CVE-2025-59201 — Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Improper access control in Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems | 5066837 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 for x64-based Systems | 5066837 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5066836 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5066836 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5066874 (Monthly Rollup) 5066877 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065508 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23571 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5066872 (Monthly Rollup) 5066876 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27974 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5066872 (Monthly Rollup) 5066876 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5065468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27974 Yes None Windows Server 2012 | 5066875 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) | 5066875 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 | 5066873 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) | 5066873 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 | 5066836 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5066836 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 | 5066782 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) | 5066782 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) | 5066780 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5066837 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066836 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066586 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066791 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066793 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066835 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066875 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5066873 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5066782 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066780 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
EoP to NETWORK SERVICE (CWE-284 Improper Access Control) in the Network List Service (netprofm) NCSI module. Any local user can forge the Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config ETW event 5600 ({5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5}); ncsi!EtwListener::ProcessEvent funnels attacker strings into ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString, which RegSetValueExW-s '<0|1><string>' into HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies with no validation. Combined with the pre-patch DACL on ...\NlaSvc\Parameters (INTERACTIVE could create subkeys -> registry key symbolic link), the coerced NETWORK SERVICE write lands at an arbitrary HKLM location; NETWORK SERVICE -> SYSTEM is a known step (Forshaw). Patch KB5066835 (ncsi.dll 10.0.26100.6899) adds ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot behind Feature_3499399482 AND tightens the registry DACL. VERIFIED 2026-07-22 via ghidriff + headless decompile (single code-changed function).
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString |
0x1800546d0 (pre) / 0x1800549f0 (post) |
code (verified via headless decompile 2026-07-22) | Builds '<0|1><attacker string>' and RegSetValueExW-s it into the default value of HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies with NO input validation. Reached from ncsi!EtwListener::ProcessEvent via forged Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config ETW event 5600 (any local user). Fix: behind WIL flag Feature_3499399482, write only happens if ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot(input) is false ('..' strings dropped). NOTE: binary fix is only half the story — KB5066835 also removed INTERACTIVE create-subkey from the DACL on ...\NlaSvc\Parameters, the actual root cause (registry key symlink -> coerced NETWORK SERVICE write to arbitrary HKLM) per itm4n. |
ncsi!ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot |
0x180053294 |
added | wcsstr(input, L'..') != NULL + WPP tracing; gates the registry write |
Feature_3499399482 WIL plumbing (+ 5 more added) |
|
added | CFR kill-switch for the new validation block |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2025-59201 — Windows NCSI ncsi.dll Elevation of Privilege (Coerced Registry Write via ETW + Registry DACL)
Summary
| Product | Microsoft Windows — ncsi.dll (Network Connection Status Indicator, hosted by the Network List Service netprofm) |
|---|---|
| Vendor | Microsoft Corporation |
| Severity | Important (MSRC) — CVSS v3.1 7.8 (High) |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (MSRC) |
| CVE Title | Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (MSRC) |
| Affected Versions | Windows 11 24H2 (and other supported SKUs) before KB5066835 |
| Tested Version | Windows 11 24H2 — ncsi.dll 10.0.26100.6725 (pre-patch) vs 10.0.26100.6899 (post-patch) |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege — arbitrary code execution as NETWORK SERVICE (MSRC FAQ); SYSTEM reachable from there via the well-known James Forshaw trick |
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-59201 |
| CWE | CWE-284: Improper Access Control (MSRC wording — accurate: the root cause is a registry DACL) |
| PoC Available | Yes — ETW trigger PoC (itm4n blog); blue-team trigger variant (poc_cve_2025_59201.c) derived from it |
| Exploit Available | No public full exploit (registry-symlink chain documented conceptually by itm4n; no code released) |
| Patch Available | Yes |
| Patch Date | October 14, 2025 — KB5066835 |
| Discovered | @t0zhang (per MSRC acknowledgment) |
Root Cause
This CVE has two halves, and the binary diff only shows one of them — itm4n’s central finding.
Half 1 (the code, visible in the diff)
ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString stores a string of the form "<0|1><input>"
into the default value of
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies
whenever the system’s proxy configuration changes. The input part is fully
attacker-influenceable (it comes from proxy settings, see the ETW trigger
below), and the function performed zero validation before calling
RegSetValueExW — verified decompilation of the pre-patch build
(10.0.26100.6725, StoreNcsiIEProxyString @ 0x1800546d0).
The patch (10.0.26100.6899, same function @ 0x1800549f0) adds the new
helper ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot (@ 0x180053294, literally
wcsstr(input, L"..") != NULL) and gates the write behind it — behind a WIL
CFR flag, Feature_3499399482:
if (Feature_3499399482__private_IsEnabled()) {
if (!ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot(param_1))
RegSetValueExW(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ, buf, cb); // '..' strings dropped
} else {
RegSetValueExW(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ, buf, cb); // legacy path
}
Half 2 (the actual vulnerability — a registry DACL)
The .. check looked like a path-traversal fix, but chasing what the
traversal would even buy led itm4n to the real issue: the DACL on
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters granted the
INTERACTIVE group permission to create subkeys. That enables a
registry key symbolic link attack:
- A low-privilege interactive user creates/replaces the subkey path leading
to
ManualProxieswith a registry symbolic link pointing at an arbitrary HKLM location. - The attacker then fires the proxy-change ETW event (below).
- The Network List Service — running as NETWORK SERVICE — follows the
symlink and performs
RegSetValueExWof an attacker-chosen string at the attacker-chosen HKLM location.
KB5066835 also changed the DACL on Parameters (the INTERACTIVE
create-subkey right was removed) — that is the real fix; the ncsi.dll
.. check is complementary hardening. Neither half alone tells the whole
story.
The trigger interface (how any local user reaches the write)
Proxy changes are broadcast as an ETW event by the
Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config provider (GUID
{5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5}), event ID 5600, level
INFORMATION, with four fields: bAutoDetect (BOOL), pwszAutoConfigUrl,
pwszProxy, pwszProxyBypass. netprofm’s ncsi.dll consumes it in
EtwListener::ProcessEvent and funnels the strings into
StoreNcsiIEProxyString. Any local user can EventRegister +
EventWrite this exact event — no Settings app needed, no special
privileges.
Complete Call Flow (userspace → vulnerable code)
[userspace, any integrity level]
EventRegister({5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5})
EventWrite(event ID 5600, level TRACE_LEVEL_INFORMATION,
{ bAutoDetect, pwszAutoConfigUrl, pwszProxy, pwszProxyBypass })
EventUnregister(...)
(legitimate source: Settings > Network > Proxy page — same provider/event)
[Network List Service — svchost.exe -k LocalService -s netprofm, NETWORK SERVICE]
ETW consumer thread
└─ ncsi!EtwListener::ProcessEvent // event 5600 handler
└─ ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString(input, bool)
├─ StringCchPrintfExW(buf, L"%s%s", bool ? L"1" : L"0", input)
├─ RegOpenKeyExW(HKLM, ...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies,
│ 0, KEY_SET_VALUE, &hKey)
│ ← DACL/symlink decides WHERE this really lands ← ROOT CAUSE
├─ input == NULL → RegDeleteValueW(hKey, NULL)
└─ else → RegSetValueExW(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ, buf, cb)
← pre-patch: no validation
← post-patch: only if no ".." (Feature_3499399482)
Relevant interfaces
| Layer | Interface |
|---|---|
| Trigger | ETW provider Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config {5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5}, event ID 5600 |
| Userspace API | EventRegister / EventWrite / EventUnregister (advapi32.dll) |
| Service | Network List Service (netprofm, NETWORK SERVICE), module ncsi.dll |
| Vulnerable sink | ncsi!StoreNcsiIEProxyString → RegSetValueExW on HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies (default value) |
| Root-cause primitive | Registry key symbolic link under HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters (pre-patch DACL: INTERACTIVE = create subkey) |
Exploitation Scenario
- Plant the symlink — as a low-privilege interactive user, create a
registry key symbolic link so the
ManualProxieswrite resolves to an attacker-chosen HKLM target (pre-patch DACL allows subkey creation underParameters). - Fire the ETW event — forge the WinINet-Config event 5600 with the
desired string content (the leading
<0|1>prefix constrains the first character; choose the payload accordingly). - Coerced write — netprofm writes the string at the symlink target as NETWORK SERVICE.
- Code execution as NETWORK SERVICE — weaponise the write (itm4n
evaluated and rejected registry string redirection
@dll,-iddue to the forced leading0/1; the precise weaponisation target is left as future work publicly). - NETWORK SERVICE → SYSTEM — the classic James Forshaw technique (abusing the service’s impersonation privileges, e.g. RoguePotato-style).
Note: itm4n released only the ETW trigger PoC; no full public exploit exists. The PoC in this package is the safe trigger variant (unique marker string, self-verifying registry read-back).
Detection & Hunting (blue team)
High-signal telemetry
| Source | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Sysmon Event 12 (Registry key create/delete) | Keys created under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters by non-SYSTEM, non-service processes — symlink planting (the smoking gun; legitimate interactive users have no business creating keys there) |
| Sysmon Event 13 (Registry value set) | netprofm svchost (svchost.exe -k LocalService -s netprofm) setting the ManualProxies default value where Details contains .. — exploitation of the string-validation half; also any write landing outside ...\NlaSvc\... (symlink followed) |
| Sysmon Event 14 (Registry key/value rename) | Renames under NlaSvc\Parameters — symlink setup variants |
| ETW | Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config event 5600 fired by processes that are NOT the Settings app / known network tooling (hunt via ETW consumer tooling; low fidelity, high signal) |
| Registry ACL audit | Baseline-diff the DACL of HKLM\...\NlaSvc\Parameters — pre-patch it grants INTERACTIVE create-subkey; any re-appearance of that ACE on patched fleets is a regression/IoC |
Sigma rule (starter)
title: CVE-2025-59201 NCSI Registry Symlink - Key Created Under NlaSvc Parameters
id: 5b2c9a10-5920-41c2-9a10-020255920100
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_key
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters'
filter_services:
Image|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\System'
filter_system:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
condition: selection and not (filter_services or filter_system)
level: high
title: CVE-2025-59201 NCSI ManualProxies Write With Path Traversal
id: 5b2c9a10-5920-41c2-9a10-020255920101
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies'
Details|contains: '..'
condition: selection
level: critical
YARA (PoC marker — ETW constants)
rule CVE_2025_59201_PoC_marker {
meta:
description = "Detects NCSI ETW-trigger PoC tooling (provider GUID + event constants)"
reference = "https://itm4n.github.io/cve-2025-59201-ncsi-eop/"
strings:
$guid = { EA E5 02 54 DD 1B 90 43 82 BE E1 08 F1 E6 34 F5 } // provider GUID
$eid = { E0 15 00 00 } // event ID 5600 (LE)
$api1 = "EventRegister" ascii
$api2 = "EventWrite" ascii
$marker = "cve_2025_59201_marker" wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and ($guid and 1 of ($api*)) and ($eid or $marker)
}
Quick hunt (PowerShell)
# Is the DACL still vulnerable? (pre-patch shows INTERACTIVE: CreateSubKey)
(Get-Acl 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters').Access |
Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -match 'INTERACTIVE' }
Remediation
- Apply KB5066835 (October 2025) or later; verify
ncsi.dll ≥ 10.0.26100.6899and the tightened DACL onHKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters(the DLL version alone does not tell you the ACL half is fixed). - Alert on subkey creation under
NlaSvc\Parametersby anything that isn’t a service/system process (Sigma above) — near-zero false positives. - Hunt for
ManualProxiesvalues containing..in historical registry telemetry.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2025-10-14 | Microsoft October 2025 Patch Tuesday (KB5066835), CVE-2025-59201 assigned (credited to @t0zhang) |
| 2025-10 | itm4n publishes the analysis: DACL root cause + ETW trigger PoC |
| 2026-07-22 | This analysis: blue-team package; fix verified via ghidriff + headless Ghidra decompilation (ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot gate behind Feature_3499399482 in StoreNcsiIEProxyString) |
References
- itm4n — CVE-2025-59201: NCSI Elevation of Privilege
- MSRC — CVE-2025-59201
- Microsoft — NCSI overview
- OnlyFm252 diff report — ncsi_dll-kb5066835
Attack Path
Any local user can forge an ETW event that the Network List Service trusts as configuration input
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.