Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.04142 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-01 archive

Executive Summary

Use after free in Desktop Windows Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
More Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Jan 13 2026
Last Updated Jan 13 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.04142 — 0.89946 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.04142
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.89946 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

17 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5073455 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5073455 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5073457 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5073457 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5073450 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5073379 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5073379 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

6 patches
Article Type Restart
5073724 Security Update Yes
5073455 Security Update Yes
5074109 Security Update Yes
5073457 Security Update Yes
5073450 Security Update Yes
5073379 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · dwmcore.dll (KB5074109)

UAF in CSynchronousSuperWetInk destructor. Pre-patch, RemoveSource() was called only if IsSuperWetCompatible() returned true — a state that could be flipped by a low-priv attacker between registration and destruction (via CMD_SET_PROPERTY LookupMode=0), leaving a dangling pointer in CSuperWetInkManager::localStrokesVector. DirtyActiveInk later dereferences the freed vtable. Patch adds Feature_1732988217 CFR flag; when enabled, RemoveSource() runs unconditionally. Sibling fix in CDelegatedInkCanvas destructor uses the same flag. Full public exploit chain (GetRECT heap spray + __fnINSTRING/CStdAsyncStubBuffer2_Disconnect gadgets → VirtualProtect + WinExec) published by Joe Desimone / Elastic Security Labs.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7309 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.7623 Download
Function Address Change Note
CSynchronousSuperWetInk::~CSynchronousSuperWetInk 1802a9818 -> 1802a9ad8 code, length, address, called similarity 0.82
wil::details::WilApi_GetFeatureEnabledState 18022b11c refcount, calling similarity 1.0
CDelegatedInkCanvas::~CDelegatedInkCanvas 18029b90c code, length, called similarity 0.69
wil::details::ReportUsageToService 1800ea660 refcount, calling similarity 0.96
wil::details_abi::heap_buffer::push_back 180216760 refcount, calling similarity 1.0
wil::details::unique_storage<struct_wil::details::resource_policy<struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64,void_(__cdecl*)(struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64),&void___cdecl_ReleaseSRWLockExclusive(struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64),struct_wistd::integral_constant<unsigned___int64,1>,struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64,struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64,0,std::nullptr_t>_>::~unique_storage<struct_wil::details::resource_policy<struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64,void_(__cdecl*)(struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64),&void___cdecl_ReleaseSRWLockExclusive(struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64),struct_wistd::integral_constant<unsigned___int64,1>,struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64,struct__RTL_SRWLOCK*___ptr64,0,std::nullptr_t>_> 1802082fc refcount, calling similarity 1.0
wil::details::EnsureSubscribedToFeatureConfigurationChanges 180201d0c refcount, calling similarity 1.0
API-MS-WIN-CORE-SYNCH-L1-1-0.DLL::AcquireSRWLockExclusive EXTERNAL:0000005d refcount, calling similarity 1.0
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis — CVE-2026-20871

Overview

CVE CVE-2026-20871
Binary dwmcore.dll (Desktop Window Manager Composition Core)
Vulnerability class CWE-416: Use After Free
Impact Elevation of Privilege (Standard User → SYSTEM)
CVSS 3.1 7.8 (High) — AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7309 (December 2025)
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.7623 (January 2026, KB5074109)
Feature flag Feature_1732988217
Credited researcher Anonymous working with Trend Zero Day Initiative
Independent analysis Joe Desimone / Elastic Security Labs — “Patch diff to SYSTEM”

Executive Summary

A use-after-free in the Desktop Window Manager’s CSynchronousSuperWetInk destructor allows a local attacker to achieve code execution as SYSTEM. The destructor conditionally calls RemoveSource() based on IsSuperWetCompatible(), but an attacker can flip the object’s LookupMode property between registration (where it was 2, making IsSuperWetCompatible() return true) and destruction (where it’s now 0, returning false). This causes RemoveSource() to be skipped, leaving a dangling pointer in CSuperWetInkManager::localStrokesVector. DWM’s next render pass dereferences the freed vtable via DirtyActiveInk, giving the attacker RIP control.

A full exploit chain including heap spray, CFG-compatible gadgets, and arbitrary code execution was independently developed and published by Elastic Security Labs.

Root Cause

Conditional Unregistration in Destructor

The core bug is a state mismatch between registration and unregistration:

// PRE-PATCH — dwmcore.dll 10.0.26100.7309
CSynchronousSuperWetInk::~CSynchronousSuperWetInk(this)
{
    *(undefined ***)this = &_vftable_;
    bVar2 = IsSuperWetCompatible(this);   // checks LookupMode
    if (bVar2) {
        CSuperWetInkManager::RemoveSource(
            *(this->channel + 0x290),     // manager pointer
            (CSuperWetSource *)this);      // removes from localStrokesVector
    }
    // ... object freed here ...
}

The State Flip Attack

The IsSuperWetCompatible() check reads the object’s LookupMode field. An attacker controls this field via CMD_SET_PROPERTY (propId 10) through the DirectComposition batch buffer interface:

  1. Registration (during Draw): LookupMode=2 → IsSuperWetCompatible() returns TRUE → object pointer added to CSuperWetInkManager::localStrokesVector
  2. Flip: Attacker sends CMD_SET_PROPERTY propId 10, value 0 → LookupMode=0
  3. Destruction (when ink trail released): IsSuperWetCompatible() returns FALSE → RemoveSource() skipped → pointer remains in vector
  4. Object freed: Standard C++ destructor chain frees the 288-byte heap allocation
  5. UAF trigger: DWM’s render loop calls CSuperWetInkManager::DirtyActiveInk, which iterates localStrokesVector and executes (*(code **)((*puVar4)->vtable + 0x50))() — virtual call through the dangling pointer

The Dangling Pointer Dereference

// In CSuperWetInkManager::DirtyActiveInk (render loop)
for (each entry in localStrokesVector) {
    pcVar2 = *(code **)((*puVar4)->vtable + 0x50);  // read vtable from freed memory
    (*pcVar2)();                                      // call through it → RIP control
}

Since the attacker controls the 288-byte freed allocation (via heap spray), they control the fake vtable pointer at offset 0, and thus the function pointer at vtable+0x50.

Sibling Fix: CDelegatedInkCanvas Destructor

The same pattern exists in CDelegatedInkCanvas::~CDelegatedInkCanvas:

// PRE-PATCH
if (*(longlong *)(this + 0xc0) != 0) {
    CSuperWetInkManager::RemoveSource(...);
}

// POST-PATCH
bVar1 = Feature_1732988217::__private_IsEnabled();
if ((bVar1) || (*(longlong *)(this + 0xc0) != 0)) {
    CSuperWetInkManager::RemoveSource(...);    // always runs when flag on
}

Both destructors are fixed under the same feature flag — they share the same localStrokesVector dangling-pointer consequence.

The Fix

// POST-PATCH — dwmcore.dll 10.0.26100.7623
CSynchronousSuperWetInk::~CSynchronousSuperWetInk(this)
{
    *(undefined ***)this = &_vftable_;
    bVar2 = Feature_1732988217::__private_IsEnabled();
    if (!bVar2) {
        bVar2 = IsSuperWetCompatible(this);
        if (!bVar2) goto LAB_0;   // skip only when flag OFF and not compatible
    }
    // When flag is ON: RemoveSource() runs UNCONDITIONALLY
    CSuperWetInkManager::RemoveSource(
        *(this->channel + 0x290),
        (CSuperWetSource *)this);
LAB_0:
    // ... cleanup ...
}

The fix inverts the logic: when Feature_1732988217 is enabled (production rollout), RemoveSource() always executes regardless of LookupMode. The IsSuperWetCompatible() check only gates RemoveSource() when the flag is disabled (kill-switch fallback).

Published Exploit Chain (Elastic Security Labs)

The following is a summary of the full exploit chain published by Elastic Security Labs. This is documented for blue-team awareness.

Trigger Sequence

  1. Create D3D11 device + DXGI swap chain + DirectComposition device
  2. Create CSynchronousSuperWetInk via CreateDelegatedInkTrailForSwapChain() (resource type 0xa8, 288 bytes)
  3. Create CSuperWetInkVisual (type 0xa5), connect via CMD_SET_REFERENCE (propId 0x34)
  4. Set LookupMode=2 via CMD_SET_PROPERTY (propId 10) → registers with manager
  5. Present frames → DWM registers pointer in localStrokesVector
  6. Set LookupMode=0 → flip the guard condition
  7. Release ink trail → destructor skips RemoveSource(), frees object
  8. Present more frames → DirtyActiveInk dereferences freed pointer

Heap Spray (GetRECT)

Reclaim the 288-byte allocation using an 18-RECT array on CRegionGeometry (type 0x81) via CMD_SET_BUFFER_PROPERTY (0x0F, propId 5). Same LFH bucket (34), 72 controlled int32s = full byte-level control.

Gadget Chain (CFG-Compatible)

  1. __fnINSTRING (user32.dll): Converts relative offsets to absolute (solving ASLR without a leak), dispatches inner function pointer
  2. CStdAsyncStubBuffer2_Disconnect (combase.dll): Two sequential vtable calls — first calls VirtualProtect to make spray page RWX, second jumps to inline shellcode calling WinExec("cmd.exe", SW_SHOW)

DWM runs at System integrity → cmd.exe spawns as SYSTEM.

CVSS 4.0 Vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Metric Value Rationale
AV:L Local Requires local code execution
AC:L Low Deterministic trigger — no race condition
AT:N None DWM always running, no special conditions
PR:L Low Standard user can create DComp resources
UI:N None No user interaction required
VC:H/VI:H/VA:H High Full SYSTEM code execution

Detection

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_20871_DWM_SuperWetInk_UAF
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects tools exploiting CVE-2026-20871 (DWM SuperWetInk UAF)"
        author      = "OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG"
        date        = "2026-07-22"
        cve         = "CVE-2026-20871"
        severity    = "critical"

    strings:
        $dcomp_create   = "DCompositionCreateDevice" ascii wide
        $ink_trail      = "CreateDelegatedInkTrailForSwapChain" ascii wide
        $nt_batch       = "NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer" ascii wide
        $nt_commit      = "NtDCompositionCommitChannel" ascii wide
        $win32u         = "win32u" ascii wide nocase
        $d3d11          = "D3D11CreateDevice" ascii wide
        $dxgi_swap      = "CreateSwapChain" ascii wide
        $virtual_prot   = "VirtualProtect" ascii
        $winexec        = "WinExec" ascii
        $cmd_exe        = "cmd.exe" ascii wide

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        filesize < 2MB and
        ($dcomp_create or $ink_trail) and
        ($nt_batch or $nt_commit) and
        ($d3d11 or $dxgi_swap) and
        2 of ($virtual_prot, $winexec, $cmd_exe)
}

rule CVE_2026_20871_GetRECT_HeapSpray
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects GetRECT heap spray pattern used in CVE-2026-20871 exploit"
        author      = "OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG"
        date        = "2026-07-22"
        cve         = "CVE-2026-20871"

    strings:
        $batch_buf    = "ProcessChannelBatchBuffer" ascii wide
        $region_geom  = { A5 00 00 00 }   /* resource type 0xa5 (CSuperWetInkVisual) */
        $set_buf_prop = { 0F 00 00 00 }   /* CMD_SET_BUFFER_PROPERTY */
        $rect_count   = { 12 00 00 00 }   /* 18 RECTs */
        $fnINSTRING   = "__fnINSTRING" ascii
        $stub_disc    = "CStdAsyncStubBuffer2_Disconnect" ascii

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        $batch_buf and
        2 of ($region_geom, $set_buf_prop, $rect_count) and
        ($fnINSTRING or $stub_disc)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2026-20871 DWM DirectComposition Ink Trail Exploitation
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-4a7b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: >
    Detects suspicious DirectComposition activity characteristic of
    CVE-2026-20871 exploitation — process creating DComp ink trails
    followed by SYSTEM-level child process spawning from dwm.exe.    
author: OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG
date: 2026/07/22
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20871
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/patch-diff-to-system
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2026.20871
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\dwm.exe'
        IntegrityLevel: System
    filter_legitimate:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\LogonUI.exe'
            - '\consent.exe'
            - '\WerFault.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
level: critical
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate DWM child processes (rare)

---
title: CVE-2026-20871 DWM Crash or Restart After DirectComposition Activity
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-4b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: >
    Detects DWM crash or unexpected restart, which may indicate failed
    exploitation of CVE-2026-20871 (heap corruption from UAF).    
author: OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG
date: 2026/07/22
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 7031  # Service terminated unexpectedly
            - 7034  # Service terminated unexpectedly
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        param1|contains: 'Desktop Window Manager'
    condition: selection
level: high
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate DWM crashes due to driver issues
    - GPU driver updates causing DWM restart

Sysmon Configuration

<!-- CVE-2026-20871: DWM SuperWetInk UAF detection -->

<!-- Event 1: Suspicious child process from dwm.exe -->
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <ParentImage condition="end with">dwm.exe</ParentImage>
</ProcessCreate>

<!-- Event 7: DComp-related DLL loads in unusual processes -->
<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
    <ImageLoaded condition="end with">dcomp.dll</ImageLoaded>
</ImageLoad>
<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
    <ImageLoaded condition="end with">win32u.dll</ImageLoaded>
</ImageLoad>

<!-- Event 10: Process access to dwm.exe -->
<ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
    <TargetImage condition="end with">dwm.exe</TargetImage>
    <GrantedAccess condition="is">0x1F0FFF</GrantedAccess>
</ProcessAccess>

<!-- Event 11: Suspicious PE drops near exploitation -->
<FileCreate onmatch="include">
    <TargetFilename condition="contains">\AppData\Local\Temp\</TargetFilename>
    <Image condition="end with">dwm.exe</Image>
</FileCreate>

Version Matrix

Version File Version Status
Pre-patch (Dec 2025) 10.0.26100.7309 Vulnerable
Post-patch (Jan 2026, KB5074109) 10.0.26100.7623 Fixed (Feature_1732988217)

References


Analysis by OnlyFm252 / STAR Labs SG — 2026-07-22

Attack Path

State flipped between registration and destruction, so the destructor skips the cleanup that would have unlinked the object

Attack path for CVE-2026-20871 State flipped between registration and destruction, so the destructor skips the cleanup that would have unlinked the object 01 — ENTRY Low-privileged user drives DWM ink object registration CSynchronousSuperWetInk objects are registered into CSuperWetInkManager::localStrokesVector. DWM runs as SYSTEM. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Attacker flips the compatibility state via CMD_SET_PROPERTY with LookupMode = 0 The state that IsSuperWetCompatible() reports is attacker-controllable after registration has already happened. 03 — PATH The CSynchronousSuperWetInk destructor runs Pre-patch it calls RemoveSource() only when IsSuperWetCompatible() returns true. 04 — MISSING CHECK Cleanup is conditional on mutable state rather than on what was actually registered Flipping the state to false before destruction skips RemoveSource(), leaving a dangling pointer in localStrokesVector. The patch makes the removal unconditional, gated behind a new feature flag. 05 — PRIMITIVE DirtyActiveInk later dereferences the freed object's vtable Controlled virtual call inside the SYSTEM DWM process.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Anonymous working with Trend Zero Day Initiative