Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.0048 🔬 Patch diffed 2025-12 archive

Executive Summary

Improper input validation in Windows Message Queuing allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Dec 9 2025
Last Updated Dec 9 2025
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.0048 — 0.39242 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.0048
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.39242 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

18 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5071543 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5071543 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5071544 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5071544 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5071546 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5071546 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5071546 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5071546 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5071546 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5071546 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5071504 (Monthly Rollup) 5071507 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5068906 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23666 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5071504 (Monthly Rollup) 5071507 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5068906 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23666 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5071504 (Monthly Rollup) 5071507 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5068906 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23666 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5071504 (Monthly Rollup) 5071507 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5068906 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23666 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5071501 (Monthly Rollup) 5071506 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5068904 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.28064 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5071501 (Monthly Rollup) 5071506 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5068904 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.28064 Yes None Windows Server 2012 5071505 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5071505 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5071503 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5071503 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5071543 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5071543 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5071544 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5071544 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

5 patches
Article Type Restart
5071543 Security Update Yes
5071544 Security Update Yes
5071546 Security Update Yes
5071505 Monthly Rollup Yes
5071503 Monthly Rollup Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff (PDB symbols resolved from Microsoft symbol server) · mqac.sys (KB5071544)

CVE-2025-62455 patch (KB5071544, December 9 2025) fixes an arbitrary file write in mqac.sys (MSMQ kernel driver) via feature flag gating. Root cause: ACpCreateBitmap and CMMFAllocator::Create both called ZwCreateFile with a DOS path (C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l%07u.mq) resolved through the calling process device map (_EPROCESS.DeviceMap) with OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES.Attributes = 0x240 (OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE|OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE). Any unprivileged process can redirect this via NtSetInformationProcess(ProcessDeviceMap) to cause SYSTEM-level file creation at an attacker-chosen path. Patch: both functions now call EvaluateCurrentState(g_Feature_1840809274_58536133_FeatureDescriptorDetails) before ZwCreateFile. When the feature flag is enabled, Attributes is changed to 0x640 (adds OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK 0x400). Deployment uses Microsoft feature experimentation rollout (same gradual-deployment pattern as CLFS.sys patches) for kill-switch capability. ZwCreateFile and the DOS path remain in both versions — the fix is in the Attributes field, not path removal. Secondary error handling updated to distinguish STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xC0000022) from other failures, suggesting the new flag is expected to produce access-denied errors in exploit scenarios. 3 functions changed (code), 1 changed (address only), 1139 functions unchanged.

Pre-patch version 10.0.17763.7919 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.17763.8146 Download
Function Address Change Note
CMMFAllocator::Create 1c001001c → 1c000f0a4 code, length, address 906 → 1115 bytes (+209 bytes, 74% match). Primary patch site alongside ACpCreateBitmap. Feature flag EvaluateCurrentState(g_Feature_1840809274_58536133_FeatureDescriptorDetails) added twice: before ZwCreateFile to gate OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES.Attributes (0x240 → 0x640 when enabled, adding OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK 0x400) and after ZwCreateFile to gate extended WPP error logging. ZwCreateFile call and DOS path remain present in both versions.
ACpCreateBitmap 1c0010de4 → 1c000f76c code, length, address 439 → 626 bytes (+187 bytes, 78% match). Feature flag EvaluateCurrentState(g_Feature_1840809274_58536133_FeatureDescriptorDetails) added twice. OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES.Attributes changes from hardcoded 0x240 (OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE|OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE) to 0x640 (adds OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK 0x400) when feature enabled. ZwCreateFile remains in both versions. Error path now distinguishes STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xC0000022) with separate WPP_SF_SD message ID 0xf vs other failures (message ID 0x10), suggesting the feature flag change is expected to produce access-denied errors during testing. Early-return refactoring of null-check paths (no functional change to success path).
WPP_SF_S 1c000fcac → 1c000fdf4 code, refcount, length, sig, address, calling 116 → 114 bytes (96% match, minor). Now called by both ACpCreateBitmap and CMMFAllocator::Create (refcount 2 → 4). Signature param_2 type changed from undefined8 to undefined2. WPP trace GUID changed (WPP_513747e657fd3457b90b087b9bdb6357_Traceguids → WPP_6abace7bf7993bf0a051e292fbd0c98c_Traceguids), consistent with recompile updating trace registration.
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis — CVE-2025-62455

Overview

CVE CVE-2025-62455
Binary mqac.sys (Microsoft Message Queuing kernel driver)
Impact Elevation of Privilege
CVSS 7.8 (Important) — Exploitation Less Likely
CWE CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
Pre-patch version 10.0.17763.7919
Post-patch version 10.0.17763.8146
KB KB5071544 (December 2025)
Credit T0 (@t0zhang)

Root Cause

The MSMQ kernel driver (mqac.sys) creates storage files on disk using ZwCreateFile with a DOS path (C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l%07u.mq) that is resolved through the calling process’s device map (_EPROCESS.DeviceMap). Both ACpCreateBitmap and CMMFAllocator::Create set OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES.Attributes = 0x240 (OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE | OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE), missing OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK (0x400). Because mqac.sys runs at SYSTEM level, the ZwCreateFile calls bypass all access checks.

Any unprivileged process can redirect its device map via NtSetInformationProcess(ProcessDeviceMap), remapping \??\C: to a symbolic link pointing to an attacker-controlled path. When the driver subsequently calls ZwCreateFile with the DOS path, the path resolution follows the redirected device map, causing SYSTEM-level file creation at an attacker-chosen location.

This is architecturally identical to CVE-2025-60705 (csc.sys) — both use Attributes=0x240 on Zw* calls with caller-influenceable paths, but CVE-2025-62455 uses device map redirection rather than registry symlinks.

Ghidra-Verified Call Chain

User-mode entry point:
  MQSendMessage / MQReceiveMessage (mqrt.dll)
    → DeviceIoControl to \\.\MSMQ
      → IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL

Kernel call chain (pre-patch mqac.sys 10.0.17763.7919):

  DriverEntry @ 0x1c0092754
    → Registers ACDeviceControl in MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL]
      (DATA xrefs at 0x1c0012be2, 0x1c0012be9)

  ACDeviceControl @ 0x1c000ba10
    → IOCTL dispatch (big switch on IoControlCode)

    Path 1 — IOCTL 0x19651407 (ACAllocatePacket):
      → ACAllocatePacket @ 0x1c00053a8
        → CPacket::Create @ 0x1c0014e04
          → CPoolAllocator::malloc @ 0x1c0011ea4
            → CPoolAllocator::CreateAllocator @ 0x1c0011c24
              → ACpCreateBitmap @ 0x1c0010de4           [VULNERABLE]
                → ACpGenerateFileName(storagePath, index)
                → ZwCreateFile(handle, 0xc0100000,
                    &ObjAttr{Attributes=0x240}, ...)
              → CMMFAllocator::Create @ 0x1c0011254     [VULNERABLE]
                → ACpGenerateFileName(storagePath, index)
                → ZwCreateFile(handle, 0xc0100000,
                    &ObjAttr{Attributes=0x240}, ...)

    Path 2 — IOCTL 0x19651063 (ACRestorePackets):
      → ACRestorePackets @ 0x1c0009938
        → RestorePackets @ 0x1c0010828
          → ACpCreateBitmap @ 0x1c0010de4               [VULNERABLE]
          → CMMFAllocator::Create @ 0x1c0011254         [VULNERABLE]

Vulnerable Code — ACpCreateBitmap

From Ghidra decompilation at 0x1c0010de4 (439 bytes pre-patch):

CPingPong * ACpCreateBitmap(
    _DEVICE_OBJECT *param_1,
    wchar_t *param_2,       // storage path template (e.g. "C:\...\l%07u.mq")
    wchar_t **param_3,      // output: generated filename
    void **param_4)         // output: file handle
{
    // ... pool allocation ...

    pCVar4 = ACpGenerateFileName(param_2, *(uint *)(lVar1 + 0x148));
    // pCVar4 = L"C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l0000001.mq"

    RtlInitUnicodeString(local_70, pCVar4);
    local_40 = local_70;           // ObjectName
    local_50[0] = 0x30;            // Length
    local_38 = 0x240;              // Attributes = OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE | OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE
                                   //              ← MISSING OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK (0x400)
    local_30 = 0; uStack_28 = 0;  // SecurityDescriptor = NULL

    iVar2 = ZwCreateFile(&local_78,
        0xc0100000,                // DesiredAccess (GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE | SYNCHRONIZE)
        local_50,                  // ObjectAttributes with Attributes=0x240
        local_60,                  // IoStatusBlock
        &local_res8,               // AllocationSize = 0x2000
        0x80,                      // FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL
        1,                         // FILE_SHARE_READ
        3,                         // FILE_OPEN_IF
        0x2a,                      // CreateOptions
        0, 0);
}

Vulnerable Code — CMMFAllocator::Create

From Ghidra decompilation at 0x1c0011254 (906 bytes pre-patch):

CMMFAllocator * CMMFAllocator::Create(
    CPoolAllocator *param_1,
    wchar_t *param_2,       // storage path template
    int param_3)            // create flag
{
    pwVar4 = ACpGenerateFileName(param_2, ...);

    RtlInitUnicodeString(local_88, pwVar4);
    local_a8 = local_88;          // ObjectName
    local_b8[0] = 0x30;           // Length
    local_a0 = 0x240;             // Attributes = 0x240
                                  //              ← MISSING OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK
    local_b0 = 0;
    local_98 = 0; uStack_90 = 0;

    iVar2 = ZwCreateFile(&local_res8,
        0xc0100000,               // GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE | SYNCHRONIZE
        puVar7,                   // ObjectAttributes with Attributes=0x240
        local_78,                 // IoStatusBlock
        &local_res20,             // AllocationSize = g_ulHeapPoolSize
        0x80,                     // FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL
        1,                        // FILE_SHARE_READ
        3,                        // FILE_OPEN_IF
        0x8022,                   // CreateOptions (includes FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT)
        0, 0);

    // On success: creates section, maps memory, initializes allocator
    // On failure: logs via WPP tracing
}

ACpGenerateFileName — Path Construction

wchar_t * ACpGenerateFileName(wchar_t *param_1, uint param_2)
{
    // param_1 = L"C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l%07u.mq"
    // param_2 = file index (masked to 28 bits)
    StringCchPrintfW(pwVar5, uVar6, param_1, (ulonglong)(param_2 & 0xfffffff));
    // Result: L"C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l0000001.mq"
}

The DOS path C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l%07u.mq begins with a drive letter. When the kernel resolves this path, it prepends \??\ and looks up the drive letter through the process’s device map. By default, \??\C: points to \Device\HarddiskVolume3 (or similar), but NtSetInformationProcess(ProcessDeviceMap) can redirect it.

The Fix

The patch adds a feature-flag-gated OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK to both vulnerable functions:

  1. Both ACpCreateBitmap (grew from 439→626 bytes) and CMMFAllocator::Create (grew from 906→1115 bytes) now call EvaluateCurrentState(g_Feature_1840809274_58536133_FeatureDescriptorDetails) before ZwCreateFile
  2. When the feature flag is enabled, Attributes changes from 0x240 to 0x640 (adds OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK)
  3. OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK forces the kernel to perform access checks against the caller’s security context rather than SYSTEM, blocking device map redirection exploits
  4. Error handling updated to distinguish STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xC0000022) from other failures — the feature flag is expected to produce access-denied in exploit scenarios
  5. Kill-switch path preserves old 0x240 behavior for controlled rollout

Attack Surface Analysis

Prerequisites

  • MSMQ feature must be installed and running (not default on client SKUs, common on Server)
  • Any local user (low-privileged)
  • The attacker can install MSMQ via DISM /Online /Enable-Feature /FeatureName:MSMQ-Server if they have admin, or target systems where MSMQ is already installed

Attack Steps

  1. Call NtSetInformationProcess(ProcessDeviceMap) to redirect \??\C: to a symbolic link pointing to the attacker’s chosen target directory
  2. Open a handle to \\.\MSMQ via CreateFile
  3. Send IOCTL 0x19651407 (ACAllocatePacket) — this triggers CPoolAllocator::CreateAllocator → ACpCreateBitmap / CMMFAllocator::Create
  4. The driver calls ZwCreateFile with the DOS path C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l0000001.mq
  5. Path resolution follows the redirected device map → file is created at the attacker’s target path under SYSTEM context
  6. Result: arbitrary file creation as SYSTEM

Impact

Full SYSTEM-level file write primitive. An attacker can:

  • Plant a malicious DLL in a system directory for DLL hijacking
  • Overwrite security-critical files
  • Create files in protected locations for persistence
  • Combined with other primitives, achieve full SYSTEM code execution

Detection Rules

YARA — PoC Detection

rule CVE_2025_62455_MSMQ_DeviceMap_EoP
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects PoC/exploit code for CVE-2025-62455 mqac.sys device map EoP"
        author = "OnlyFm252"
        date = "2026-07-19"
        cve = "CVE-2025-62455"
        severity = "high"

    strings:
        $device1 = "\\\\.\\MSMQ" ascii wide
        $device2 = "\\Device\\MSMQ" ascii wide
        $api1 = "NtSetInformationProcess" ascii
        $api2 = "ProcessDeviceMap" ascii wide
        $api3 = "DeviceIoControl" ascii
        $ioctl1 = { 07 14 65 19 }  // 0x19651407 little-endian (ACAllocatePacket)
        $ioctl2 = { 63 10 65 19 }  // 0x19651063 little-endian (ACRestorePackets)
        $path1 = "msmq\\storage" ascii wide nocase
        $path2 = "l%07u.mq" ascii wide

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        (($device1 or $device2) and ($api1 or $api2)) or
        (($ioctl1 or $ioctl2) and ($path1 or $path2)) or
        ($api1 and $api2 and ($device1 or $device2))
}

YARA — Vulnerable Binary Detection

rule CVE_2025_62455_Vulnerable_mqac_sys
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects pre-patch mqac.sys vulnerable to CVE-2025-62455"
        author = "OnlyFm252"
        date = "2026-07-19"
        cve = "CVE-2025-62455"

    strings:
        // ACpCreateBitmap / CMMFAllocator::Create: MOV DWORD [rbp+X], 0x240
        // This is Attributes = OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE | OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE
        $attr_set = { C7 45 ?? 40 02 00 00 }  // mov [rbp+offset], 0x240

        $driver = "mqac.sys" ascii wide
        $pool_tag = "MQHA" ascii  // 0x4841514d reversed

        // Feature flag call should NOT be present in vulnerable version
        $feature_flag = "Feature_1840809274" ascii wide

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        $driver and
        $pool_tag and
        #attr_set >= 2 and
        not $feature_flag
}

Sigma — MSMQ Device Map Manipulation

title: Process Device Map Manipulation Targeting MSMQ
id: b4d7e182-9a3c-4f8b-a021-cve202562455a
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects processes that open the MSMQ device shortly after manipulating
    their process device map, which is the attack vector for CVE-2025-62455.
    NtSetInformationProcess(ProcessDeviceMap) redirects drive letter resolution,
    causing mqac.sys to create files at attacker-chosen paths.    
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/19
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-62455
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\msmq\storage\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.mq'
    filter_normal_path:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\'
    condition: selection and not filter_normal_path
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2025.62455

Sigma — Suspicious MSMQ Device Access

title: Suspicious MSMQ Device Access from Non-Service Process
id: b4d7e182-9a3c-4f8b-a021-cve202562455b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects non-standard processes accessing the MSMQ device, which is
    a prerequisite for triggering CVE-2025-62455. Normal MSMQ access
    comes from mqsvc.exe and legitimate MSMQ applications.    
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/19
logsource:
    category: file_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Device\MSMQ'
    filter_known:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\mqsvc.exe'
            - '\mmc.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_known
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2025.62455

Sysmon Configuration

<!-- CVE-2025-62455: Monitor for MSMQ device map exploitation -->

<!-- Rule: Detect MSMQ storage file creation outside normal path -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2025-62455" groupRelation="or">
  <FileCreate onmatch="include">
    <TargetFilename condition="end with">.mq</TargetFilename>
  </FileCreate>
</RuleGroup>

<!-- Rule: Detect mqac.sys driver load -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2025-62455-Driver" groupRelation="or">
  <DriverLoad onmatch="include">
    <ImageLoaded condition="end with">mqac.sys</ImageLoaded>
  </DriverLoad>
</RuleGroup>

<!-- Rule: Detect MSMQ device access from unusual processes -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2025-62455-Access" groupRelation="or">
  <FileCreate onmatch="include">
    <TargetFilename condition="contains">msmq\storage</TargetFilename>
  </FileCreate>
</RuleGroup>

References


Attack Path

Arbitrary file write as SYSTEM by hijacking the calling process device map used to resolve a DOS path in mqac.sys

Attack path for CVE-2025-62455 Arbitrary file write as SYSTEM by hijacking the calling process device map used to resolve a DOS path in mqac.sys 01 — ENTRY Local user with MSMQ installed sends or receives a queue message MQSendMessage / MQReceiveMessage (mqrt.dll) -> DeviceIoControl to \\.\MSMQ. Not default on client SKUs but common on Server. Any low-privileged account. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Attacker redirects their own process device map before triggering the path NtSetInformationProcess(ProcessDeviceMap) repoints the DOS device namespace, so 'C:' resolves wherever the attacker chooses. 03 — PATH The IOCTL dispatch reaches the storage-file creation helpers ACDeviceControl -> IOCTL 0x19651407 ACAllocatePacket -> CPacket::Create, and the parallel CMMFAllocator::Create path. Both open C:\Windows\System32\msmq\storage\l%07u.mq. 04 — MISSING CHECK ZwCreateFile called with a DOS path resolved through the caller's device map, Attributes = 0x240 OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE|OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE with no OBJ_FORCE_ACCESS_CHECK, and a DOS-relative rather than an absolute NT path. The kernel resolves it under the attacker's redirected map. The patch gates the path behind a feature flag and resolves it safely. 05 — PRIMITIVE File creation and write anywhere on disk with SYSTEM authority The attacker chooses the destination; the content is MSMQ storage data. Sufficient for DLL planting or overwriting a privileged binary.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

T0