CVE-2026-24287 — Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
External control of file name or path in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
Verified Attribution
Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5078885 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5078883 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5078883 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8037 10.0.26100.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.8037 10.0.26100.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8037 10.0.26200.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5079473 (Security Update) 5079420 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5077181 5077212 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.8037 10.0.26200.7979 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5079466 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems | 5079466 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5078752 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 5078766 (Security Update) 5078737 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5075906 5075943 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4893 10.0.20348.4830 Yes No None Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5078766 (Security Update) 5078737 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5075906 5075943 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4893 10.0.20348.4830 Yes No None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) | 5078734 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5078752 |
Security Update | Yes |
5078885 |
Security Update | Yes |
5078883 |
Security Update | Yes |
5079466 |
Security Update | Yes |
5078734 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
External control of file name/path (CWE-73) in the Windows Projected File System minifilter prjflt.sys PrjfPortConnect volume-name handling, local EoP. A client connecting to the ProjFS communication port supplies a _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT { GUID virtualizationInstanceID; UINT Version; USHORT VolumeLength; WCHAR szVolume[256]; }. PrjfPortConnect builds usVolumeName from szVolume/VolumeLength (fully user-controlled) and passes it to PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName -> FltGetVolumeFromName, which ultimately calls ZwCreateFile with ObjectName = usVolumeName. PRE: the name is not restricted to a legitimate volume device path, so a low-privileged user can supply an arbitrary object path (e.g. L"\Device\SrvAdmin") and cause prjflt to open a privileged device it could not otherwise open - its IRP_MJ_CREATE routine (e.g. SrvNetCreate) then runs. Diff of prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.7920 -> .8036 (Mar 10 2026, KB5079473) confirms the fix: gated behind CFR flag Feature_78846265, PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName now calls a new helper PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath(name, ...) to validate that the supplied name is a proper global volume path before FltGetVolumeFromName / FltGetVolumeInstanceFromName, rejecting arbitrary device paths.
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName |
code change |
code (volume-name now validated as a global volume path, CFR-gated) | Pre: FltGetVolumeFromName(Globals, param_1 /*user szVolume*/, ...) then FltGetVolumeInstanceFromName - no restriction to volume devices. Post (Feature_78846265): calls PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath(param_1, local_b0, param_3) to validate the name is a global volume path before resolving it. |
PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath |
new function |
added | New validator that confirms the user-supplied volume name is a legitimate global volume path, preventing arbitrary device/object paths from reaching ZwCreateFile. |
Feature_78846265 |
gate |
added (CFR gate) | CFR flag gating the volume-name validation; the original unrestricted path still ships when disabled. |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2026-24287 — Windows Projected File System prjflt.sys Unrestricted User Volume Name in PrjfPortConnect → Arbitrary Device Open (External Control of File Path)
Summary
| Product | Windows — prjflt.sys (Windows Projected File System / ProjFS minifilter; port connect) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-24287 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CVSS | 7.8 / 6.8 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C |
| CWE | CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path |
| Delivery | Local — a crafted _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT to the ProjFS filter port |
| KB / Fixed build | KB5079473 — prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.8036 (Win11 24H2 x64) |
| Patch Date | March 10, 2026 (2026-Mar) |
| Pre-patch binary | prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.7920 — SHA256 e31bf9ae1bdff86e6683e469dd56d341c019c02e389d3086608ba61de160949f |
| Post-patch binary | prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.8036 — SHA256 d5afe5fe1f66c520b1b49bf43d8567d80c4dd42a03621cbceb6587bc29a424dc |
| Feature flag | Feature_78846265 — the fix is CFR-gated |
| Exploitability | Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC) |
Product Description
PrjfPortConnect is the ProjFS minifilter’s filter-port connect callback. A client
connecting to the ProjFS communication port passes a _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT:
struct _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT {
GUID virtualizationInstanceID;
UINT Version;
USHORT VolumeLength;
WCHAR szVolume[256]; // fully user-controlled
};
PrjfPortConnect builds a UNICODE_STRING usVolumeName from szVolume /
VolumeLength and resolves it via
PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName → FltGetVolumeFromName, which ultimately calls
ZwCreateFile with ObjectAttributes.ObjectName = usVolumeName:
FLTMGR!FltpIoGetDeviceObjectPointer
FLTMGR!FltGetVolumeFromName
prjflt!PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName
prjflt!PrjfPortConnect
Vulnerability Summary
usVolumeName is taken directly from the user-supplied szVolume/VolumeLength,
so it is fully attacker-controlled, and pre-patch it was not restricted to a
legitimate volume-device path. A low-privileged client can therefore supply an
arbitrary object path and make prjflt open a device it could not open itself:
With
usVolumeName = L"\Device\SrvAdmin", a normal user causesprjfltto open\Device\SrvAdmin— normally restricted to administrators — and itsIRP_MJ_CREATEroutineSrvNetCreate(andSrvNetCleanup/SrvNetCloseon close) is invoked on the user’s behalf.
Because prjflt performs the ZwCreateFile in kernel context with an
attacker-chosen name, this is external control of a file/device path (CWE-73) that
grants a normal user access to privileged device create/cleanup routines — a local
EoP primitive.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local, low-privileged (
PR:L,AV:L,AC:L): connect to the ProjFS filter port with a crafted_PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT. - Set
szVolumeto an arbitrary object path (e.g.\Device\SrvAdmin) rather than a real volume. - Result:
prjfltopens the specified device and drives its create/cleanup/close routines.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The user-supplied connection volume name was resolved and opened without validating
that it referred to a legitimate global volume path, so any device/object path
under the attacker’s control reached ZwCreateFile.
The patch (confirmed — diff, .7920 → .8036)
Gated behind Feature_78846265, PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName now routes the
user name through a new validator PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath before
resolving it, so a name that is not a proper global volume path is rejected:
// PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName (10.0.26100.8036) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch (from our diff)
if (Feature_78846265__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline()) {
iVar1 = FltGetVolumeFromName(Globals, param_1, &local_b8);
if (iVar1 >= 0)
iVar1 = FltGetVolumeInstanceFromName(Globals, local_b8, 0, param_2);
// validate the supplied name is a legitimate global volume path:
iVar1 = PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath(param_1, local_b0, param_3);
}
With PrjfValidateAndGetGlobalVolumePath confirming the name is a global volume
path, an arbitrary device path such as \Device\SrvAdmin no longer resolves,
closing the arbitrary-device-open.
Patch Completeness Assessment
CFR-gated behind Feature_78846265. The validation runs only when the flag is
enabled; the original unrestricted path still ships when disabled. Verify
Feature_78846265 is enabled to confirm the fix is live.
Detection Guidance
Behavioural. ProjFS filter-port connections whose _PRJ_CONNECTION_CONTEXT
szVolume is a non-volume object path (e.g. \Device\... device names);
ZwCreateFile from prjflt!PrjfGetInstanceFromVolumeName targeting privileged
devices on unpatched/flag-disabled builds.
Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_78846265 is enabled.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-24287 (Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege), released 2026-03-10, KB5079473.
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/prjflt_sys-cve-2026-24287-ghidriff.md
Attack Path
A fully user-controlled ProjFS connection volume name reaches ZwCreateFile, letting a normal user open privileged devices
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
ChenJian with Sea Security Orca Team