CVE-2025-55677 — Windows Device Association Broker Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows Device Association Broker service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5066835 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Untrusted pointer dereference (CWE-822) in the Windows Device Association Broker service das.dll, local elevation of privilege from Medium Integrity to Local Service (Important, AV:L, AC:L, CVSS 7.8). das.dll brokers device association and stores per-device properties read/written via _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty, which route property data through _PnpValidatePropertyData (property data is typed - e.g. security-descriptor strings via ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW). PRE: device-property data was interpreted without fully validating its type/size against the supplied buffer, so a property whose declared type implies an embedded pointer/typed reference could cause the service to dereference an attacker-controlled (untrusted) pointer; no race is required (AC:L). Self-diff (ghidriff, --no-bsim) of das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 -> .6725 (Oct 14 2025, KB5066835; das file version .6725 ships in KB5066835 whose OS build is .6899) confirms the fix: _PnpValidatePropertyData (called by _PnpGetObjectProperty, _PnpSetObjectProperty, ValidFilter, ValidateQueryData) gains validation (body 889 -> 957 bytes, ratio 0.25) gated behind CFR flag Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation, validating the property type/size against the buffer before the data is interpreted. This same consolidated validation also fixes the companion use-after-free CVE-2025-50174; the two bugs are not separately isolable in the binary (confirmed-changed level).
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
_PnpValidatePropertyData |
code change |
code (device-property data validation added, CFR-gated) | Body grew 889 -> 957 bytes (ratio 0.25); now calls Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation and validates property type/size against the supplied buffer before use, so a property whose type implies an embedded pointer can no longer drive an untrusted pointer dereference. Called by _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty / ValidFilter / ValidateQueryData. |
Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation |
gate |
added (CFR gate) | New CFR flag gating the property-data validation in _PnpValidatePropertyData; the original unvalidated interpretation still ships when disabled. (The remainder of the diff is WIL feature-flag infrastructure linked in with this gate.) |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2025-55677 — Windows Device Association Broker das.dll Unvalidated Device-Property Data → Untrusted Pointer Dereference
Summary
| Product | Windows — das.dll (Device Association Broker Service / Device Association Framework) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-55677 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege (Medium Integrity → Local Service) |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CVSS | 7.8 / 6.8 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C |
| CWE | CWE-822: Untrusted Pointer Dereference |
| Delivery | Local — supply crafted device-property data to the broker |
| KB / Fixed build | KB5066835 — das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 (Win11 24H2 / Server 2025 x64; OS build 26100.6899) |
| Patch Date | October 14, 2025 (2025-Oct) |
| Pre-patch binary | das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 — SHA256 03b28d00d03ef4d5bfab345a19308a6ac52901a7d4c6c4af427baa79005e8917 |
| Post-patch binary | das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 — SHA256 38e7db1a2a268cbb8447bf3d44d1c89ded23dc61566d32a0e34a30c844b15614 |
| Feature flag | Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation — the fix is CFR-gated |
| Exploitability | Exploitation Unlikely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC) |
Companion CVE: the same
das.dllupdate also fixes CVE-2025-50174 (CWE-416 use-after-free) via the same_PnpValidatePropertyDataproperty-validation hardening. Both are addressed by the introduction ofFeature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation.
Product Description
das.dll is the Device Association Broker Service (OneCore Device Association
Framework), which brokers device pairing/association and stores per-device
properties. Property values are read and written through _PnpGetObjectProperty
and _PnpSetObjectProperty, which pass the property data to _PnpValidatePropertyData
before it is interpreted. Property data is typed (e.g. security-descriptor strings via
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW), and some types carry embedded
references.
Vulnerability Summary
Pre-patch, device-property data handed to the broker was interpreted without fully
validating its type/size against the supplied buffer, so for a property whose type
implies an embedded pointer/typed reference, a crafted value could cause the service to
dereference an attacker-controlled (“untrusted”) pointer (CWE-822). Because the
Device Association Broker runs at a higher privilege than the caller, a
Medium-Integrity attacker who supplies crafted property data can elevate to Local
Service (per the MSRC FAQ). Unlike the companion UAF, this path does not require
a race (AC:L).
Confirmation level: the diff’s only security-relevant
das.dllchange is_PnpValidatePropertyData(body grew 889→957 bytes, now gated byFeature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation); the rest of the diff is WIL feature-flag plumbing pulled in with the new gate. The untrusted-pointer-dereference and the companion use-after-free are addressed by this single consolidated property validation and are not separately isolable in the binary; stated at confirmed-changed level.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local, low-privileged / Medium Integrity (
AV:L,AC:L,PR:L): reach the Device Association Broker property get/set interface. - Supply a crafted device property whose data does not match its declared type/size.
- Result (pre-patch): the service dereferences an attacker-controlled pointer derived from the property data.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
Device-property data was interpreted (including as typed references) without validating the property type/size against the actual buffer, allowing a crafted property value to be treated as a pointer and dereferenced.
The patch (confirmed — diff, .5074 → .6725)
_PnpValidatePropertyData — called by _PnpGetObjectProperty, _PnpSetObjectProperty,
ValidFilter, and ValidateQueryData — gains additional validation (function length
889 → 957 bytes; instruction ratio 0.25), gated behind
Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation:
// _PnpValidatePropertyData(short *data, uint type, uint size) (10.0.26100.6725) — PATCHED (from the diff)
// now calls Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation__private_IsEnabled() and, when enabled,
// validates the property type/size against the supplied buffer BEFORE the data is
// interpreted -- so a property whose declared type implies an embedded pointer/typed
// reference can no longer be dereferenced when the data does not match.
With the property data validated before use, a crafted property can no longer drive the broker to dereference an untrusted pointer, closing the CWE-822 condition. (The same validation also constrains the buffer lifetime handling that caused the companion use-after-free, CVE-2025-50174.)
Patch Completeness Assessment
CFR-gated behind Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation. The added property
validation runs only when the flag is enabled; the original unvalidated interpretation
still ships when disabled. Verify the flag is enabled to confirm the fix is live.
Detection Guidance
Behavioural. Access-violation / crash telemetry in the Device Association Broker
service (das!_PnpValidatePropertyData / _PnpGetObjectProperty /
_PnpSetObjectProperty) on unpatched/flag-disabled builds when malformed device
properties are submitted; unexpected device-property writes from Medium-Integrity
processes.
Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation is
enabled.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2025-55677 (Windows Device Association Broker Service Elevation of Privilege), released 2025-10-14, KB5066835.
- Companion: CVE-2025-50174 (same binary/update, CWE-416 use-after-free).
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/das_dll-cve-2025-50174-55677-ghidriff.md
Attack Path
Crafted device-property data drives the broker to dereference an untrusted pointer
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
Hwiwon Lee (hwiwonl), SEC-agent team
Jongseong Kim (nevul37), SEC-agent team