Executive Summary

External control of file name or path in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Mar 10 2026
Last Updated Mar 10 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00325 — 0.252 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

Verified Attribution

Report-backed
Verified binaryprjflt.sys
FunctionPrjfSetupVolumeInformationHandler
SourceBug-hunter LPE writeup (shared collection)
NoteReached via FltGetVolumeFromName / port-connect volume-info setup.

Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00325
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.252 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

15 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5078752 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5078752 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5078885 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5078885 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5078885 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5078885 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5078885 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5078885 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5078883 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5078883 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8037 10.0.26100.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8037 10.0.26100.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8037 10.0.26200.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8037 10.0.26200.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems 5079466 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems 5079466 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5078752 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5078752 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5078766 (Security Update) 5078737 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5075906 5075943 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4893 10.0.20348.4830 Yes No None Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5078766 (Security Update) 5078737 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5075906 5075943 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4893 10.0.20348.4830 Yes No None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5078734 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

5 patches
Article Type Restart
5078752 Security Update Yes
5078885 Security Update Yes
5078883 Security Update Yes
5079466 Security Update Yes
5078734 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · prjflt.sys (KB5079473)

External control of file name/path (CWE-73) in the Windows Projected File System minifilter prjflt.sys PrjfPortConnect volume-name handling, local EoP. A client connecting to the ProjFS communication port supplies a _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT { GUID virtualizationInstanceID; UINT Version; USHORT VolumeLength; WCHAR szVolume[256]; }. PrjfPortConnect builds usVolumeName from szVolume/VolumeLength (fully user-controlled) and passes it to PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName -> FltGetVolumeFromName, which ultimately calls ZwCreateFile with ObjectName = usVolumeName. PRE: the name is not restricted to a legitimate volume device path, so a low-privileged user can supply an arbitrary object path (e.g. L"\Device\SrvAdmin") and cause prjflt to open a privileged device it could not otherwise open - its IRP_MJ_CREATE routine (e.g. SrvNetCreate) then runs. Diff of prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.7920 -> .8036 (Mar 10 2026, KB5079473) confirms the fix: gated behind CFR flag Feature_78846265, PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName now calls a new helper PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath(name, ...) to validate that the supplied name is a proper global volume path before FltGetVolumeFromName / FltGetVolumeInstanceFromName, rejecting arbitrary device paths.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7920 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.8036 Download
Function Address Change Note
PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName code change code (volume-name now validated as a global volume path, CFR-gated) Pre: FltGetVolumeFromName(Globals, param_1 /*user szVolume*/, ...) then FltGetVolumeInstanceFromName - no restriction to volume devices. Post (Feature_78846265): calls PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath(param_1, local_b0, param_3) to validate the name is a global volume path before resolving it.
PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath new function added New validator that confirms the user-supplied volume name is a legitimate global volume path, preventing arbitrary device/object paths from reaching ZwCreateFile.
Feature_78846265 gate added (CFR gate) CFR flag gating the volume-name validation; the original unrestricted path still ships when disabled.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2026-24287 — Windows Projected File System prjflt.sys Unrestricted User Volume Name in PrjfPortConnect → Arbitrary Device Open (External Control of File Path)


Summary

Product Windows — prjflt.sys (Windows Projected File System / ProjFS minifilter; port connect)
CVE ID CVE-2026-24287
Impact Elevation of Privilege
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.8 / 6.8 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
Delivery Local — a crafted _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT to the ProjFS filter port
KB / Fixed build KB5079473 — prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.8036 (Win11 24H2 x64)
Patch Date March 10, 2026 (2026-Mar)
Pre-patch binary prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.7920 — SHA256 e31bf9ae1bdff86e6683e469dd56d341c019c02e389d3086608ba61de160949f
Post-patch binary prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.8036 — SHA256 d5afe5fe1f66c520b1b49bf43d8567d80c4dd42a03621cbceb6587bc29a424dc
Feature flag Feature_78846265 — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Product Description

PrjfPortConnect is the ProjFS minifilter’s filter-port connect callback. A client connecting to the ProjFS communication port passes a _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT:

struct _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT {
    GUID   virtualizationInstanceID;
    UINT   Version;
    USHORT VolumeLength;
    WCHAR  szVolume[256];      // fully user-controlled
};

PrjfPortConnect builds a UNICODE_STRING usVolumeName from szVolume / VolumeLength and resolves it via PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName → FltGetVolumeFromName, which ultimately calls ZwCreateFile with ObjectAttributes.ObjectName = usVolumeName:

FLTMGR!FltpIoGetDeviceObjectPointer
FLTMGR!FltGetVolumeFromName
prjflt!PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName
prjflt!PrjfPortConnect

Vulnerability Summary

usVolumeName is taken directly from the user-supplied szVolume/VolumeLength, so it is fully attacker-controlled, and pre-patch it was not restricted to a legitimate volume-device path. A low-privileged client can therefore supply an arbitrary object path and make prjflt open a device it could not open itself:

With usVolumeName = L"\Device\SrvAdmin", a normal user causes prjflt to open \Device\SrvAdmin — normally restricted to administrators — and its IRP_MJ_CREATE routine SrvNetCreate (and SrvNetCleanup/SrvNetClose on close) is invoked on the user’s behalf.

Because prjflt performs the ZwCreateFile in kernel context with an attacker-chosen name, this is external control of a file/device path (CWE-73) that grants a normal user access to privileged device create/cleanup routines — a local EoP primitive.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, low-privileged (PR:L, AV:L, AC:L): connect to the ProjFS filter port with a crafted _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT.
  • Set szVolume to an arbitrary object path (e.g. \Device\SrvAdmin) rather than a real volume.
  • Result: prjflt opens the specified device and drives its create/cleanup/close routines.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The user-supplied connection volume name was resolved and opened without validating that it referred to a legitimate global volume path, so any device/object path under the attacker’s control reached ZwCreateFile.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .7920 → .8036)

Gated behind Feature_78846265, PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName now routes the user name through a new validator PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath before resolving it, so a name that is not a proper global volume path is rejected:

// PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName (10.0.26100.8036) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch (from our diff)
if (Feature_78846265__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline()) {
    iVar1 = FltGetVolumeFromName(Globals, param_1, &local_b8);
    if (iVar1 >= 0)
        iVar1 = FltGetVolumeInstanceFromName(Globals, local_b8, 0, param_2);
    // validate the supplied name is a legitimate global volume path:
    iVar1 = PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath(param_1, local_b0, param_3);
}

With PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath confirming the name is a global volume path, an arbitrary device path such as \Device\SrvAdmin no longer resolves, closing the arbitrary-device-open.

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_78846265. The validation runs only when the flag is enabled; the original unrestricted path still ships when disabled. Verify Feature_78846265 is enabled to confirm the fix is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. ProjFS filter-port connections whose _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT szVolume is a non-volume object path (e.g. \Device\... device names); ZwCreateFile from prjflt!PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName targeting privileged devices on unpatched/flag-disabled builds.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_78846265 is enabled.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-24287 (Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege), released 2026-03-10, KB5079473.
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/prjflt_sys-cve-2026-24287-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

A fully user-controlled ProjFS connection volume name reaches ZwCreateFile, letting a normal user open privileged devices

Attack path for CVE-2026-24287 A fully user-controlled ProjFS connection volume name reaches ZwCreateFile, letting a normal user open privileged devices 01 — ENTRY Local user connects to the ProjFS filter port with a crafted _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT prjflt.sys PrjfPortConnect builds usVolumeName from the user szVolume/VolumeLength. AV:L/PR:L/AC:L. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Sets szVolume to an arbitrary object path, e.g. \Device\SrvAdmin The name is fully user-controlled and not restricted to a volume device. 03 — MISSING CHECK Unvalidated name passed to FltGetVolumeFromName -> ZwCreateFile (CWE-73) PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName resolves any supplied path; ZwCreateFile opens it with ObjectName = usVolumeName. 04 — PATH prjflt opens a privileged device on the user's behalf e.g. \Device\SrvAdmin - normally not openable by a normal user - has its IRP_MJ_CREATE (SrvNetCreate) invoked. 05 — PRIMITIVE Access to privileged device interfaces -> EoP The Mar 2026 fix (Feature_78846265) validates the name as a global volume path via PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath before use.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

ChenJian with Sea Security Orca Team