Executive Summary

Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Oct 14 2025
Last Updated Oct 14 2025
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00396 — 0.32694 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

Verified Attribution

Report-backed
Verified binaryprjflt.sys
FunctionPrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder
WeaknessCWE-200
SourceBug-hunter LPE writeup (shared collection)
NotePrjLeak: placeholder-info write path leaks captured security descriptor data (SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor).

Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00396
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.32694 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

23 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5066782 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5066782 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5066780 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

6 patches
Article Type Restart
5066586 Security Update Yes
5066791 Security Update Yes
5066793 Security Update Yes
5066835 Security Update Yes
5066782 Security Update Yes
5066780 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · prjflt.sys (KB5066835)

Untrusted pointer dereference (CWE-822) in the Windows Projected File System minifilter prjflt.sys PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder, local EoP. An unprivileged user reaches PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder via PrjfPortMessage -> PrjfWritePlaceholderInformationHandler, passing a _PRJ_PLACEHOLDER_INFO whose inline SecurityDescriptor (at PlaceholderInfo+SdOffset) is fully attacker-controlled. PRE: PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder passes that raw user SecurityDescriptor straight to FltCreateFileEx2; because the create runs with PreviousMode == KernelMode, the downstream nt!SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor does NOT range-check the SD's Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl fields, so they can point to arbitrary kernel addresses that are later dereferenced. Diff of prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.6725 -> .6899 (Oct 14 2025, KB5066835) confirms the fix: gated behind CFR flag Feature_2983238971, PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder now pre-captures the user SD with SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor((PlaceholderInfo+0x44)+base, 1, 1) using PreviousMode = UserMode (arg 1), which validates the pointer fields and produces a sanitized self-relative kernel copy before FltCreateFileEx2, then frees it with SeReleaseSecurityDescriptor(local_f8, 1, 1). Note: our diff shows Feature_2983238971 (build/arch); PrjfWritePlaceholderInformationHandler and PrjfUpdatePlaceholderIfNeededHandler also gained the gate.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.6725 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.6899 Download
Function Address Change Note
PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder code change code (user SecurityDescriptor now captured as UserMode before FltCreateFileEx2, CFR-gated) Pre: raw user SD (PlaceholderInfo+SdOffset) passed to FltCreateFileEx2 while PreviousMode==KernelMode -> SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor skips Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl range checks -> arbitrary kernel pointer deref. Post (Feature_2983238971): iVar4 = SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor((ulonglong)*(uint*)(param_1+0x44)+param_2, 1, 1) captures/validates the SD as UserMode; on cleanup SeReleaseSecurityDescriptor(local_f8, 1, 1) frees the captured copy.
PrjfWritePlaceholderInformationHandler code change code (CFR-gated caller path) Caller that routes the user placeholder message to PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder; gained the Feature_2983238971 gate.
SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor import newly called SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor / SeReleaseSecurityDescriptor are now imported and called by PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder to capture and release the user SD as UserMode.
Feature_2983238971 gate added (CFR gate) CFR flag gating the SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor(UserMode) capture path; the original raw-SD path still ships when disabled.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2025-59207 — Windows Projected File System prjflt.sys User-Controlled Placeholder SecurityDescriptor Passed to File Creation Under KernelMode → Untrusted Pointer Dereference


Summary

Product Windows — prjflt.sys (Windows Projected File System / ProjFS minifilter; placeholder copy)
CVE ID CVE-2025-59207
Impact Elevation of Privilege
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.8 / 6.8 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-822: Untrusted Pointer Dereference (+ CWE-20: Improper Input Validation)
Delivery Local — a crafted placeholder message to the ProjFS communication port
KB / Fixed build KB5066835 — prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.6899 (Win11 24H2 x64)
Patch Date October 14, 2025 (2025-Oct)
Pre-patch binary prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.6725 — SHA256 ed9ae611924b369392d4ceceef99751da7a972186032480e8ad6258750e9ec74
Post-patch binary prjflt.sys 10.0.26100.6899 — SHA256 185bab380ff59a6ebad6551af33abfa4e00ab37049ac9515c686b6e0f88d0f27
Feature flag Feature_2983238971 — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Product Description

prjflt.sys is the Windows Projected File System (ProjFS) minifilter. A user-mode ProjFS provider communicates with it over a filter communication port; incoming messages are dispatched by PrjfPortMessage. A “write placeholder information” message routes through PrjfWritePlaceholderInformationHandler to PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder, which materialises a placeholder file by calling FltCreateFileEx2. The _PRJ_PLACEHOLDER_INFO message carries an inline SecurityDescriptor for the new file, located at PlaceholderInfo + SdOffset:

struct _PRJ_PLACEHOLDER_INFO {
    _PRJ_FILE_BASIC_INFO BasicInfo;
    ULONG EaLength; ULONG EaBufferOffset;
    ULONG SdLength; ULONG SdOffset;      // SecurityDescriptor = (char*)PlaceholderInfo + SdOffset
    ...
    char EaBuffer[]; char SecurityDescriptor[];
};

Vulnerability Summary

The SecurityDescriptor content is fully attacker-controlled (it comes from the user input buffer). Pre-patch, PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder passed that raw SecurityDescriptor straight to FltCreateFileEx2. File creation runs with PreviousMode == KernelMode, so when the object manager reaches nt!SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor it does not range-check the descriptor’s pointer fields — Owner, Group, Sacl, Dacl — which in an absolute security descriptor are pointers. An attacker can therefore point any of them at an arbitrary kernel address, which the kernel then dereferences while capturing the descriptor:

nt!SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor      // PreviousMode == KernelMode -> Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl NOT range-checked
nt!ObpCaptureObjectCreateInformation
nt!ObOpenObjectByNameEx
nt!IopCreateFile -> nt!IoCreateFileEx
FLTMGR!FltCreateFileEx2
prjflt!PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder        // passes the raw user SecurityDescriptor
prjflt!PrjfWritePlaceholderInformationHandler

Because the descriptor’s pointer fields are trusted as-is, a crafted placeholder message yields an untrusted-pointer dereference of an attacker-chosen kernel address (CWE-822). ProjFS placeholder creation runs in the kernel and the port is reachable by a low-privileged local user, so this is a local EoP primitive.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, low-privileged (PR:L, AV:L, AC:L): connect to the ProjFS communication port and send a “write placeholder information” message.
  • Craft _PRJ_PLACEHOLDER_INFO with a valid SdOffset/SdLength and an absolute SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR whose Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl fields point at the target kernel addresses.
  • Result: SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor (running as KernelMode) dereferences the attacker-chosen pointers without validation.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The user-supplied placeholder SecurityDescriptor was forwarded to FltCreateFileEx2 without first being captured/validated as user data. Since the file-create path executes with PreviousMode == KernelMode, SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor skipped the address-scope checks on the descriptor’s Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl pointers, letting them reference arbitrary kernel memory.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .6725 → .6899)

Gated behind Feature_2983238971, PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder now pre-captures the user SecurityDescriptor itself, as UserMode, before file creation — forcing the pointer-field validation that the KernelMode path had skipped — and releases the captured copy afterwards:

// PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder (10.0.26100.6899) — PATCHED, feature-enabled branch (from our diff)
// param_1 = PlaceholderInfo; *(uint*)(param_1 + 0x44) = SdOffset
iVar4 = SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor((ulonglong)*(uint *)(param_1 + 0x44) + param_2, 1, 1);
if (-1 < iVar4) goto LAB_5;      // proceed with the captured, validated SD
...
// cleanup:
uVar5 = Feature_2983238971__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();
if (((int)uVar5 != 0) && (local_f8 != 0))
    SeReleaseSecurityDescriptor(local_f8, 1, 1);   // free the captured copy

SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor(SecurityDescriptor, PreviousMode = UserMode /*1*/, ...) validates the descriptor’s Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl against the user-address range and produces a sanitised, self-relative kernel copy, which is then used for FltCreateFileEx2 in place of the raw user pointer. With the descriptor captured as UserMode, an out-of-range (kernel) pointer is rejected rather than dereferenced, closing the untrusted-pointer dereference. SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor / SeReleaseSecurityDescriptor are newly imported and called by the function, and the surrounding placeholder handlers (PrjfWritePlaceholderInformationHandler, PrjfUpdatePlaceholderIfNeededHandler) carry the same gate.

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_2983238971. The capture-as-UserMode path runs only when the flag is enabled; the original raw-SD path still ships when disabled. Verify Feature_2983238971 is enabled to confirm the fix is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. ProjFS “write placeholder information” messages whose _PRJ_PLACEHOLDER_INFO carries an absolute SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR with kernel-range Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl pointers; arbitrary-address / pool-read bugchecks in nt!SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor reached from prjflt!PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder → FltCreateFileEx2 on unpatched/flag-disabled builds.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_2983238971 is enabled.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2025-59207 (Windows Projected File System Elevation of Privilege), released 2025-10-14, KB5066835.
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/prjflt_sys-cve-2025-59207-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

A user-controlled placeholder SecurityDescriptor is passed to file creation under KernelMode, so its pointer fields are dereferenced without range checks

Attack path for CVE-2025-59207 A user-controlled placeholder SecurityDescriptor is passed to file creation under KernelMode, so its pointer fields are dereferenced without range checks 01 — ENTRY Local user sends a placeholder message to the ProjFS port prjflt.sys PrjfPortMessage -> PrjfWritePlaceholderInformationHandler -> PrjfCopyAsPlaceHolder, reachable unprivileged. AV:L/PR:L/AC:L. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Supplies a _PRJ_PLACEHOLDER_INFO with an attacker-controlled inline SecurityDescriptor SecurityDescriptor = PlaceholderInfo + SdOffset; Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl fields set to arbitrary kernel addresses. 03 — MISSING CHECK Raw user SD passed to FltCreateFileEx2 while PreviousMode == KernelMode (CWE-822) nt!SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor skips address-scope checks on Owner/Group/Sacl/Dacl when PreviousMode is KernelMode, so they are trusted as-is. 04 — PATH Kernel dereferences the attacker-chosen SD pointers during object create ObpCaptureObjectCreateInformation -> IopCreateFile -> IoCreateFileEx use the unvalidated SD fields. 05 — PRIMITIVE Untrusted kernel pointer dereference -> EoP The Oct 2025 fix (Feature_2983238971) pre-captures the SD via SeCaptureSecurityDescriptor with PreviousMode=UserMode, validating the pointers before use.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

ChenJian with Sea Security Orca Team