CVE-2025-55680 — Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
Verified Attribution
Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066791 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5066586 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 | 5066782 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) | 5066782 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) | 5066780 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5066586 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066791 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066793 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066835 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066782 |
Security Update | Yes |
5066780 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
TOCTOU race (CWE-367) in cldflt.sys HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders (IOCTL 0x903BC / CfCreatePlaceholders): the placeholder relName is validated for '\' and ':' while still living in a userspace buffer mapped into kernel VA via IoAllocateMdl+MmProbeAndLockPages+MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache (shared physical pages). A racing thread flips one wide char 'D'->'\' between validation and FltCreateFileEx2, so the create resolves through an attacker-planted junction inside the attacker's own sync root into a protected directory (e.g. C:\Windows\System32) — arbitrary file/directory creation as SYSTEM, leveraged for DLL side-loading privesc (Exodus Intelligence, patched October 2025 KB5066835). VERIFIED 2026-07-20 via GhidraMCP: fix snapshots the payload into kernel pool behind Feature_4257790267 (ExAllocatePool2+memcpy) so validate and use both read the private copy.
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
cldflt!HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders |
0x14005e934 (pre) / 0x14005e954 (post) |
code (verified via GhidraMCP 2026-07-20) | TOCTOU: relName validated ('\' 0x5C / ':' 0x3A scan) and then consumed by FltCreateFileEx2 directly from an MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache-mapped USERSPACE buffer; attacker thread flips 'D'->'\' between check and use so the create follows an attacker junction (e.g. JUSTASTRING -> C:\Windows\System32) => arbitrary file/dir creation as SYSTEM. Fix: behind new WIL flag Feature_4257790267, the entire payload is snapshotted into a private pool buffer (ExAllocatePool2 NonPagedPoolNx + ProbeForWrite + memcpy) and both the scan and ObjectName use the snapshot; results memcpy'd back on success. |
Feature_4257790267__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline (+ fallback/reporting) |
|
added | New CFR kill-switch gating the pool-snapshot path; legacy MDL path remains compiled in behind the flag |
cldflt!HsmFltProcessCreatePlaceholders (caller) |
|
context (unchanged) | IOCTL 0x903BC (Tag 0x9000001A=IO_REPARSE_TAG_CLOUD, OpType 0xC0000001) dispatch via HsmFltPreFILE_SYSTEM_CONTROL -> HsmiOpPrepareOperation; size checks nInBufferSize>=0x20, payload>=0x50 |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2025-55680 — Windows Cloud Files Minifilter cldflt.sys TOCTOU Privilege Escalation
Summary
| Product | Microsoft Windows — cldflt.sys (Cloud Files Minifilter driver) |
|---|---|
| Vendor | Microsoft Corporation |
| Severity | Important (MSRC) — CVSS v3.1 7.8 (High), temporal 6.8 |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C (MSRC) |
| CVE Title | Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (MSRC) |
| Affected Versions | Windows 10/11 and Server releases shipping cldflt.sys with the vulnerable HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders (bug present since at least the CVE-2020-17136 fix era) |
| Tested Version | Windows 11 24H2 — cldflt.sys 10.0.26100.6725 (pre-patch) vs 10.0.26100.6899 (post-patch) |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege — arbitrary file/directory creation anywhere on the system with kernel (OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE) privileges, i.e. effectively SYSTEM (writeup says “privilege escalation” without naming SYSTEM; SYSTEM-level effect inferred from the kernel-mode create — estimate) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-55680 |
| CWE | CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition |
| PoC Available | Yes (trigger PoC below, reconstructed from the Exodus Intelligence writeup) |
| Exploit Available | No public full exploit; Exodus disclosed the complete technique. MSRC: not exploited, not publicly disclosed pre-patch; exploitability assessment “Exploitation More Likely” |
| Patch Available | Yes |
| Patch Date | October 14, 2025 — KB5066835 |
| Discovered | March 2024, Michele Campa (Exodus Intelligence) |
Root Cause
HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders() processes CfCreatePlaceholders() requests. The
placeholder payload — including the relative filename (relName) — lives in
a userspace buffer owned by the calling process. The driver maps that
buffer into kernel virtual address space with the standard MDL sequence:
mdl = IoAllocateMdl(placeholderPayload, placeholderPayload_size, 0, 0, NULL);
ProbeForRead(placeholderPayload, placeholderPayload_size, 4);
MmProbeAndLockPages(mdl, KernelMode, IoReadAccess);
mapped = MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache(mdl, KernelMode, MmCached, NULL, FALSE, 0x40000010);
MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache does not copy — the kernel mapping and the
userspace buffer are backed by the same physical pages. Every read the
driver does through mapped can change underneath it at any time.
For each placeholder entry, the function then performs a classic double-fetch:
// [CHECK] — read #1 of the shared buffer: scan relName for '\' and ':'
for (i = 0; i < relName_len / 2; i++) {
ch = *(WCHAR *)((char *)mapped + relName_offset + 2*i);
if (ch == L'\\' || ch == L':')
return 0xC000CF0B; // reject
}
// ... time window ...
// [USE] — read #2 of the shared buffer: ObjectName STILL points into `mapped`
name.Buffer = (WCHAR *)((char *)mapped + relName_offset);
name.Length = name.MaximumLength = relName_len;
ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory = dirHandle; // BaseDirectoryPath
ObjectAttributes.Attributes = OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE | OBJ_INHERIT; // 0x240
FltCreateFileEx2(..., 0x100180 /*DesiredAccess*/, &ObjectAttributes, ...,
CreateOptions /*0x208020 | dir bit*/, ..., 0x800 /*IO_IGNORE_SHARE_ACCESS_CHECK*/, ...);
A second userspace thread that continuously rewrites the payload flips a single character between check and use:
"JUSTASTRINGDnewfile.dll" — passes the check (no backslash)
"JUSTASTRING\newfile.dll" — what FltCreateFileEx2 actually sees
If JUSTASTRING is a junction the attacker planted inside their own
sync root pointing at a protected directory (e.g. C:\Windows\System32),
FltCreateFileEx2 follows it — the minifilter passes no flag to fail on
reparse points — and creates newfile.dll there as SYSTEM. Writing a
payload into the new file and getting it side-loaded (e.g. via a privileged
service’s DLL search path) completes the privesc.
Why the check existed at all
The \ / : scan was itself a security fix — added for CVE-2020-17136
to stop path traversal via .. / absolute paths in placeholder names.
CVE-2025-55680 is the TOCTOU bypass of that very mitigation: the check is
correct, but it validates a buffer the attacker still owns.
The patch (verified via GhidraMCP, 2026-07-20)
The post-patch build (cldflt.sys 10.0.26100.6899) adds a new WIL
Controlled-Feature-Rollout flag, Feature_4257790267, and behind it
replaces the MDL shared mapping with a private pool snapshot of the
entire placeholder payload — HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders @ 0x14005e954
(pre-patch: 0x14005e934):
uVar7 = Feature_4257790267__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();
if (uVar7 == 0) {
// legacy: IoAllocateMdl + ProbeForRead + MmProbeAndLockPages
// + MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache → shared pages (vulnerable)
} else {
buf = ExAllocatePool2(NonPagedPoolNx, payload_size, 'HsSp');
ProbeForWrite(payload, payload_size, 4);
memcpy(buf, payload, payload_size); // snapshot into private pool
}
// ... entry loop: the '\' / ':' scan AND ObjectName.Buffer both read `buf`
// on success: memcpy(payload, buf, payload_size) copies results back
Both the check and the use now dereference the same private snapshot, so the
double-fetch is eliminated at the root — mutating the userspace buffer
mid-flight changes nothing. The legacy MDL path remains compiled in behind
the flag (CFR kill-switch pattern, same as CVE-2026-42980), but unlike that
case the new branch is real new code, so a function-level diff does show
HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders as changed.
Complete Call Flow (userspace → vulnerable code)
[userspace, any integrity level]
CfRegisterSyncRoot("C:\\Users\\<u>\\syncroot", ...) cldapi.dll — one-time setup
CfCreatePlaceholders(BaseDirectoryPath, PlaceholderArray, 1, 0, &n)
└─ cldapi.dll builds ioctl_0x903BC { Tag=0x9000001A, OpType=0xC0000001,
size>=0x50, placeholder_payload* (USER VA) }
└─ NtFsControlFile(hBaseDir, 0x903BC, inBuf, inLen) inLen >= 0x20
[kernel — cldflt.sys, minifilter pre-op]
HsmFltPreFILE_SYSTEM_CONTROL(CallbackData w/ FSCTL 0x903BC)
└─ HsmiOpPrepareOperation
└─ HsmFltProcessCreatePlaceholders
│ checks: nInBufferSize >= 0x20; ioctl_0x903BC.size >= 0x50
├─ HsmpRelativeStreamOpen(...) // handle to BaseDirectoryPath
└─ HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders(..., placeholder_payload, size)
├─ IoAllocateMdl / ProbeForRead / MmProbeAndLockPages
├─ mapped = MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache(...) // shared pages!
└─ loop over entries:
├─ copy fixed fields → placeholderPayload_stack
├─ [CHECK] scan mapped->relName for '\' / ':' ← read #1
├─ build ObjectAttributes{ RootDirectory=dir,
│ ObjectName → mapped->relName } ← read #2
└─ FltCreateFileEx2(...) // junction followed
Relevant interfaces
| Layer | Interface |
|---|---|
| Win32 API | CfRegisterSyncRoot, CfCreatePlaceholders (cldapi.dll) |
| Native API | NtFsControlFile / DeviceIoControl on a directory inside the sync root |
| IOCTL | 0x903BC with Tag = 0x9000001A (IO_REPARSE_TAG_CLOUD), OpType = 0xC0000001 |
| Kernel entry | cldflt!HsmFltPreFILE_SYSTEM_CONTROL (minifilter pre-callback for IRP_MJ_FILE_SYSTEM_CONTROL) |
| Vulnerable sink | cldflt!HsmpOpCreatePlaceholders → FltCreateFileEx2 |
ioctl_0x903BC input buffer layout (from the Exodus writeup):
| Offset | Size | Field |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | 4 | Tag = 0x9000001A |
| 0x04 | 4 | OpType = 0xC0000001 |
| 0x0C | 4 | size (≥ 0x50) |
| 0x10 | 8 | placeholder_payload → create_placeholder_t |
create_placeholder_t:
| Offset | Size | Field |
|---|---|---|
| 0x08 | 2 | relativeName_offset |
| 0x0A | 2 | relativeName_len |
| 0x0C | 2 | fileidentity_offset |
| 0x0E | 2 | fileidentity_len |
| 0x2E | 4 | fileAttributes |
| 0x50 | var | relName (wide chars) |
| var | var | fileid |
Exploitation Scenario (Exodus technique)
- Setup —
CfRegisterSyncRoot()on an attacker-owned directory; createJUSTASTRINGinside it as a junction →C:\Windows\System32. - Race — three thread classes:
- Create threads: loop
CfCreatePlaceholderswithrelName = L"JUSTASTRINGDnewfile.dll",fileAttributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL. - Changer threads: flip character 8
D ↔ \in the payload buffer with a small delay. - Monitor thread: polls for
C:\Windows\System32\newfile.dll; on success, stops the race and writes the DLL payload.
- Create threads: loop
- Privesc — DLL side-loading into a privileged process.
- Cleanup — remove placeholder/junction artifacts.
Win condition: the flip to \ lands after the check scan but before
FltCreateFileEx2 reads the name. The window is wide (object-manager lookup
setup between the scan and the create), so a few thousand iterations
typically suffice.
Detection & Hunting (blue team)
High-signal telemetry
| Source | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Sysmon Event 11 (FileCreate) | Files appearing in C:\Windows\System32, C:\Windows\SysWOW64, or program dirs whose creating process is a non-admin user process — especially .dll/.exe |
| Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688 | Processes calling CfRegisterSyncRoot (cldapi.dll loaded) that are not known sync engines (OneDrive.exe, etc.) |
| File system | Junctions/reparse points created inside sync-root directories pointing outside the sync root (audit FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT) |
| ETW | Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File / minifilter tracing: bursts of failed CfCreatePlaceholders (status 0xC000CF0B) from one process = race attempts |
Sigma rule (starter)
title: CVE-2025-55680 Cloud Files Placeholder TOCTOU - Junction in Sync Root
id: 9e4f6f10-5568-4c2e-9a10-020255568000
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\Windows\System32\'
- '\Windows\SysWOW64\'
filter_known_sync:
Image|contains:
- '\OneDrive'
- '\Nextcloud'
- '\Dropbox'
condition: selection and not filter_known_sync
level: high
YARA (PoC marker — payload constants)
rule CVE_2025_55680_PoC_marker {
meta:
description = "Detects artifacts of the cldflt.sys placeholder TOCTOU PoC"
reference = "https://blog.exodusintel.com/2025/10/20/microsoft-windows-cloud-files-minifilter-toctou-privilege-escalation/"
strings:
$ioctl = { 1A 00 00 90 01 00 00 C0 } // Tag 0x9000001A + OpType 0xC0000001 (LE bytes in buffer ctor)
$api1 = "CfCreatePlaceholders" ascii
$api2 = "CfRegisterSyncRoot" ascii
$marker = "JUSTASTRING" wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and 2 of ($api*) and ($ioctl or $marker)
}
Sysmon config fragment
<RuleGroup name="cve-2025-55680">
<FileCreate onmatch="include">
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\System32\</TargetFilename>
</FileCreate>
</RuleGroup>
(Combine with the creating-process filter above — the creating process is the race winner’s user process, not a service.)
Remediation
- Apply KB5066835 (October 2025) or later; verify
cldflt.sys ≥ 10.0.26100.6899. - Alert on sync-root registration by non-standard processes — legitimate use is essentially OneDrive and installed sync clients.
- Hunt for junctions under registered sync roots (registry:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CloudFiles\SyncRoots/ per-user equivalent — check on your build: this path is not mentioned in the Exodus writeup or Microsoft Cloud Files API docs and could not be verified from public sources; estimate).
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2024-03 | Exodus Intelligence discovers the race condition |
| 2025-10-14 | Microsoft October 2025 Patch Tuesday (KB5066835), CVE-2025-55680 assigned |
| 2025-10-20 | Exodus publishes full technical writeup |
| 2026-07-20 | This analysis: blue-team package derived from the Exodus writeup; fix verified via ghidriff + live GhidraMCP decompilation (pool snapshot behind Feature_4257790267) |
References
- Exodus Intelligence — Microsoft Windows Cloud Files Minifilter TOCTOU Privilege Escalation
- MSRC — CVE-2025-55680
- Microsoft Docs — CfCreatePlaceholders
- OnlyFm252 diff report — cldflt_sys-kb5066835
Attack Path
TOCTOU on a path validated in shared physical pages - a racing thread flips one character between the check and the create
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.