Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.00307 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-04 archive

Executive Summary

Use after free in Windows Container Isolation FS Filter Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Exploitation Unlikely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Apr 14 2026
Last Updated Apr 14 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00307 — 0.23209 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00307
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.23209 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

27 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5082198 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5082198 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5082123 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5082123 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5082200 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5082052 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5082052 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5083769 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems 5083768 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems 5083768 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5082198 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5082198 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5082123 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5082123 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5082142 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5082142 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5082060 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5082063 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5082063 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

9 patches
Article Type Restart
5082198 Security Update Yes
5082123 Security Update Yes
5082200 Security Update Yes
5082052 Security Update Yes
5083769 Security Update Yes
5083768 Security Update Yes
5082142 Security Update Yes
5082060 Security Update Yes
5082063 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · wcifs.sys (KB5083769)

Reference-count underflow use-after-free (CWE-416) via cleanup asymmetry in the Windows Container Isolation FS minifilter wcifs.sys WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem. The function allocates a work item (FltAllocateGenericWorkItem), then ObfReferenceObject(target) +1, then FltQueueGenericWorkItem. Two failure paths shared ONE cleanup block (LABEL_10/LABEL_14) that unconditionally ObfDereferenceObject'd: on queue-insert failure the ref was already taken (symmetric), but on ALLOCATION failure the goto reaches the same cleanup before ObfReferenceObject ran -> a dereference with no matching reference, so the object's refcount ends 1 lower than actual. A container doing heavy file I/O can exhaust NonPagedPoolNx to make the allocation fail repeatedly, decrementing until the count hits 0 while other paths still hold pointers -> object freed -> kernel UAF -> EoP. Diff of wcifs.sys 10.0.26100.7920 -> .8246 (Apr 14 2026, KB5083769) confirms the fix: gated behind CFR flag Feature_1773654331, a boolean flag (init false) is set true only immediately after ObfReferenceObject, and the shared-cleanup ObfDereferenceObject is guarded by `!feature || flag` so it runs only when a ref was actually taken; control flow restructured from goto-merge to if/else with early return on success. Note: our diff shows Feature_1773654331, differing from the circulated screenshots' Feature_2042089787 (build/arch difference); the ref-tracking-flag guard is identical.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7920 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.8246 Download
Function Address Change Note
WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem code change code (ref-tracking flag guards shared-cleanup deref, CFR-gated) Pre: alloc-fail -> goto shared cleanup -> unconditional ObfDereferenceObject with no matching ObfReferenceObject -> refcount underflow. Post (Feature_1773654331 enabled): bVar13=false initially, set true right after ObfReferenceObject; cleanup does ObfDereferenceObject only if `!feature || bVar13`; goto-merge restructured to if/else + early return on success.
Feature_1773654331 gate added (CFR gate) CFR flag gating the guarded dereference; the original unconditional deref still ships when disabled.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2026-33098 — Windows Container Isolation FS wcifs.sys Reference-Count Underflow in WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem → Use-After-Free


Summary

Product Windows — wcifs.sys (Windows Container Isolation File System minifilter)
CVE ID CVE-2026-33098
Impact Elevation of Privilege
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.8 / 6.8 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-416: Use After Free (reference-count underflow via cleanup asymmetry)
Delivery Local — force allocation failures under memory pressure to underflow a refcount
KB / Fixed build KB5083769 — wcifs.sys 10.0.26100.8246 (Win11 24H2 x64)
Patch Date April 14, 2026 (2026-Apr)
Pre-patch binary wcifs.sys 10.0.26100.7920 — SHA256 586e4753c651381ee945a92c3b7b3ce044515f2b19daabfdad6c827f8eadcb5e
Post-patch binary wcifs.sys 10.0.26100.8246 — SHA256 b17e6ee478e8614fb7dca82410f88b7d97e9acaa1ea059cc4a3aaa370206a19a
Feature flag Feature_1773654331 — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Product Description

wcifs.sys is the Windows Container Isolation file-system minifilter (used by containers / app isolation). WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem asynchronously enqueues “expansion” work items: it allocates a work item, takes a reference on the target object, and queues the work.


Vulnerability Summary

WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem has two failure points that shared one cleanup block (LABEL_10/LABEL_14), which unconditionally called ObfDereferenceObject:

  1. FltAllocateGenericWorkItem — if this allocation fails, the code gotos the shared cleanup before ObfReferenceObject was ever called.
  2. FltQueueGenericWorkItem — if the queue insert fails, ObfReferenceObject has already run, so the cleanup dereference is correctly symmetric.
// WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem (10.0.26100.7920) — PRE-PATCH, from our diff
GenericWorkItem = FltAllocateGenericWorkItem();
if (!GenericWorkItem) { v4 = 0xC000009A; goto LABEL_10; }   // *** alloc fail: no ref taken yet ***
ObfReferenceObject(Object);                                 // ref +1 (only reached on alloc success)
v4 = FltQueueGenericWorkItem(...);
if (v4 < 0) FltFreeGenericWorkItem(GenericWorkItem);
LABEL_10:
LABEL_14:
    _InterlockedDecrement((int *)(a3 + 32));
    ObfDereferenceObject(Object);                           // *** unconditional deref ***

On the allocation-failure path the object is dereferenced without a matching reference having been taken, so its refcount ends up one lower than it should be. In a container doing heavy file I/O, an attacker can deliberately exhaust NonPagedPoolNx to make the allocation fail repeatedly; each failure drops the count by one until it reaches 0 while other paths still hold pointers, freeing the object. Subsequent use through those pointers is a kernel use-after-free (CWE-416) → EoP.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, low-privileged (PR:L, AV:L, AC:L), typically inside a container / isolation context that reaches the expansion path.
  • Drive memory pressure on NonPagedPoolNx so FltAllocateGenericWorkItem fails repeatedly; each failure underflows the target object’s refcount by one.
  • Once the count hits zero with live pointers outstanding → free → UAF.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

Two error paths with different resource-acquisition states (reference taken vs not) merged into one cleanup block via goto, so the shared unconditional ObfDereferenceObject over-releases on the allocation-failure path — a cleanup-asymmetry reference-count underflow.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .7920 → .8246)

Gated behind Feature_1773654331, the fix introduces a boolean flag (init false) that is set true only immediately after ObfReferenceObject, and the shared-cleanup ObfDereferenceObject is now guarded so it only runs when a reference was actually taken:

// WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem (10.0.26100.8246) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch
bVar13 = false;                                             // ref-taken flag (reference's v6)
...
ObfReferenceObject(Object);
uVar11 = Feature_1773654331__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsage();
bVar13 = (int)uVar11 != 0;                                  // *** set true only after the ref ***
...
LABEL_14:
    _InterlockedDecrement((int *)(a3 + 32));
    if (!Feature_1773654331__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsage() || bVar13)   // *** deref only if ref taken ***
        ObfDereferenceObject(Object);

So on allocation failure (bVar13 == false) the dereference is skipped, keeping the refcount balanced. The control flow was also restructured from the goto-merge into an if/else with an early return on success, so the same asymmetry cannot easily recur. Our diff of wcifs.sys 10.0.26100.7920 → .8246 confirms WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem is the changed function with the added Feature_1773654331-gated flag/guard.

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_1773654331. The guarded dereference runs only when the flag is enabled; the original unconditional deref still ships when disabled. Verify Feature_1773654331 is enabled to confirm the fix is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. Container/isolation workloads driving NonPagedPoolNx exhaustion during file expansion; refcount-underflow / UAF bugchecks in wcifs!WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem and the target object teardown on unpatched/flag-disabled builds.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_1773654331 is enabled.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-33098 (Windows Container Isolation FS Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege), released 2026-04-14, KB5083769.
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/wcifs_sys-cve-2026-33098-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

An allocation-failure path dereferences a wcifs object it never referenced, underflowing the refcount to a free-while-in-use

Attack path for CVE-2026-33098 An allocation-failure path dereferences a wcifs object it never referenced, underflowing the refcount to a free-while-in-use 01 — ENTRY Local low-priv process in a container drives WcScheduleExpansionWorkItem (heavy file I/O) wcifs.sys queues expansion work items: FltAllocateGenericWorkItem, then ObfReferenceObject(target), then FltQueueGenericWorkItem. AV:L/PR:L/AC:L. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Exhaust NonPagedPoolNx so FltAllocateGenericWorkItem fails repeatedly Under memory pressure the allocation fails; the code goto's the shared cleanup before ObfReferenceObject is called. 03 — PATH The shared cleanup block unconditionally calls ObfDereferenceObject On the alloc-failure path no reference was taken, but the same cleanup (LABEL_10/LABEL_14) still decrements - an over-release. 04 — MISSING CHECK Cleanup asymmetry: deref without a matching ref -> refcount underflow (CWE-416) Each allocation failure leaves the object's refcount one lower than actual; repeated failures drive it toward 0. 05 — PRIMITIVE Refcount reaches 0 with live pointers -> object freed -> kernel UAF -> EoP Other paths still hold pointers to the prematurely freed object and use it. The Apr 2026 fix (Feature_1773654331) tracks whether the ref was taken and dereferences only then.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Anonymous