Important CVSS 7.4 EPSS 0.00319 🔬 Patch diffed 2026-01 archive

Executive Summary

Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows WalletService allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.4
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Jan 13 2026
Last Updated Jan 13 2026
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00319 — 0.24602 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.4 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
High
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
None
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.4

EPSS Score

0.00319
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.24602 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

16 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5073722 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5073722 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5073723 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5073723 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5073724 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5073455 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5073455 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5074109 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

5 patches
Article Type Restart
5073722 Security Update Yes
5073723 Security Update Yes
5073724 Security Update Yes
5073455 Security Update Yes
5074109 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · WalletService.dll (KB5074109)

Singleton-teardown race condition (CWE-362 -> use-after-free) in the Windows WalletService WalletService.dll TheWallet singleton, local EoP. TheWallet is a reference-counted singleton with a global instance pointer s_pInstance and a refcount at this+0x48. PRE: TheWallet::Release decrements the count and, when it reaches 0, enters the critical section, re-checks count==0, then UNCONDITIONALLY sets s_pInstance=0 (plain assignment) and destroys the object via vtable[0x50] - without accounting for another thread that re-referenced the object or created a new instance in the window. A concurrent thread that acquired/created the instance is left with a pointer to freed memory (TOCTOU -> UAF). IN-HOUSE ghidriff of WalletService.dll 10.0.26100.7309 -> .7623 (Jan 13 2026, KB5074109) confirms the fix: TheWallet::Release is the only code-changed function; gated behind CFR flag Feature_3403109688, after entering the critical section it double-checks the refcount (if *(this+0x48)!=0 abort) and clears the global pointer with InterlockedCompareExchange64(&s_pInstance, 0, this) (null only if s_pInstance still == this, abort on CAS failure) before destroying the object. Note: our x64 24H2 diff shows Feature_3403109688, differing from the circulated screenshots' Feature_3671545144 (build/arch difference); the double-check + CAS mechanism is identical. We ship what our diff shows.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.7309 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.7623 Download
Function Address Change Note
TheWallet::Release code change code (double-checked refcount + InterlockedCompareExchange64 on singleton pointer, CFR-gated) Pre: after refcount hits 0 and entering s_cs, unconditionally s_pInstance=0 (plain assignment) + destroy via vtable[0x50]. Post (Feature_3403109688 enabled): inside the lock, if *(this+0x48)!=0 goto done (abort - another thread re-referenced); LOCK; if (this==s_pInstance){s_pInstance=0;} UNLOCK (InterlockedCompareExchange64(&s_pInstance,0,this)); if CAS failed goto done; destroy only after both checks. Feature-disabled keeps the old teardown. Refcount at this+0x48 (this+18 DWORDs).
Feature_3403109688 gate added (CFR gate) CFR flag gating the double-check + compare-exchange teardown; the original unconditional s_pInstance=0 + destroy path still ships in .7623.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2026-20853 — Windows WalletService WalletService.dll Singleton Release Race: Unconditional Teardown in TheWallet::Release


Summary

Product Windows — WalletService.dll (WalletService; TheWallet singleton)
CVE ID CVE-2026-20853
Impact Elevation of Privilege
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.4 / 6.4 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-362 Race Condition (improper synchronization) — leads to UAF
Delivery Local race — re-reference the singleton during its reference-count teardown window
KB / Fixed build KB5074109 — WalletService.dll 10.0.26100.7623 (Win11 24H2 x64)
Patch Date January 13, 2026 (2026-Jan)
Pre-patch binary WalletService.dll 10.0.26100.7309 — SHA256 ce29edfce447d9f20218d33c60e98a7f2f339512735d3bcfb73227888e47e218
Post-patch binary WalletService.dll 10.0.26100.7623 — SHA256 0050a978e39b82cb28a554f9c1263f0cc90bf2fcf5b771c850832f50596c8d67
Feature flag Feature_3403109688 — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Product Description

WalletService.dll implements the Windows WalletService. TheWallet is a reference-counted singleton: a global instance pointer s_pInstance and a reference count (at this + 0x48). TheWallet::Release decrements the count and, when it reaches zero, clears the global pointer and destroys the object under a critical section (s_cs). The service is reachable without special privileges (PR:N), so a lifetime race in the singleton teardown is a local elevation vector.


Vulnerability Summary

Pre-patch, once the reference count reached zero TheWallet::Release entered the critical section, re-checked the count, and then unconditionally nulled the global pointer and destroyed the object:

// TheWallet::Release (10.0.26100.7309) — PRE-PATCH, from our diff
result = _InterlockedDecrement(this + 0x48);   // refcount--
if (result == 0) {
    EnterCriticalSection(&s_cs);
    if (*(int *)(this + 0x48) == 0) {
        s_pInstance = 0;                        // *** plain assignment ***
        (**vtable[0x50])(this, 1);              // *** destroy object ***
    }
    LeaveCriticalSection(&s_cs);
    return 0;
}
return result;

The teardown overwrites s_pInstance and frees the object without accounting for another thread that may have re-referenced the object or created a new instance in the brief window. This is a TOCTOU race: a concurrent thread that obtained/created the instance ends up with a pointer to memory this path then frees — a use-after-free reachable through the singleton (CWE-362 → UAF).


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, PR:N / AV:L; AC:H reflects the race timing.
  • Race: acquire a new reference to TheWallet (or create a new instance) exactly while another thread runs Release past the count-zero check.
  • Winning the race leaves a live reference pointing at a freed/destroyed object.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

After confirming the reference count is zero, Release destroys the object and clears the global pointer without re-validating, under the lock, that (a) the count is still zero and (b) s_pInstance still refers to this. A concurrent re-reference or re-creation therefore desynchronizes ownership from the teardown.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .7309 → .7623)

Gated behind Feature_3403109688, TheWallet::Release adds a double check inside the critical section and a compare-exchange on the global pointer:

// TheWallet::Release (10.0.26100.7623) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch
if (iVar1 - 1 != 0) return iVar1 - 1;               // refcount not 0 -> done
EnterCriticalSection(&s_cs);                         // CComCritSecLock
if (Feature_3403109688::IsEnabled()) {
    if (*(u64 *)(this + 0x48) != 0) goto done;       // *** double-check: another thread re-referenced -> abort ***
    LOCK();
    pTVar3 = s_pInstance;
    if (this == s_pInstance) { s_pInstance = 0; pTVar3 = this; }  // *** CAS: null only if s_pInstance == this ***
    UNLOCK();                                          // = InterlockedCompareExchange64(&s_pInstance, 0, this)
    if (this != pTVar3) goto done;                    // CAS failed -> abort
}
else {                                                // feature-disabled: original behaviour
    if (*(int *)(this + 0x48) != 0) goto done;
    s_pInstance = 0;
}
if (this != 0) (**vtable[0x50])(this, 1);            // destroy only after both checks pass
done:
LeaveCriticalSection(&s_cs);

If the count became non-zero after the lock (another thread re-referenced), the release is aborted; and the global pointer is cleared only when it still equals this via the interlocked compare-exchange — so a thread that installed a new instance is not clobbered and the object is destroyed only when it is truly the last owner. This closes the teardown race.

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_3403109688. The double-check + CAS path runs only when the flag is enabled; the original unconditional teardown still ships in .7623. Patch state is not determined by file version alone — the runtime-gated pattern seen across this corpus. Verify Feature_3403109688 is enabled to confirm the race-free path is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. Concurrent acquisition/creation and release of the WalletService TheWallet singleton; crashes shortly after the last Release.

Crash signature. UAF / invalid-pointer bugchecks in WalletService!TheWallet::Release or on the TheWallet vtable after teardown, on unpatched or flag-disabled builds.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_3403109688 is enabled so the double-check and compare-exchange run.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2026-20853 (Windows WalletService Elevation of Privilege), released 2026-01-13, KB5074109.
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/walletservice_dll-cve-2026-20853-ghidriff.md
  • Related same-KB Clipboard/singleton race: CVE-2026-20844 (clipboardserver.dll).

Attack Path

TheWallet::Release nulls the singleton and frees it without re-checking for a concurrent re-reference, leaving a dangling pointer

Attack path for CVE-2026-20853 TheWallet::Release nulls the singleton and frees it without re-checking for a concurrent re-reference, leaving a dangling pointer 01 — ENTRY Multiple threads use the WalletService TheWallet singleton (PR:N) TheWallet is a reference-counted singleton (global s_pInstance, refcount at this+0x48). TheWallet::Release runs when a reference is dropped. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Release decrements the refcount to 0 and enters the critical section On count==0 it takes s_cs and re-checks count==0, intending to tear down the singleton. 03 — PATH Pre-patch it unconditionally nulls s_pInstance and destroys the object s_pInstance = 0 (plain assignment) then vtable[0x50](this,1) frees the object, with no guard for a concurrent re-reference / new instance. 04 — MISSING CHECK Another thread re-references or re-creates the singleton in the window (CWE-362) That thread holds/installs a pointer while Release proceeds to free the object - the ownership check and the teardown are not atomic (TOCTOU). 05 — PRIMITIVE Live reference points at freed memory -> use-after-free -> EoP The concurrent thread uses the destroyed TheWallet object. The Jan 2026 fix (Feature_3403109688) double-checks the refcount under the lock and clears s_pInstance via InterlockedCompareExchange64(&s_pInstance,0,this), aborting if either check fails.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules