Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.00417 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-02 archive

Executive Summary

Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Exploitation Unlikely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Feb 10 2026
Last Updated Feb 10 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00417 — 0.34629 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00417
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.34629 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

23 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5075999 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5075999 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5075904 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5075904 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5075912 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5075941 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5075941 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5073379 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.7840 10.0.26100.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) 5077181 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5074109 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.7781 10.0.26100.7840 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5074109 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.7840 10.0.26200.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5077181 (Security Update) 5077212 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5074109 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26200.7840 10.0.26200.7781 Yes None Windows 11 Version 26H1 for ARM64-based Systems 5077179 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 26H1 for x64-based Systems 5077179 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 5075971 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5075971 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5075970 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5075970 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5075999 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5075999 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5075904 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5075904 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5075906 (Security Update) 5075943 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5073457 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4773 10.0.20348.4711 Yes None Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5075906 (Security Update) 5075943 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Elevation of Privilege 5073457 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.4773 10.0.20348.4711 Yes None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5075897 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

8 patches
Article Type Restart
5075999 Security Update Yes
5075904 Security Update Yes
5075912 Security Update Yes
5075941 Security Update Yes
5077179 Security Update Yes
5075971 Monthly Rollup Yes
5075970 Monthly Rollup Yes
5075897 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · afd.sys (KB5077181)

Patch diff 10.0.26100.7623 -> 10.0.26100.7824

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7623 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.7824 Download
Function Address Change Note
AfdBReceive 14003f640 -> 14003e810 code, length, address, called similarity 0.63
NTOSKRNL.EXE::MmMapLockedPages EXTERNAL:000000d5 -> EXTERNAL:000000d6 refcount, address similarity 1.0
AfdNotifyPostEvents 14005364c -> 140053cac code, length, address, called similarity 0.39
memcpy 140074980 -> 140075200 refcount, address similarity 1.0
AfdFastDatagramReceive 140033850 -> 140032940 code, length, address, called similarity 0.6
AfdTdiCreateAO 14002c650 -> 14002b6a0 code, length, sig, address, called similarity 0.92
AfdNotifyDestroyContext 14005349c -> 140053adc code, length, address, called similarity 0.67
AfdCleanupCore 140013870 -> 1400135a0 code, length, address, called similarity 0.67
AfdTransmitPackets 140043d30 -> 140044100 code, length, address, called similarity 0.41
AfdBCommonChainedReceiveEventHandler 14001a380 -> 140019340 code, length, address, called similarity 0.98
AfdSuperAccept 14002a310 -> 140029300 code, length, address, called similarity 0.26
AfdSanConnectHandler 14005c570 -> 14005cc50 code, length, address, called similarity 0.29
AfdRestartSuperAcceptGetAddress 14004a7e0 -> 14004ae30 code, length, address, called similarity 0.98
AfdCloseCore 140006ac8 -> 1400150c0 code, length, address, called similarity 0.17
wil_details_IsEnabledFallback 14004b4c8 -> 14004bab4 refcount, address, calling similarity 1.0
AfdReceiveDatagram 14003dec0 -> 14003d010 code, length, address, called similarity 0.67
AfdSanAcceptCore 140044f40 -> 1400453bc code, length, address, called similarity 0.19
__security_check_cookie 140074850 -> 1400750c0 refcount, address, calling similarity 1.0
AfdNotifyProcessRegistration 14005390c -> 140053fb8 code, length, address, called similarity 0.48
AfdExtractAfdSendMsgInfo 1400422a0 -> 1400415b0 code, length, address, called similarity 0.41
__C_specific_handler 140049fdd -> 14004a62d refcount, address similarity 0.89
AfdCompleteBufferedSendsUnlock 140005230 code, length, called similarity 0.48
AfdFastConnectionSend 140032e60 -> 140031ef0 code, length, address, called similarity 0.7
AfdFastConnectionReceive 140031ef0 -> 140030f00 code, length, address, called similarity 0.5
__GSHandlerCheck_SEH 1400747b4 -> 140075024 refcount, address similarity 1.0
NTOSKRNL.EXE::ExFreePoolWithTag EXTERNAL:000000f5 -> EXTERNAL:000000f6 refcount, address, calling similarity 1.0
AfdQueryHandles 14003a350 -> 140039510 code, length, sig, address, called similarity 0.63
AfdBind 14002acb0 -> 140029c70 code, length, address, called similarity 0.1
AfdFastDatagramSend 140034280 -> 1400333d0 code, length, address, called similarity 0.41
Feature_2829529401__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004acf0 -> 14004c900 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_447951161__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004acf0 -> 14004d200 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_TCPIP_2025_Wave4_AfdTransmit_MSRC__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004acf0 -> 14005bd78 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_3923194169__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004acf0 -> 140060620 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_2829529401__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004c310 -> 14004c900 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_447951161__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004c310 -> 14004d200 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_TCPIP_2025_Wave4_AfdTransmit_MSRC__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004c310 -> 14005bd78 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_3923194169__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 14004c310 -> 140060620 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_447951161__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 140056c40 -> 14004d200 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
Feature_3923194169__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline 140056c40 -> 140060620 name, fullname, refcount, sig, address, calling, called similarity 0.71
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2026-21236 — afd.sys AfdSanConnectHandler Heap-Based Buffer Overflow


Summary

Product Microsoft Windows — afd.sys (Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock)
Vendor Microsoft Corporation
Severity CVSS v3.1 7.8 (High)
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (MSRC)
CVE Title Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
CWE CWE-122 (Heap-based Buffer Overflow), CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write)
Affected Versions Windows 10 (1607+), Windows 11 (23H2/24H2/25H2), Windows Server 2012–2025
Tested Version Windows 11 24H2 — afd.sys 10.0.26100.7623 (pre, KB5074109) vs 10.0.26100.7824 (post, KB5077181)
Impact Local EoP — authenticated local attacker corrupts kernel pool memory → SYSTEM
Exploitability (MSRC) “Exploitation Unlikely” — practical trigger requires Windows Server with SAN/RDMA components
PoC Available NCC Group published a full analysis + PoC walkthrough (Python, WinDbg-verified BSOD); no public weaponised exploit
Patch Date February 2026 Patch Tuesday — KB5077181

Root Cause

afd.sys still carries the legacy SAN (System Area Network / Windows Sockets Direct, RDMA) code path for backwards compatibility. Two IOCTL handlers cooperate across two different socket handles:

  1. AfdSuperAccept — called on a listener SAN endpoint. It parses a user-controlled Type3InputBuffer whose length fields (ReceiveDataLength, RemoteAddressLength, …) are sanity-checked, then allocates an MDL of user-influenced TotalLength via IoAllocateMdl + MmProbeAndLockPages. This is the destination buffer.

  2. AfdSanConnectHandler — called on a connecting SAN endpoint. It copies the connect request’s address payload into the listener’s MDL buffer (MmMapLockedPages). The copy length is read from the user-controlled input buffer (*_Src) and was never checked against the size of the buffer allocated by AfdSuperAccept.

Because the attacker controls the allocation size (via AfdSuperAccept), the copy size, and the copied bytes (via AfdSanConnectHandler), a copy size larger than the allocation produces a fully controlled kernel heap/pool overflow (in NCC’s demo: 0x1000-byte buffer, 0x2002-byte copy, classic 'A'*0x1000 + 'B'*0x1002 pattern observed in WinDbg over the MDL’s mapped VA).

The patch (verified in our ghidriff diff, 7623 → 7824)

Behind WIL feature flag Feature_3923194169, the copy length is now clamped against the destination buffer’s size field (*(uint*)(lVar15 + 0x18), sourced from the IRP stack) before both copy sites:

// post-patch 10.0.26100.7824 — clamp added before memcpy
if ((int)(uVar27 + 4) < (int)((uVar5 & 0xffff) - 8)) uVar27 = uVar27 + 4;
else                                                uVar27 = (short)uVar5 - 8;
memcpy(_Dst + 2, _Src, _Size);        // clamped

AfdSuperAccept and AfdRestartSuperAcceptGetAddress were also touched in the same change set (call-site/context alignment).


Reaching the bug — userspace call flow

Platform gate: AfdSanCreateHelper checks MmIsThisAnNtAsSystem() — SAN endpoint creation succeeds only on Windows Server SKUs with SAN components installed. On Windows 10/11 client the vulnerable code exists but the endpoint cannot be created; the IOCTL returns an error. This is why MSRC rates exploitation “Unlikely”.

AFD has no documented userspace SAN API; all interaction is raw IRP traffic (NCC’s approach, building on Akamai’s prior AFD research):

ntdll!NtCreateFile("\\Device\\Afd\\Endpoint", EA = "AfdSwOpenPacket")
        │                                   ← SAN endpoint (NOT "AfdOpenPacketXX")
        ▼
afd!AfdSanCreateHelper ── MmIsThisAnNtAsSystem() gate (Server only)
        │
        ├─► [handle A] SAN listener endpoint
        │       NtDeviceIoControlFile(hA, IOCTL 0x12003 AfdBind)      ← bind to address
        │       NtDeviceIoControlFile(hA, AfdSuperAccept)             ← allocates MDL
        │                                  buffer of attacker-chosen TotalLength
        │
        └─► [handle B] SAN connecting endpoint
                NtDeviceIoControlFile(hB, IOCTL 0x12003 AfdBind)
                NtDeviceIoControlFile(hB, IOCTL 0x120E2)  ──► afd!AfdSanConnectHandler
                                   │                            memcpy(listener_MDL + off,
                                   │                            user_src, *_Src)  ← BUG
                                   ▼
                     pool overflow with attacker size + contents → bugcheck
Element Value
Device \Device\Afd\Endpoint via NtCreateFile with EA name AfdSwOpenPacket (SAN)
IOCTL — bind 0x12003 (AfdBind)
IOCTL — vulnerable handler 0x120E2 (AfdSanConnectHandler)
Supporting call AfdSuperAccept on the listener handle (creates the undersized buffer)
Privileges Local authenticated user on Windows Server with SAN/RDMA present
Detection surface NtCreateFile on \Device\Afd\Endpoint with EA AfdSwOpenPacket is extraordinarily rare on real systems — a high-fidelity hunt/telemetry signal on its own

PoC policy (deliberate)

No new PoC is shipped for this CVE:

  1. NCC Group’s paper already contains a complete, debugger-verified PoC walkthrough (Python + WinDbg) — duplicating it adds nothing.
  2. A trigger only fires on Windows Server; it cannot be crash-validated on a Windows 11 client, and unvalidated kernel PoCs are worse than none.
  3. For blue-team purposes the signal is the attempt, not the crash: SAN endpoint creation (EA AfdSwOpenPacket) and IOCTL 0x120E2 have no legitimate userspace callers on modern systems.

See poc_cve_2026_21241.c for the client-reachable afd.sys bug from the same Patch Tuesday (CVE-2026-21241), which does produce a validatable crash.


Detection engineering

  • Sysmon/ETW (process): any process opening \Device\Afd\Endpoint with an Extended Attribute named AfdSwOpenPacket (visible via kernel Object/IoCreateFile tracing, e.g. Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File or a minifilter). On clients this should be near-zero prevalence.
  • IOCTL auditing: IOCTL 0x120E2 to AFD endpoints. Requires driver-level telemetry (ETW kernel IOCTL providers / EDR), but is unambiguous.
  • YARA (memory/disk): PoCs and tooling embed the EA string AfdSwOpenPacket and the IOCTL constant 0x120E2 — both are stable, low-collision indicators.
  • Crash forensics: bugchecks in afd!AfdSanConnectHandler / afd!AfdSuperAccept on pre-KB5077181 Server builds.

References

Attack Path

A SAN connect handler copies an attacker-controlled length into a buffer whose size the attacker also chose, overflowing kernel pool

Attack path for CVE-2026-21236 A SAN connect handler copies an attacker-controlled length into a buffer whose size the attacker also chose, overflowing kernel pool 01 — ENTRY Local low-privileged user on a Windows host with the legacy SAN / Winsock Direct (RDMA) path afd.sys still carries the System Area Network code path. Two IOCTL handlers cooperate across two socket handles. PR:L, AV:L; MSRC rates practical trigger as needing Server SAN/RDMA components. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT AfdSuperAccept on a listener SAN endpoint allocates an MDL of attacker-influenced size The Type3InputBuffer length fields are sanity-checked, then an MDL of user-influenced TotalLength is locked via IoAllocateMdl + MmProbeAndLockPages - this becomes the destination buffer. 03 — PATH AfdSanConnectHandler copies the connect request's address payload into that MDL On the connecting SAN endpoint, the handler maps the listener's buffer (MmMapLockedPages) and memcpy's the address payload in; the copy length is read from the user-controlled input buffer. 04 — MISSING CHECK The copy length is never checked against the allocated buffer size The attacker controls the allocation size (via AfdSuperAccept), the copy size, and the copied bytes (via AfdSanConnectHandler). NCC's demo: 0x1000-byte buffer, 0x2002-byte copy. 05 — PRIMITIVE Controlled kernel pool overflow -> SYSTEM A copy larger than the allocation overruns the mapped pool buffer with attacker bytes (CWE-122/787). The Feb 2026 fix clamps the copy length against the destination size field before both copy sites, gated behind Feature_3923194169.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

JUSTWIN Team