Important CVSS 7 EPSS 0.00323 🔬 Patch diffed 2025-10 archive

Executive Summary

Use after free in Windows Device Association Broker service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Oct 14 2025
Last Updated Oct 14 2025
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00323 — 0.25008 percentile
NVD CVSS 7 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
High
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.1

EPSS Score

0.00323
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.25008 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

6 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5066835 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

1 patch
Article Type Restart
5066835 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · das.dll (KB5066835)

Use-after-free (CWE-416, race-triggered) in the Windows Device Association Broker service das.dll, local elevation of privilege from Medium Integrity to Local Service (Important, AV:L, AC:H race, CVSS 7.0). das.dll brokers device association and stores per-device properties read/written via _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty, routing property data through _PnpValidatePropertyData; typed values (e.g. security-descriptor strings via ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, freed via LocalFree) involve allocated buffers. PRE: the property get/set handling did not adequately validate/serialize a property-data buffer/object lifetime against concurrent operations, so a race between property access and teardown could free a buffer while still in use - a use-after-free; winning the race (AC:H) in the higher-privileged broker elevates Medium Integrity to Local Service. Self-diff (ghidriff, --no-bsim) of das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 -> .6725 (Oct 14 2025, KB5066835; das file version .6725 ships in KB5066835 whose OS build is .6899) confirms the fix: _PnpValidatePropertyData (called by _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty / ValidFilter / ValidateQueryData) is hardened (body 889 -> 957 bytes, ratio 0.25) gated behind CFR flag Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation, validating property data for type/size/buffer consistency before use so the property-data object can no longer be used after being freed on a racing path. This same consolidated validation also fixes the companion untrusted-pointer-dereference CVE-2025-55677; the two bugs are not separately isolable in the binary (confirmed-changed level).

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.5074 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.6725 Download
Function Address Change Note
_PnpValidatePropertyData code change code (device-property data/lifetime validation added, CFR-gated) Body grew 889 -> 957 bytes (ratio 0.25); now calls Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation and validates property type/size/buffer consistency before use, constraining the property-data buffer (e.g. converted security descriptor freed via LocalFree) so it can no longer be used after free on a racing path. Called by _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty / ValidFilter / ValidateQueryData.
Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation gate added (CFR gate) New CFR flag gating the property-data validation in _PnpValidatePropertyData; the original handling still ships when disabled. (The remainder of the diff is WIL feature-flag infrastructure linked in with this gate.)
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2025-50174 — Windows Device Association Broker das.dll Device-Property Handling Race → Use-After-Free


Summary

Product Windows — das.dll (Device Association Broker Service / Device Association Framework)
CVE ID CVE-2025-50174
Impact Elevation of Privilege (Medium Integrity → Local Service)
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.0 / 6.1 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-416: Use After Free (race-triggered)
Delivery Local — win a race on device-property get/set
KB / Fixed build KB5066835 — das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 (Win11 24H2 / Server 2025 x64; OS build 26100.6899)
Patch Date October 14, 2025 (2025-Oct)
Pre-patch binary das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 — SHA256 03b28d00d03ef4d5bfab345a19308a6ac52901a7d4c6c4af427baa79005e8917
Post-patch binary das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 — SHA256 38e7db1a2a268cbb8447bf3d44d1c89ded23dc61566d32a0e34a30c844b15614
Feature flag Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Companion CVE: the same das.dll update also fixes CVE-2025-55677 (CWE-822 untrusted pointer dereference) via the same _PnpValidatePropertyData property validation. Both are addressed by the introduction of Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation.


Product Description

das.dll is the Device Association Broker Service (OneCore Device Association Framework), brokering device pairing/association and per-device properties. Property values are read/written via _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty, which route property data through _PnpValidatePropertyData. Typed property values — e.g. security-descriptor strings converted with ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW and released with LocalFree — involve allocated buffers whose lifetime must be managed across concurrent operations.


Vulnerability Summary

Pre-patch, the broker’s device-property get/set handling did not adequately serialize / validate the lifetime of a property-data buffer/object against concurrent operations, so a race (AC:H — “requires an attacker to win a race condition”) between property access and teardown could free a buffer/object while it was still in use — a use-after-free (CWE-416). Because the Device Association Broker runs at higher privilege than the caller, a Medium-Integrity attacker who wins the race can elevate to Local Service (per the MSRC FAQ).

Confirmation level: the diff’s only security-relevant das.dll change is _PnpValidatePropertyData (body grew 889→957 bytes, now gated by Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation); the remaining diff is WIL feature-flag plumbing pulled in with the new gate. The use-after-free and the companion untrusted-pointer-dereference (CVE-2025-55677) are addressed by this single consolidated property validation and are not separately isolable in the binary; stated at confirmed-changed level.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local, low-privileged / Medium Integrity (AV:L, PR:L); AC:H — must win a race between a device-property operation and the release/teardown of its data buffer.
  • Result: a property-data buffer/object is freed while still referenced by the broker.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The device-property get/set path did not safely validate/serialize a property-data buffer’s lifetime against concurrent operations, so a teardown could free it while another operation still used it.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .5074 → .6725)

The device-property validation routine _PnpValidatePropertyData — called by _PnpGetObjectProperty, _PnpSetObjectProperty, ValidFilter, and ValidateQueryData — is hardened (function length 889 → 957 bytes; instruction ratio 0.25) and gated behind Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation:

// _PnpValidatePropertyData(short *data, uint type, uint size) (10.0.26100.6725) — PATCHED (from the diff)
//   under Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation, property data is validated for
//   type/size/buffer consistency before use, constraining how the property-data
//   buffer/object (e.g. the converted security descriptor freed via LocalFree) is
//   handled -- so it can no longer be used after being freed on a racing path.

By validating property data before it is used (and constraining the associated buffer handling), the broker no longer operates on a freed property-data object on a racing path, closing the use-after-free. (The same validation also closes the companion untrusted-pointer-dereference, CVE-2025-55677.)

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation. The added validation runs only when the flag is enabled; the original handling still ships when disabled. Verify the flag is enabled to confirm the fix is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. Use-after-free / heap-corruption crashes in the Device Association Broker service (das!_PnpValidatePropertyData / _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty) on unpatched/flag-disabled builds, correlated with concurrent device-property operations from Medium-Integrity processes.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation is enabled.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2025-50174 (Windows Device Association Broker Service Elevation of Privilege), released 2025-10-14, KB5066835.
  • Companion: CVE-2025-55677 (same binary/update, CWE-822 untrusted pointer dereference).
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/das_dll-cve-2025-50174-55677-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

A race between a device-property operation and buffer teardown frees a property-data object still in use

Attack path for CVE-2025-50174 A race between a device-property operation and buffer teardown frees a property-data object still in use 01 — ENTRY Medium-Integrity attacker drives device-property get/set operations Reaches the Device Association Broker property interface (_PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty). AV:L / PR:L. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Wins a race against the property-data buffer teardown AC:H - the attacker triggers a concurrent teardown so the property-data buffer/object is freed while still referenced. 03 — MISSING CHECK Property-data object freed while in use (CWE-416) Pre-patch the get/set path does not validate/serialize the buffer lifetime, so the broker operates on a freed property-data object. 04 — IMPACT Use-after-free -> Local Service Reuse of the freed object in the higher-privileged broker elevates the attacker from Medium Integrity to Local Service.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules