Moderate CVSS 6.2 EPSS 0.04956 ⚠️ Exploited in the wild 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-02 archive

Executive Summary

Null pointer dereference in Windows Remote Access Connection Manager allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service locally.

Overview

6.2
CVSS MEDIUM
Moderate
MS Severity
Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Exploitation Detected
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Denial of Service
Released Feb 10 2026
Last Updated Feb 10 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Listed (added 2026-02-10)
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.04956 — 0.91415 percentile
NVD CVSS 6.2 MEDIUM — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
None
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
None
INTEGRITY
None
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 5.4

EPSS Score

0.04956
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.91415 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

23 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5075999 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5075999 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5075904 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5075904 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5075941 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5075941 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Moderate Denial of Service 5073379 Base: 6.2 Temporal: 5.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.7840 10.0.26100.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) 5077181 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service 5074109 Base: 6.2 Temporal: 5.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.7781 10.0.26100.7840 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Moderate Denial of Service 5074109 Base: 6.2 Temporal: 5.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.7840 10.0.26200.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Moderate Denial of Service 5074109 Base: 6.2 Temporal: 5.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.7840 10.0.26200.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems 5077179 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems 5077179 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2012 5075971 (Monthly Rollup) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5075971 (Monthly Rollup) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5075970 (Monthly Rollup) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5075970 (Monthly Rollup) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2016 5075999 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5075999 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2019 5075904 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5075904 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes
Windows Server 2022 5075906 (Security Update) 5075943 (Security Hotpatch Update) Moderate Denial of Service 5073457 Base: 6.2 Temporal: 5.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4773 10.0.20348.4711 Yes None Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5075906 (Security Update) 5075943 (Security Hotpatch Update) Moderate Denial of Service 5073457 Base: 6.2 Temporal: 5.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4773 10.0.20348.4711 Yes None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5075897 (Security Update) Moderate Denial of Service Yes

Patches

8 patches
Article Type Restart
5075999 Security Update Yes
5075904 Security Update Yes
5075912 Security Update Yes
5075941 Security Update Yes
5077179 Security Update Yes
5075971 Monthly Rollup Yes
5075970 Monthly Rollup Yes
5075897 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · rasman.dll (KB5077181)

Patch diff 10.0.26100.7309 -> 10.0.26100.7705 (RpcConnect shared-binding UAF; fix retired Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix gate)

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7309
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.7705
Function Address Change Note
wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToServiceDirect 180024eb4 -> 180024e54 code, length, sig, address similarity 0.43
Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 180024340 -> 1800242f0 code, length, address similarity 0.69
wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToService 180024e30 -> 180024dd8 code, length, sig, address similarity 0.63
RpcConnect 180011e90 code, length, sig, called similarity 0.45
wil_details_IsEnabledFallback 180025258 -> 1800251f0 code, refcount, length, sig, address, calling similarity 0.48
wil_details_FeatureStateCache_TryEnableDeviceUsageFastPath 18002504c -> 180024ff4 code, length, sig, address similarity 0.4
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis — CVE-2026-21525

Summary

Field Value
CVE CVE-2026-21525
Binary rasman.dll (Remote Access Connection Manager)
Component RpcConnect — shared RPC binding cache to the RRAS router
Bug Class Use-After-Free of shared binding handle, surfaced as NULL Pointer Dereference (CWE-476; MSRC)
Impact Denial of Service — RasMan service (svchost) crash; kills all VPN/RAS connectivity
CVSS 3.1 6.2 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Exploited ITW Yes
Patch February 2026 Patch Tuesday (KB5077181, Win11 24H2 10.0.26100.7309 → 10.0.26100.7705)
Diff evidence rasman_dll-kb5077181.md — 6 code-changed functions; fix is feature-flagged Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix

Vulnerability Overview

RpcConnect in rasman.dll establishes an RPC binding from the RasMan service to the RRAS router, either over the local ncalrpc:[RasmanLrpc] endpoint or the ncacn_np:\PIPE\ROUTER named pipe. For the local case, the binding handle is cached in a global variable g_hBinding and shared by all callers, with a global reference count _g_dwRefCount, both protected by g_RpcCs.

The pre-patch error path frees this shared global binding while other callers still hold it, and increments the reference count even when the operation failed — so subsequent callers receive a dangling (or NULL) binding handle and dereference it, crashing the RasMan service.

Root Cause — error path frees the shared global binding

Pre-patch (10.0.26100.7309)

// g_hBinding: GLOBAL cached RPC binding shared by all RasMan clients
// _g_dwRefCount: GLOBAL refcount

// Fast path: reuse cached binding
if (g_hBinding != NULL) {
    _g_dwRefCount++;          // refcount++
    *out = g_hBinding;
    goto LAB_1;
}

// ... full connect path; for the local endpoint, Binding = &g_hBinding ...

if (Status != 0) {            // ERROR PATH
    if (bVar1) {              // a binding was created
        if (*Binding != NULL)
            RpcBindingFree(Binding);   // BUG: Binding == &g_hBinding here!
        *Binding = NULL;               // zeroes the GLOBAL, still held by others
    }
    pwVar10 = I_RpcMapWin32Status(Status);
}
if (bVar11) {
    _g_dwRefCount++;          // BUG: refcount++ even on failure
    *local_78 = g_hBinding;   // hands caller the freed/NULL global binding
}

Two interlocking defects:

  1. UAF: on any error after a local binding was created (RpcBindingFromStringBindingW / RpcBindingSetAuthInfoExW failure), the code frees g_hBinding — the binding every other RasMan client is concurrently using through the fast path.
  2. Refcount/NULL confusion: _g_dwRefCount is incremented even on failure, and the caller is returned the just-freed (or NULL) g_hBinding. The next RPC call on that handle dereferences freed RPC runtime state → NULL pointer dereference inside the RasMan service process (MSRC’s CWE-476).

The internal feature flag shipped for this fix is literally named Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix, confirming the UAF nature of the bug. MSRC rates the externally observable crash as CWE-476 / DoS.

Post-patch (10.0.26100.7705)

  • The Feature_817320250 (UAF fix) gate call is removed entirely — the fix is now always on.
  • On error, only the caller’s own binding handle (in_stack_00000068) is freed; g_hBinding is never freed on the error path.
  • _g_dwRefCount++ only executes on the success path, after *out = g_hBinding.
  • The cleanup FreeSid(local_80) now runs unconditionally (previously gated behind the feature check).
if (Status != 0) {
    if (bVar1) {
        if (*out != NULL)
            RpcBindingFree(out);    // FIXED: caller-local handle only
        *out = NULL;
    }
    pwVar10 = I_RpcMapWin32Status(Status);
    if (!bVar11) goto LAB_1;        // no refcount++, no global hand-out
}
*out = g_hBinding;
_g_dwRefCount++;                    // success path only

Call Flow / Reachability

Any local process using RAS APIs (RasDial, VPN connect, IKEv2/PPP/SSTP/L2TP)
  → rasapi32.dll client
    → RPC to RasMan service (svchost -k netsvcs, SYSTEM)
      → RasRPCBind / RasRpcConnect / RemoteSubmitRequestLocal
        → RpcConnect *** VULNERABLE ***
          → RpcBindingFromStringBindingW / RpcBindingSetAuthInfoExW
            → on failure: RpcBindingFree(&g_hBinding)   [pre-patch]
          → next caller's fast path derefs freed g_hBinding → crash
  • Attack surface: local, no privileges required (PR:N per MSRC). Any local user can initiate RAS connections (e.g. rasdial, RasDialW), which drives the RasMan service through RpcConnect.
  • Trigger condition: force the local-endpoint connect path to fail after a binding handle was created, while another thread/process holds or immediately re-acquires the cached global binding. Failures in RpcBindingSetAuthInfoExW (auth/QoS setup) are the most plausible race-free error source; a connect/cancel race increases the odds of hitting the error path mid-use.
  • Effect: access violation inside the RasMan service host (svchost.exe running RasMan), service crash → all VPN/RAS connectivity drops until the service restarts.

Exploitation Notes (ITW)

MSRC marks this CVE as exploited in the wild as a local DoS. No public technical writeup exists at time of writing; the analysis above is derived entirely from the binary diff. Because the crash is in a SYSTEM service, the primitive is a reliable, low-noise local DoS — valuable as a force-reboot / availability-impact gadget in an attack chain.

Patch Analysis

Function Match Change
RpcConnect 48% Error path frees caller-local binding only; refcount++ on success only; feature gate retired
Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 96% Flag retired (no longer called from RpcConnect)
wil_details_FeatureReporting_*, wil_details_IsEnabledFallback, FeatureStateCache_TryEnableDeviceUsageFastPath 90–94% Mechanical churn from the retired gate

Detection

YARA — patched rasman.dll (fix retired the feature gate)

rule CVE_2026_21525_RasMan_RpcConnect
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects rasman.dll builds with the CVE-2026-21525 RpcConnect shared-binding UAF"
        cve         = "CVE-2026-21525"

    strings:
        $endpoint = "RasmanLrpc" wide
        $router   = "\\PIPE\\ROUTER" wide
        $sec      = "Security=Impersonation Dynamic True" wide
        $flag     = "Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix" ascii wide

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        $endpoint and $router and $sec and
        not $flag   // patched: gate retired
}

Sigma — RasMan service crash

title: CVE-2026-21525 RasMan Service Crash (Shared Binding UAF)
id: b7e2c1aa-2152-5c00-9e25-cve202621525
status: experimental
description: >
    Detects crashes of the Remote Access Connection Manager service consistent
    with CVE-2026-21525 exploitation (error path frees the shared g_hBinding
    RPC binding; next caller dereferences freed/NULL handle).    
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/28
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-21525
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_restart:
        EventID: 7031
        ServiceName: 'Remote Access Connection Manager'
    selection_app_error:
        EventID: 1000
        FaultingModule|contains: 'rasman.dll'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499
    - cve.2026.21525

Sysmon

<Sysmon schemaversion="4.90">
  <EventFiltering>
    <!-- Event 1: watch for processes spawned right after rasman crash/restart -->
    <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
      <CommandLine condition="contains">RasMan</CommandLine>
    </ProcessCreate>
    <!-- Event 18: named-pipe connects to the RRAS router pipe -->
    <PipeEvent onmatch="include">
      <PipeName condition="is">\PIPE\ROUTER</PipeName>
    </PipeEvent>
  </EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>

Recommended additional logging: enable System log monitoring for Service Control Manager events 7031/7034 on RasMan, and Application Error 1000/1001 with faulting module rasman.dll.

References

  • MSRC Advisory — CVE-2026-21525
  • Diff: rasman_dll-kb5077181.md (10.0.26100.7309 → 10.0.26100.7705)
  • Feature flag evidence: Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix (present in pre-patch build, retired in patch)

Attack Path

Use-after-free on a shared global RPC binding in rasman.dll - the error path frees a handle other callers still hold

Attack path for CVE-2026-21525 Use-after-free on a shared global RPC binding in rasman.dll - the error path frees a handle other callers still hold RasMan callers g_hBinding (global) RPC binding handle Caller A: RpcConnect() - binds to RRAS over ncalrpc:[RasmanLrpc] 1 The local binding handle is cached in the global g_hBinding and shared by all callers, with reference count _g_dwRefCount, both under g_RpcCs. g_hBinding published, _g_dwRefCount incremented 2 Caller B: RpcConnect() hits an error path 3 Error path frees the shared global binding and still increments the refcount 4 The free targets g_hBinding itself, not a per-caller handle, so every other holder is left with a dangling pointer. The refcount is bumped even though the operation failed, so the accounting no longer reflects reality. Caller A's handle is now dangling (or NULL) 5 Next use dereferences the freed binding - RasMan service crash 6 Denial of service against the Remote Access Connection Manager. The patch retires the Feature_VPN_BugFixes_25B_Use_After_Free_Fix gate and stops the error path from freeing shared state.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules