Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.00396 🔬 Patch diffed 2025-10 archive

Executive Summary

Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows Device Association Broker service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Exploitation Unlikely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Oct 14 2025
Last Updated Oct 14 2025
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00396 — 0.32694 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00396
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.32694 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

6 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

1 patch
Article Type Restart
5066835 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · das.dll (KB5066835)

Untrusted pointer dereference (CWE-822) in the Windows Device Association Broker service das.dll, local elevation of privilege from Medium Integrity to Local Service (Important, AV:L, AC:L, CVSS 7.8). das.dll brokers device association and stores per-device properties read/written via _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty, which route property data through _PnpValidatePropertyData (property data is typed - e.g. security-descriptor strings via ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW). PRE: device-property data was interpreted without fully validating its type/size against the supplied buffer, so a property whose declared type implies an embedded pointer/typed reference could cause the service to dereference an attacker-controlled (untrusted) pointer; no race is required (AC:L). Self-diff (ghidriff, --no-bsim) of das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 -> .6725 (Oct 14 2025, KB5066835; das file version .6725 ships in KB5066835 whose OS build is .6899) confirms the fix: _PnpValidatePropertyData (called by _PnpGetObjectProperty, _PnpSetObjectProperty, ValidFilter, ValidateQueryData) gains validation (body 889 -> 957 bytes, ratio 0.25) gated behind CFR flag Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation, validating the property type/size against the buffer before the data is interpreted. This same consolidated validation also fixes the companion use-after-free CVE-2025-50174; the two bugs are not separately isolable in the binary (confirmed-changed level).

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.5074 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.6725 Download
Function Address Change Note
_PnpValidatePropertyData code change code (device-property data validation added, CFR-gated) Body grew 889 -> 957 bytes (ratio 0.25); now calls Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation and validates property type/size against the supplied buffer before use, so a property whose type implies an embedded pointer can no longer drive an untrusted pointer dereference. Called by _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty / ValidFilter / ValidateQueryData.
Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation gate added (CFR gate) New CFR flag gating the property-data validation in _PnpValidatePropertyData; the original unvalidated interpretation still ships when disabled. (The remainder of the diff is WIL feature-flag infrastructure linked in with this gate.)
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2025-55677 — Windows Device Association Broker das.dll Unvalidated Device-Property Data → Untrusted Pointer Dereference


Summary

Product Windows — das.dll (Device Association Broker Service / Device Association Framework)
CVE ID CVE-2025-55677
Impact Elevation of Privilege (Medium Integrity → Local Service)
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.8 / 6.8 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-822: Untrusted Pointer Dereference
Delivery Local — supply crafted device-property data to the broker
KB / Fixed build KB5066835 — das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 (Win11 24H2 / Server 2025 x64; OS build 26100.6899)
Patch Date October 14, 2025 (2025-Oct)
Pre-patch binary das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 — SHA256 03b28d00d03ef4d5bfab345a19308a6ac52901a7d4c6c4af427baa79005e8917
Post-patch binary das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 — SHA256 38e7db1a2a268cbb8447bf3d44d1c89ded23dc61566d32a0e34a30c844b15614
Feature flag Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Unlikely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Companion CVE: the same das.dll update also fixes CVE-2025-50174 (CWE-416 use-after-free) via the same _PnpValidatePropertyData property-validation hardening. Both are addressed by the introduction of Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation.


Product Description

das.dll is the Device Association Broker Service (OneCore Device Association Framework), which brokers device pairing/association and stores per-device properties. Property values are read and written through _PnpGetObjectProperty and _PnpSetObjectProperty, which pass the property data to _PnpValidatePropertyData before it is interpreted. Property data is typed (e.g. security-descriptor strings via ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW), and some types carry embedded references.


Vulnerability Summary

Pre-patch, device-property data handed to the broker was interpreted without fully validating its type/size against the supplied buffer, so for a property whose type implies an embedded pointer/typed reference, a crafted value could cause the service to dereference an attacker-controlled (“untrusted”) pointer (CWE-822). Because the Device Association Broker runs at a higher privilege than the caller, a Medium-Integrity attacker who supplies crafted property data can elevate to Local Service (per the MSRC FAQ). Unlike the companion UAF, this path does not require a race (AC:L).

Confirmation level: the diff’s only security-relevant das.dll change is _PnpValidatePropertyData (body grew 889→957 bytes, now gated by Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation); the rest of the diff is WIL feature-flag plumbing pulled in with the new gate. The untrusted-pointer-dereference and the companion use-after-free are addressed by this single consolidated property validation and are not separately isolable in the binary; stated at confirmed-changed level.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, low-privileged / Medium Integrity (AV:L, AC:L, PR:L): reach the Device Association Broker property get/set interface.
  • Supply a crafted device property whose data does not match its declared type/size.
  • Result (pre-patch): the service dereferences an attacker-controlled pointer derived from the property data.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

Device-property data was interpreted (including as typed references) without validating the property type/size against the actual buffer, allowing a crafted property value to be treated as a pointer and dereferenced.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .5074 → .6725)

_PnpValidatePropertyData — called by _PnpGetObjectProperty, _PnpSetObjectProperty, ValidFilter, and ValidateQueryData — gains additional validation (function length 889 → 957 bytes; instruction ratio 0.25), gated behind Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation:

// _PnpValidatePropertyData(short *data, uint type, uint size) (10.0.26100.6725) — PATCHED (from the diff)
//   now calls Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation__private_IsEnabled() and, when enabled,
//   validates the property type/size against the supplied buffer BEFORE the data is
//   interpreted -- so a property whose declared type implies an embedded pointer/typed
//   reference can no longer be dereferenced when the data does not match.

With the property data validated before use, a crafted property can no longer drive the broker to dereference an untrusted pointer, closing the CWE-822 condition. (The same validation also constrains the buffer lifetime handling that caused the companion use-after-free, CVE-2025-50174.)

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation. The added property validation runs only when the flag is enabled; the original unvalidated interpretation still ships when disabled. Verify the flag is enabled to confirm the fix is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. Access-violation / crash telemetry in the Device Association Broker service (das!_PnpValidatePropertyData / _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty) on unpatched/flag-disabled builds when malformed device properties are submitted; unexpected device-property writes from Medium-Integrity processes.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation is enabled.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2025-55677 (Windows Device Association Broker Service Elevation of Privilege), released 2025-10-14, KB5066835.
  • Companion: CVE-2025-50174 (same binary/update, CWE-416 use-after-free).
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/das_dll-cve-2025-50174-55677-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

Crafted device-property data drives the broker to dereference an untrusted pointer

Attack path for CVE-2025-55677 Crafted device-property data drives the broker to dereference an untrusted pointer 01 — ENTRY Medium-Integrity attacker submits crafted device-property data Reaches the Device Association Broker property get/set interface (_PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty). AV:L / AC:L / PR:L (local, no race). 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Property data mismatches its declared type/size A property whose type implies an embedded pointer/typed reference carries an attacker-controlled value. 03 — MISSING CHECK Unvalidated property data dereferenced (CWE-822) Pre-patch the broker interprets the property data without validating type/size, dereferencing an attacker-controlled (untrusted) pointer. 04 — IMPACT Untrusted pointer dereference -> Local Service Controlled dereference in the higher-privileged broker elevates the attacker from Medium Integrity to Local Service.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Hwiwon Lee (hwiwonl), SEC-agent team
Jongseong Kim (nevul37), SEC-agent team