CVE-2026-25188 — Windows Telephony Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Telephony Service allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5078938 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5078938 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5078883 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5078883 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8037 10.0.26100.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8037 10.0.26100.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8037 10.0.26200.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8037 10.0.26200.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5079466 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems | 5079466 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 | 5078775 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) | 5078775 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 | 5078774 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) | 5078774 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 | 5078938 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5078938 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 5078766 (Security Update) 5078737 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5075906 5075943 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4893 10.0.20348.4830 Yes No None Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5078766 (Security Update) 5078737 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5075906 5075943 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4893 10.0.20348.4830 Yes No None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) | 5078734 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5078938 |
Security Update | Yes |
5078752 |
Security Update | Yes |
5078885 |
Security Update | Yes |
5078883 |
Security Update | Yes |
5079466 |
Security Update | Yes |
5078775 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5078774 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5078734 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) in the Windows Telephony Service (tapisrv.dll) LForward, the server-side handler for lineForward. LForward parses a client-supplied LINEFORWARDLIST (header + array of LINEFORWARD entries, each with variable-length caller/callee address blobs referenced by offset/size). It allocates a heap buffer of 2 x dwTotalSize (the client-declared list size) and copies the list in, widening embedded ANSI address strings to Unicode. Each entry's caller/callee block is validated INDIVIDUALLY with IsBadSizeOffset, but the CUMULATIVE size of all entries' variable-length address data is never checked against the allocation. A crafted list whose entries each pass the per-entry check but whose aggregate (or ANSI->Unicode-widened, or overlapping/aliased-offset) address data exceeds 2 x dwTotalSize overflows the tapisrv service heap (ghTapisrvHeap) with attacker-controlled bytes - a local EoP. IN-HOUSE ghidriff diff of 10.0.26100.7623 -> .8036 shows LForward is the only function with a real code change; the March fix adds an integer-overflow-checked cumulative size accumulator validated against dwTotalSize, GATED behind CFR flag Feature_3967746362 - with the flag off the patched binary still runs the per-entry-only validation and remains overflowable. Credit: h4urek.
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
LForward |
18000a750 -> 18000a790 |
code (cumulative size validation added, CFR-gated) | Pre-patch validates each LINEFORWARD entry's caller/callee address block individually via IsBadSizeOffset but never sums them; allocation is HeapAlloc(ghTapisrvHeap,8,dwTotalSize*2). Post-patch adds Feature_3967746362__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline() checks at 3 sites that accumulate each entry's CallerSize/CalleeSize into a running total (local_c4) with 32-bit add-overflow checks and reject when the total exceeds dwTotalSize (handles the aliased caller==callee case specially). Length 1502 -> 1656; match ratio 0.25/b_ratio 0.37. The cumulative check runs only when the flag is enabled. |
Feature_3967746362__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline |
18000699c (new) |
added (CFR flag accessor) | New Controlled Feature Rollout flag accessor introduced by this patch and called only from LForward. Gates the cumulative-size bounds check. |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2026-25188 — Windows Telephony Service tapisrv.dll Heap Overflow in LForward via Unvalidated Cumulative Size of a LINEFORWARDLIST
Summary
| Product | Microsoft Windows — tapisrv.dll (Telephony / TAPI Service) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-25188 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CWE | CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow |
| Patch Date | March 10, 2026 |
| Pre-patch binary | tapisrv.dll 10.0.26100.7623 (KB5074105, Jan 2026) — SHA256 3eda9356b2b1dbc9af6b3ea719536e05ba4011f82bbc12aff0cbb0a37b0efeb2 |
| Post-patch binary | tapisrv.dll 10.0.26100.8036 (KB5079473, Mar 2026) — SHA256 2f6946261b077051b3626b946a94e64b80b7360eef015cbd454b5f2d656bf1ec |
| Feature flag | Feature_3967746362 — the fix is CFR-gated |
Product Description
The Telephony Service (tapisrv.dll, hosted in a svchost.exe) implements the
server side of the classic TAPI 2.x API. Client processes call functions such as
lineForward through tapi32.dll, which marshals the request over the TAPI
RPC/ALPC surface to tapisrv. Because the service runs with high privilege and
the request buffers are fully controlled by the (potentially low-privileged)
client, TAPI request handlers are a long-standing local elevation-of-privilege
surface — tapisrv.dll has produced a run of EoP bugs including CVE-2024-26230,
CVE-2024-43626 and CVE-2026-42912.
LForward is the server-side handler for lineForward. It parses a client
LINEFORWARDLIST — a header followed by an array of LINEFORWARD entries, each
carrying variable-length caller-address and callee-address blobs referenced by
offset/size pairs into the same buffer.
Vulnerability Summary
LForward allocated a heap buffer sized at 2 × dwTotalSize (the total size the
client declares in the list header) and copied the list into it, widening the
embedded ANSI address strings to Unicode. Each entry’s caller/callee address
block was bounds-checked individually with IsBadSizeOffset, but the
cumulative size of all entries’ variable-length address data was never
checked against the allocation.
// LForward (tapisrv.dll 10.0.26100.7623) — PRE-PATCH, from our ghidriff diff
required = header + (nEntries-1)*stride; // local_94 = uVar12 + uVar6
if ((uVar6 <= required) && (required <= dwTotalSize)) { // fixed part fits the header claim
for (i = 0; i < nEntries; i++) { // per-entry checks only
if (bad dwForwardMode) goto error;
if (IsBadSizeOffset(dwTotalSize, required, entry->CallerOff, entry->CallerSize)) goto error;
if (IsBadSizeOffset(dwTotalSize, required, entry->CalleeOff, entry->CalleeSize)) goto error;
entry = (uint*)((char*)entry + stride);
}
if (param_2[0xb] != 0xffffffff && nEntries != 0) {
if ((ulonglong)dwTotalSize * 2 > 0xffffffff) goto error;
_Dst = HeapAlloc(ghTapisrvHeap, 8, dwTotalSize * 2); // *** 2 x dwTotalSize ***
...
memcpy(_Dst, list, (nEntries-1)*stride + header);
*_Dst = *_Dst * 2; // records the doubled size
// NewToOld / OldToNew widening then writes each entry's address strings
// (MultiByteToWideChar) into _Dst — total expanded bytes can exceed 2*dwTotalSize
}
}
IsBadSizeOffset only proves that a single entry’s offset + size lands
inside dwTotalSize. Nothing sums the caller/callee address bytes across all
entries. A LINEFORWARDLIST whose individual entries each pass the per-entry
check, but whose aggregate variable-length address data — especially when the
ANSI→Unicode widening doubles it — exceeds the 2 × dwTotalSize heap
allocation, overflows the buffer with client-controlled bytes. Overlapping /
aliased caller and callee offsets (the same bytes counted for multiple entries)
are the natural way to make the declared dwTotalSize small while the expanded
output is large.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local authenticated session — any process that can open the TAPI client
interface and issue
lineForward. No administrative rights. - No user interaction, no special hardware.
- The corrupted allocation is in the
tapisrvservice heap (ghTapisrvHeap), in the high-privileged service process — a heap overflow there is the EoP primitive. - The overflow contents are attacker-controlled (the widened address strings), so this is a controlled overflow suitable for grooming, not a blind smash.
Vulnerability Details
Call Chain
Low-privileged client:
tapi32!lineForward -> TAPI RPC/ALPC -> tapisrv
|
Telephony service (tapisrv.dll):
<request dispatch>
-> LForward [*** heap overflow ***]
LineProlog / ValidateCallParams (parse + per-entry IsBadSizeOffset)
HeapAlloc(ghTapisrvHeap, 8, dwTotalSize*2)
memcpy + NewToOldLineforwardlist / OldToNewLineforwardlist (ANSI->Unicode widen)
Root Cause
Two facts combine:
- The allocation is sized from the client’s declared
dwTotalSize(2 × dwTotalSize), not from the actual sum of the entries’ variable-length address data. - Validation is per-entry, never cumulative.
IsBadSizeOffsetbounds each caller/callee block on its own; the running total of all blocks — which is what actually gets written during the widening copy — is never compared against the allocation. Overlapping offsets let the declared size stay small while the written size grows.
The patch
The March build inserts a cumulative, integer-overflow-checked size
accumulator into the per-entry loop and validates it against dwTotalSize
before the copy:
// LForward (10.0.26100.8036) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch
if (Feature_3967746362__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline()) {
// aliased caller==callee case: advance dwTotalSize by the shared block once
if (((entry->CalleeOff == entry->CallerOff) && (entry->CalleeSize == entry->CallerSize) &&
(t = entry->CalleeSize + dwTotalSize, wrapped = t < dwTotalSize, dwTotalSize = t, wrapped))
|| (t = entry->CallerSize + acc, t < acc)) goto error; // add-overflow check
acc = entry->CalleeSize + t; // running required size
if ((acc < t) || (dwTotalSize < acc)) goto error; // stays within the buffer
}
The accumulator acc (local_c4) is seeded with the fixed-part size and grows
by each entry’s caller and callee address sizes, with every addition checked for
32-bit wraparound and the total checked against dwTotalSize on each iteration.
A list whose aggregate address data would overrun the allocation is now rejected
before HeapAlloc/memcpy.
Patch Completeness Assessment
The fix is gated behind a Controlled Feature Rollout flag. LForward in
10.0.26100.8036 calls Feature_3967746362__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline()
at three points, and the cumulative bounds check runs only when the flag
returns non-zero. With the flag disabled, the patched binary executes the
original per-entry-only validation and remains overflowable. Patch state cannot
be inferred from file version alone — the corrected path is live only where the
CFR flag is enabled.
This is consistent with the pattern across this corpus: the CLFS 2025–2026 fixes,
the August 2026 CVEs, and even the CVE-2024-38077 (lserver.dll) pre-auth RCE
all ship their memory-safety fix behind a feature flag while the vulnerable code
path remains compiled in.
Detection Guidance
Crash signature. Heap-corruption bugchecks or svchost.exe (TapiSrv host)
crashes with the faulting allocation in ghTapisrvHeap, stack through
tapisrv!LForward → NewToOldLineforwardlist / OldToNewLineforwardlist /
memcpy. Enabling pageheap on the TapiSrv svchost makes the overrun land on a
guard page at LForward.
Behavioural. Non-telephony processes opening the TAPI client interface and
issuing lineForward with a LINEFORWARDLIST carrying many entries and/or
entries whose caller/callee address offsets overlap or point at the same bytes —
a legitimate forwarding list has a small entry count and non-overlapping blobs.
Config note. Because the fix is CFR-gated, confirming Feature_3967746362 is
enabled is the only way to verify the corrected path is live; file version alone
is insufficient.
Related tapisrv.dll CVEs
LForward and its neighbours in tapisrv.dll are a recurring EoP surface:
- CVE-2024-26230 — Telephony Service EoP (use-after-free)
- CVE-2024-43626 — Telephony Service EoP
- CVE-2026-42912 — Telephony Service EoP
CVE-2026-25188 adds a cumulative-size validation defect to that history, in the
same lineForward handling path.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-25188 (Windows Telephony Service, Elevation of Privilege)
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/tapisrv_dll-cve-2026-25188-ghidriff.md
Attack Path
Per-entry-only validation lets a LINEFORWARDLIST's aggregate address data overflow a 2 x dwTotalSize heap buffer in the Telephony service
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.