Vendor ID)
    ikeext!IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId
      WfpMemAlloc → MMSA+0x208

  IKE_AUTH fragments (SKF x2+)
    ikeext!IkeInsertFragEntry
    ikeext!IkeReinjectReassembledPacket
      memcpy(stack_struct, MMSA+0x178, 0xA8)  // aliases blob ptr
      ikeext!IkeQueueRecvRequest
        shallow-copy to heap work-item

  Thread pool callback
    ikeext!IkeDestroyPacketContext
      WfpMemFree(work_item+0xC8)   // FIRST FREE

  MMSA teardown
    ikeext!IkeCleanupMMNegotiation
      ikeext!IkeDerefMMSA
        ikeext!IkeFreeMMSA
          WfpMemFree(MMSA+0x208)   // SECOND FREE (double-free)

Detection notes (blue team)

  • Network detection: Monitor UDP/500 and UDP/4500. Correlation rule:

    1. IKE_SA_INIT from source IP with Vendor ID 68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8 (offset 17+: 20 22 08 for IKEv2 + IKE_SA_INIT + Initiator flag).
    2. Followed by IKE_AUTH SKF fragments from same source with 35 20 23 08 at offset 16 and 00 00 00 01 at offset 20.
    3. On port 4500, add +4 to all offsets for the non-ESP marker.
  • Crash signature: Heap corruption or double-free crash in ikeext!IkeFreeMMSA or ikeext!WfpMemFree. The service runs as SYSTEM in svchost, so a crash may manifest as a service restart (Event ID 7034) rather than a full bugcheck.

  • Behavioral tell: A remote host sending IKEv2 fragments with SKF payloads to a Windows VPN/gateway role that does not normally expect fragmented IKE_AUTH. Legitimate IKEv2 fragment reassembly is rare in most enterprise environments.

  • ETW: Microsoft-Windows-IKEEXT provider may log anomalous fragment reassembly events; correlate with the network signature above.

Attack Path

A Security Realm blob pointer is shallow-copied during IKEv2 fragment reassembly, aliasing the MMSA field and getting freed twice

Attack path for CVE-2026-33824 A Security Realm blob pointer is shallow-copied during IKEv2 fragment reassembly, aliasing the MMSA field and getting freed twice 01 — ENTRY Remote unauthenticated attacker sends IKE_SA_INIT to UDP/500 or UDP/4500 ikeext.dll (IKEEXT service, SYSTEM) listens pre-auth on 500/4500. The IKE_SA_INIT carries a Microsoft Security Realm Vendor ID payload (68 6a 8c bd fe 63 4b 40 51 46 fb 2b af 33 e9 e8). 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Vendor ID makes IkeHandleSecurityRealmVendorId allocate a blob at MMSA+0x208 A heap blob is allocated and its pointer stored in the Main Mode Security Association structure at offset 0x208. 03 — PATH Attacker sends >=2 SKF fragments (type 0x35) with an invalid IKE_AUTH; reassembly shallow-copies the blob pointer IkeReinjectReassembledPacket copies MMSA+0x178..0x21F (including the 0x208 blob ptr) into a stack struct; IkeQueueRecvRequest shallow-copies it into a heap work item, so work_item+0xC8 aliases MMSA+0x208. The reassembly buffer at 0x10 is deep-copied; the blob pointer is not. 04 — MISSING CHECK Two owners of one allocation: work_item+0xC8 and MMSA+0x208 alias The blob pointer now has two independent owners that will each free it. Nothing tracks that the work item's copy aliases the MMSA field. 05 — PRIMITIVE Double free (WfpMemFree twice) in the SYSTEM IKEEXT service -> RCE/DoS Thread-pool processing: IkeDestroyPacketContext -> WfpMemFree(work_item+0xC8) = first free. MMSA teardown: IkeCleanupMMNegotiation -> IkeDerefMMSA -> IkeFreeMMSA -> WfpMemFree(MMSA+0x208) = second free. Double free of the same allocation -> service crash or, under heap grooming, code execution as SYSTEM. The April fix deep-copies the blob (IkeCopyBlob) so the copy is freed instead of the aliased original - gated behind CFR flag Feature_3844326713.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

2 public PoCs
RepositoryStarsPublishedDescription
EpSiLoNPoInTOrI/IKEV2-POC 6 2026-05-18 IKEv2, ikeext.dll, CVE-2026-33824, double free, heap grooming, ROP, SKF fragmentation, Windows exploit, anti-debug, obfuscation, API hooking, shellcode, reverse shell
kaleth4/CVE-2026-33824 1 2026-04-21

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

WARP & MORSE team at Microsoft