CVE-2026-21237 — Windows Subsystem for Linux Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Subsystem for Linux allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
Verified Attribution
Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5075912 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5075912 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5075912 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5075912 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5075912 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5075912 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5075941 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5075941 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5073379 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.7840 10.0.26100.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) 5077181 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5074109 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.7781 10.0.26100.7840 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5074109 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.7840 10.0.26200.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5074109 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.7840 10.0.26200.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5077179 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems | 5077179 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 5075906 (Security Update) 5075943 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5073457 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4773 10.0.20348.4711 Yes None Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5075906 (Security Update) 5075943 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5073457 Base: 7.0 Temporal: 6.1 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4773 10.0.20348.4711 Yes None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) | 5075897 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5075912 |
Security Update | Yes |
5075941 |
Security Update | Yes |
5077179 |
Security Update | Yes |
5075897 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Race-condition use-after-free (CWE-362 + CWE-416) in the Windows 9P/WSL redirector p9rdr.sys UserCallback/Waiter mechanism, local EoP. Opening \Device\P9Rdr\<distro>\... drives p9fs::P9CreateVNetRoot -> Device::CallUserCallback -> UserCallbackManager::CallUserCallback; when no callback is registered it calls NotifyUserProcess, which signals P9RdrService (WNF), creates a _P9RDR_USER_CALLBACK, adds it to the manager list, and attaches a _P9RDR_WAITER targeting the create IRP's RxContext (RxContext+0xD0); control returns and rdbss RxCancellableWaitSync waits on RxContextForCreate->ConditionEvent. The callback/waiter objects (which reference the create-IRP RxContext and carry a PEX_TIMER) had inadequately synchronized lifetime: between register and wait, the timer firing / the user-mode service responding / a cancel can free the callback (and waiter) while another path still uses it (or the RxContext) -> UAF. Diff of p9rdr.sys 10.0.26100.7824 -> .8328 (Feb 10 2026, KB5077181) confirms the fix: gated behind CFR flags Feature_1655910715 / Feature_3906416953, the changed functions p9fs::UserCallbackManager::RegisterUserCallback, p9fs::UserCallback::SetCallbackTimeout and p9fs::UserCallbackManager::FindOrInsertCallbackWithLockHeld add explicit reference management (FindOrInsertCallbackWithLockHeld calls UserCallback::ReleaseReference under the manager lock) and rework the ExSetTimer timeout, so the callback/waiter/RxContext cannot be freed while still in use. Note: our diff shows Feature_1655910715/Feature_3906416953 (build/arch); function names refactored (FindCallback->FindOrInsertCallback) vs the reporter analysis.
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
p9fs::UserCallbackManager::FindOrInsertCallbackWithLockHeld |
code change |
code (reference release under manager lock, CFR-gated) | Adds UserCallback::ReleaseReference(*(UserCallback**)(entry+0x58)) so the callback is reference-counted and released under the manager lock, preventing use of a freed callback. |
p9fs::UserCallback::SetCallbackTimeout |
code change |
code (timeout rework) | Reworks the ExSetTimer callback timeout so the timer firing cannot free the callback while it is still referenced by the waiting RxContext path. |
p9fs::UserCallbackManager::RegisterUserCallback |
code change |
code (callback registration lifetime) | Registration reworked alongside the reference-management fix for the UserCallback/waiter lifetime. |
Feature_1655910715 / Feature_3906416953 |
gate |
added (CFR gate) | CFR flags gating the reference-managed UserCallback lifetime fix; original path still ships when disabled. |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2026-21237 — Windows 9P Redirector p9rdr.sys UserCallback/Waiter Lifetime Race in the VNetRoot Create Path → Use-After-Free
Summary
| Product | Windows — p9rdr.sys (Plan 9 / 9P redirector; WSL \\wsl.localhost file access) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-21237 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CVSS | 7.0 / 6.1 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C |
| CWE | CWE-362 Race Condition + CWE-416 Use After Free |
| Delivery | Local race — open \Device\P9Rdr\... while the user-callback / waiter is torn down |
| KB / Fixed build | KB5077181 — p9rdr.sys 10.0.26100.7840 (Win11 24H2 x64) |
| Patch Date | February 10, 2026 (2026-Feb) |
| Pre-patch binary | p9rdr.sys 10.0.26100.7824 — SHA256 f52bad554e22d669e8129ce19b7eb8507bdbbd1306284e9a3afac6316bad5e97 |
| Post-patch binary | p9rdr.sys 10.0.26100.8328 — SHA256 e532c53349f770f2ba3ce7d503d7f3e24f792c09983bb5649a93b4d3c373354d |
| Feature flag | Feature_1655910715 / Feature_3906416953 — the fix is CFR-gated |
| Exploitability | Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC) |
Product Description
p9rdr.sys is the Windows 9P (Plan 9) network redirector used by WSL for
\\wsl.localhost\... access. Opening \Device\P9Rdr\<distro>\... drives
p9fs::P9CreateVNetRoot (from rdbss!RxConstructNetRoot), which calls
p9fs::Device::CallUserCallback → p9fs::UserCallbackManager::CallUserCallback.
When no callback is registered, it calls NotifyUserProcess, which signals the
P9RdrService (via a WNF state update), creates a _P9RDR_USER_CALLBACK, adds it
to the manager list, and attaches a _P9RDR_WAITER whose target is the create
IRP’s RxContext (at RxContext + 0xD0). Control returns and
rdbss!RxCancellableWaitSync waits on RxContextForCreate->ConditionEvent.
Vulnerability Summary
The _P9RDR_USER_CALLBACK / _P9RDR_WAITER objects and the create-IRP RxContext
they reference had an inadequately synchronized lifetime. The callback carries
a PEX_TIMER (timeout) and a waiter linked to the RxContext; between registering
the callback and the create thread waiting on RxContext->ConditionEvent, a
concurrent event — the timer firing, the user-mode P9RdrService responding, or a
cancel — can tear down / free the callback (and its waiter) while another path still
references it (or vice-versa, the RxContext), producing a use-after-free
(CWE-362 → CWE-416). Because the object references the create IRP’s kernel
RxContext, the freed-object reuse is exploitable for local EoP.
// _P9RDR_USER_CALLBACK / _P9RDR_WAITER (from the reporter analysis)
struct _P9RDR_USER_CALLBACK { __int64 RefNo64; _RX_CONTEXT_CREATE *RxContext; LUID AuthenticationId,
LinkedAuthenticationId; LIST_ENTRY ManagerLink; PVOID PushLock; _P9RDR_WAITER *Waiter1, *Waiter2;
PEX_TIMER Timer; bool bWaiterEnabled; };
struct _P9RDR_WAITER { _P9RDR_USER_CALLBACK *Callback; PVOID Handler, HandlerParam; _P9RDR_WAITER *Next; };
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local, low-privileged (
PR:L,AV:L);AC:Hreflects the race window. - Race: open a
\Device\P9Rdr\...path (creating a pending user callback + waiter bound to the createRxContext) and win the race against the callback timeout / service response / cancel so one side frees the object the other still uses.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The user-callback / waiter object lifetime (and its reference to the create-IRP
RxContext) was not consistently reference-counted / lock-synchronized across the
notify → wait → timeout/response window, so concurrent teardown could free an
object still in use.
The patch (confirmed — diff, .7824 → .8328)
Gated behind Feature_1655910715 / Feature_3906416953, the fix reworks the
UserCallback registration and timeout to reference-count the callback and release
it under the manager lock. Our diff shows the changed functions
(p9fs::UserCallbackManager::RegisterUserCallback,
p9fs::UserCallback::SetCallbackTimeout,
p9fs::UserCallbackManager::FindOrInsertCallbackWithLockHeld) gaining explicit
reference management — e.g. FindOrInsertCallbackWithLockHeld now calls
p9fs::UserCallback::ReleaseReference(...) on the callback, and
SetCallbackTimeout reworks the ExSetTimer timeout:
// p9fs::UserCallbackManager::FindOrInsertCallbackWithLockHeld (10.0.26100.8328) — PATCHED (from our diff)
...
UserCallback::ReleaseReference(*(UserCallback **)(entry + 0x58)); // *** release under the manager lock ***
// p9fs::UserCallback::SetCallbackTimeout — reworked ExSetTimer(...) for the callback timeout
By reference-counting the callback and releasing it only under the manager lock,
the callback (and its waiter/RxContext linkage) can no longer be freed while
another path still holds it, closing the race.
Patch Completeness Assessment
CFR-gated behind Feature_1655910715 / Feature_3906416953. The reference-
managed path runs only when the flags are enabled; the original path still ships
when disabled. Verify the flags are enabled to confirm the fix is live.
Detection Guidance
Behavioural. Rapid open/cancel of \\wsl.localhost\... / \Device\P9Rdr\...
paths while the P9RdrService is slow to respond (forcing the callback timeout);
UAF / pool-corruption bugchecks in p9rdr!p9fs::UserCallbackManager::* /
NotifyUserProcess on unpatched/flag-disabled builds.
Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_1655910715 /
Feature_3906416953 are enabled.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-21237 (Windows 9P / WSL Redirector Elevation of Privilege), released 2026-02-10, KB5077181.
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/p9rdr_sys-cve-2026-21237-ghidriff.md
Attack Path
A 9P VNetRoot create registers a user-callback+waiter bound to the create RxContext, which a concurrent timeout/response frees mid-wait
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
ChenJian with Sea Security Orca Team