Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.00415 🔬 Patch diffed 2025-10 archive

Executive Summary

Improper access control in Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Oct 14 2025
Last Updated Oct 14 2025
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00415 — 0.34444 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00415
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.34444 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

33 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems 5066837 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 for x64-based Systems 5066837 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5066836 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5066836 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5066791 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5066793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5066872 (Monthly Rollup) 5066876 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27974 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5066872 (Monthly Rollup) 5066876 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27974 Yes None Windows Server 2012 5066875 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5066875 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5066873 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5066873 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5066836 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5066836 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5066586 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5066782 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5066782 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5066780 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

10 patches
Article Type Restart
5066837 Security Update Yes
5066836 Security Update Yes
5066586 Security Update Yes
5066791 Security Update Yes
5066793 Security Update Yes
5066835 Security Update Yes
5066875 Monthly Rollup Yes
5066873 Monthly Rollup Yes
5066782 Security Update Yes
5066780 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff + headless Ghidra decompile verification · ncsi.dll (KB5066835)

EoP to NETWORK SERVICE (CWE-284 Improper Access Control) in the Network List Service (netprofm) NCSI module. Any local user can forge the Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config ETW event 5600 ({5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5}); ncsi!EtwListener::ProcessEvent funnels attacker strings into ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString, which RegSetValueExW-s '<0|1><string>' into HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies with no validation. Combined with the pre-patch DACL on ...\NlaSvc\Parameters (INTERACTIVE could create subkeys -> registry key symbolic link), the coerced NETWORK SERVICE write lands at an arbitrary HKLM location; NETWORK SERVICE -> SYSTEM is a known step (Forshaw). Patch KB5066835 (ncsi.dll 10.0.26100.6899) adds ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot behind Feature_3499399482 AND tightens the registry DACL. VERIFIED 2026-07-22 via ghidriff + headless decompile (single code-changed function).

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.6725 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.6899 Download
Function Address Change Note
ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString 0x1800546d0 (pre) / 0x1800549f0 (post) code (verified via headless decompile 2026-07-22) Builds '<0|1><attacker string>' and RegSetValueExW-s it into the default value of HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies with NO input validation. Reached from ncsi!EtwListener::ProcessEvent via forged Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config ETW event 5600 (any local user). Fix: behind WIL flag Feature_3499399482, write only happens if ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot(input) is false ('..' strings dropped). NOTE: binary fix is only half the story — KB5066835 also removed INTERACTIVE create-subkey from the DACL on ...\NlaSvc\Parameters, the actual root cause (registry key symlink -> coerced NETWORK SERVICE write to arbitrary HKLM) per itm4n.
ncsi!ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot 0x180053294 added wcsstr(input, L'..') != NULL + WPP tracing; gates the registry write
Feature_3499399482 WIL plumbing (+ 5 more added) added CFR kill-switch for the new validation block
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2025-59201 — Windows NCSI ncsi.dll Elevation of Privilege (Coerced Registry Write via ETW + Registry DACL)


Summary

Product Microsoft Windows — ncsi.dll (Network Connection Status Indicator, hosted by the Network List Service netprofm)
Vendor Microsoft Corporation
Severity Important (MSRC) — CVSS v3.1 7.8 (High)
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (MSRC)
CVE Title Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (MSRC)
Affected Versions Windows 11 24H2 (and other supported SKUs) before KB5066835
Tested Version Windows 11 24H2 — ncsi.dll 10.0.26100.6725 (pre-patch) vs 10.0.26100.6899 (post-patch)
Impact Elevation of Privilege — arbitrary code execution as NETWORK SERVICE (MSRC FAQ); SYSTEM reachable from there via the well-known James Forshaw trick
CVE ID CVE-2025-59201
CWE CWE-284: Improper Access Control (MSRC wording — accurate: the root cause is a registry DACL)
PoC Available Yes — ETW trigger PoC (itm4n blog); blue-team trigger variant (poc_cve_2025_59201.c) derived from it
Exploit Available No public full exploit (registry-symlink chain documented conceptually by itm4n; no code released)
Patch Available Yes
Patch Date October 14, 2025 — KB5066835
Discovered @t0zhang (per MSRC acknowledgment)

Root Cause

This CVE has two halves, and the binary diff only shows one of them — itm4n’s central finding.

Half 1 (the code, visible in the diff)

ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString stores a string of the form "<0|1><input>" into the default value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies whenever the system’s proxy configuration changes. The input part is fully attacker-influenceable (it comes from proxy settings, see the ETW trigger below), and the function performed zero validation before calling RegSetValueExW — verified decompilation of the pre-patch build (10.0.26100.6725, StoreNcsiIEProxyString @ 0x1800546d0).

The patch (10.0.26100.6899, same function @ 0x1800549f0) adds the new helper ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot (@ 0x180053294, literally wcsstr(input, L"..") != NULL) and gates the write behind it — behind a WIL CFR flag, Feature_3499399482:

if (Feature_3499399482__private_IsEnabled()) {
    if (!ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot(param_1))
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ, buf, cb);   // '..' strings dropped
} else {
    RegSetValueExW(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ, buf, cb);       // legacy path
}

Half 2 (the actual vulnerability — a registry DACL)

The .. check looked like a path-traversal fix, but chasing what the traversal would even buy led itm4n to the real issue: the DACL on HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters granted the INTERACTIVE group permission to create subkeys. That enables a registry key symbolic link attack:

  1. A low-privilege interactive user creates/replaces the subkey path leading to ManualProxies with a registry symbolic link pointing at an arbitrary HKLM location.
  2. The attacker then fires the proxy-change ETW event (below).
  3. The Network List Service — running as NETWORK SERVICE — follows the symlink and performs RegSetValueExW of an attacker-chosen string at the attacker-chosen HKLM location.

KB5066835 also changed the DACL on Parameters (the INTERACTIVE create-subkey right was removed) — that is the real fix; the ncsi.dll .. check is complementary hardening. Neither half alone tells the whole story.

The trigger interface (how any local user reaches the write)

Proxy changes are broadcast as an ETW event by the Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config provider (GUID {5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5}), event ID 5600, level INFORMATION, with four fields: bAutoDetect (BOOL), pwszAutoConfigUrl, pwszProxy, pwszProxyBypass. netprofm’s ncsi.dll consumes it in EtwListener::ProcessEvent and funnels the strings into StoreNcsiIEProxyString. Any local user can EventRegister + EventWrite this exact event — no Settings app needed, no special privileges.


Complete Call Flow (userspace → vulnerable code)

[userspace, any integrity level]
EventRegister({5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5})
EventWrite(event ID 5600, level TRACE_LEVEL_INFORMATION,
           { bAutoDetect, pwszAutoConfigUrl, pwszProxy, pwszProxyBypass })
EventUnregister(...)
   (legitimate source: Settings > Network > Proxy page — same provider/event)

[Network List Service — svchost.exe -k LocalService -s netprofm, NETWORK SERVICE]
ETW consumer thread
  └─ ncsi!EtwListener::ProcessEvent            // event 5600 handler
       └─ ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString(input, bool)
            ├─ StringCchPrintfExW(buf, L"%s%s", bool ? L"1" : L"0", input)
            ├─ RegOpenKeyExW(HKLM, ...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies,
            │                0, KEY_SET_VALUE, &hKey)
            │     ← DACL/symlink decides WHERE this really lands  ← ROOT CAUSE
            ├─ input == NULL  → RegDeleteValueW(hKey, NULL)
            └─ else           → RegSetValueExW(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ, buf, cb)
                                   ← pre-patch: no validation
                                   ← post-patch: only if no ".." (Feature_3499399482)

Relevant interfaces

Layer Interface
Trigger ETW provider Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config {5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5}, event ID 5600
Userspace API EventRegister / EventWrite / EventUnregister (advapi32.dll)
Service Network List Service (netprofm, NETWORK SERVICE), module ncsi.dll
Vulnerable sink ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString → RegSetValueExW on HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies (default value)
Root-cause primitive Registry key symbolic link under HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters (pre-patch DACL: INTERACTIVE = create subkey)

Exploitation Scenario

  1. Plant the symlink — as a low-privilege interactive user, create a registry key symbolic link so the ManualProxies write resolves to an attacker-chosen HKLM target (pre-patch DACL allows subkey creation under Parameters).
  2. Fire the ETW event — forge the WinINet-Config event 5600 with the desired string content (the leading <0|1> prefix constrains the first character; choose the payload accordingly).
  3. Coerced write — netprofm writes the string at the symlink target as NETWORK SERVICE.
  4. Code execution as NETWORK SERVICE — weaponise the write (itm4n evaluated and rejected registry string redirection @dll,-id due to the forced leading 0/1; the precise weaponisation target is left as future work publicly).
  5. NETWORK SERVICE → SYSTEM — the classic James Forshaw technique (abusing the service’s impersonation privileges, e.g. RoguePotato-style).

Note: itm4n released only the ETW trigger PoC; no full public exploit exists. The PoC in this package is the safe trigger variant (unique marker string, self-verifying registry read-back).


Detection & Hunting (blue team)

High-signal telemetry

Source Indicator
Sysmon Event 12 (Registry key create/delete) Keys created under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters by non-SYSTEM, non-service processes — symlink planting (the smoking gun; legitimate interactive users have no business creating keys there)
Sysmon Event 13 (Registry value set) netprofm svchost (svchost.exe -k LocalService -s netprofm) setting the ManualProxies default value where Details contains .. — exploitation of the string-validation half; also any write landing outside ...\NlaSvc\... (symlink followed)
Sysmon Event 14 (Registry key/value rename) Renames under NlaSvc\Parameters — symlink setup variants
ETW Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config event 5600 fired by processes that are NOT the Settings app / known network tooling (hunt via ETW consumer tooling; low fidelity, high signal)
Registry ACL audit Baseline-diff the DACL of HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters — pre-patch it grants INTERACTIVE create-subkey; any re-appearance of that ACE on patched fleets is a regression/IoC

Sigma rule (starter)

title: CVE-2025-59201 NCSI Registry Symlink - Key Created Under NlaSvc Parameters
id: 5b2c9a10-5920-41c2-9a10-020255920100
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: registry_key
detection:
  selection:
    TargetObject|contains: '\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters'
  filter_services:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\svchost.exe'
      - '\System'
  filter_system:
    User|contains:
      - 'SYSTEM'
      - 'NETWORK SERVICE'
      - 'LOCAL SERVICE'
  condition: selection and not (filter_services or filter_system)
level: high
title: CVE-2025-59201 NCSI ManualProxies Write With Path Traversal
id: 5b2c9a10-5920-41c2-9a10-020255920101
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: registry_set
detection:
  selection:
    TargetObject|contains: '\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies'
    Details|contains: '..'
  condition: selection
level: critical

YARA (PoC marker — ETW constants)

rule CVE_2025_59201_PoC_marker {
    meta:
        description = "Detects NCSI ETW-trigger PoC tooling (provider GUID + event constants)"
        reference = "https://itm4n.github.io/cve-2025-59201-ncsi-eop/"
    strings:
        $guid   = { EA E5 02 54 DD 1B 90 43 82 BE E1 08 F1 E6 34 F5 }  // provider GUID
        $eid    = { E0 15 00 00 }                                      // event ID 5600 (LE)
        $api1   = "EventRegister" ascii
        $api2   = "EventWrite" ascii
        $marker = "cve_2025_59201_marker" wide
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and ($guid and 1 of ($api*)) and ($eid or $marker)
}

Quick hunt (PowerShell)

# Is the DACL still vulnerable? (pre-patch shows INTERACTIVE: CreateSubKey)
(Get-Acl 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters').Access |
  Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -match 'INTERACTIVE' }

Remediation

  1. Apply KB5066835 (October 2025) or later; verify ncsi.dll ≥ 10.0.26100.6899 and the tightened DACL on HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters (the DLL version alone does not tell you the ACL half is fixed).
  2. Alert on subkey creation under NlaSvc\Parameters by anything that isn’t a service/system process (Sigma above) — near-zero false positives.
  3. Hunt for ManualProxies values containing .. in historical registry telemetry.

Timeline

Date Event
2025-10-14 Microsoft October 2025 Patch Tuesday (KB5066835), CVE-2025-59201 assigned (credited to @t0zhang)
2025-10 itm4n publishes the analysis: DACL root cause + ETW trigger PoC
2026-07-22 This analysis: blue-team package; fix verified via ghidriff + headless Ghidra decompilation (ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot gate behind Feature_3499399482 in StoreNcsiIEProxyString)

References


Attack Path

Any local user can forge an ETW event that the Network List Service trusts as configuration input

Attack path for CVE-2025-59201 Any local user can forge an ETW event that the Network List Service trusts as configuration input 01 — ENTRY Local user writes a Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config ETW event 5600 Provider GUID {5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5}. ETW providers can be written by unprivileged processes; netprofm consumes them as NETWORK SERVICE. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT The event payload carries an attacker-chosen proxy string ncsi!EtwListener::ProcessEvent funnels the string straight through to the storage helper. 03 — PATH ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString writes it to the registry It builds '<0|1><attacker string>' and RegSetValueExW's it into the default value of HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies. 04 — MISSING CHECK The only gate is a '..' substring scan, and there is no authentication of the event source ncsi!ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot does wcsstr(input, L'..') and nothing else - it does not establish that the event came from a trusted producer. CWE-284. 05 — PRIMITIVE Attacker-controlled value written under HKLM by NETWORK SERVICE Elevation to NETWORK SERVICE with a write into a machine-wide configuration key that other components read back.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

T0