CVE-2025-50174 — Windows Device Association Broker Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Use after free in Windows Device Association Broker service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 25H2 for x64-based Systems | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) | 5066835 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5066835 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Use-after-free (CWE-416, race-triggered) in the Windows Device Association Broker service das.dll, local elevation of privilege from Medium Integrity to Local Service (Important, AV:L, AC:H race, CVSS 7.0). das.dll brokers device association and stores per-device properties read/written via _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty, routing property data through _PnpValidatePropertyData; typed values (e.g. security-descriptor strings via ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, freed via LocalFree) involve allocated buffers. PRE: the property get/set handling did not adequately validate/serialize a property-data buffer/object lifetime against concurrent operations, so a race between property access and teardown could free a buffer while still in use - a use-after-free; winning the race (AC:H) in the higher-privileged broker elevates Medium Integrity to Local Service. Self-diff (ghidriff, --no-bsim) of das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 -> .6725 (Oct 14 2025, KB5066835; das file version .6725 ships in KB5066835 whose OS build is .6899) confirms the fix: _PnpValidatePropertyData (called by _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty / ValidFilter / ValidateQueryData) is hardened (body 889 -> 957 bytes, ratio 0.25) gated behind CFR flag Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation, validating property data for type/size/buffer consistency before use so the property-data object can no longer be used after being freed on a racing path. This same consolidated validation also fixes the companion untrusted-pointer-dereference CVE-2025-55677; the two bugs are not separately isolable in the binary (confirmed-changed level).
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
_PnpValidatePropertyData |
code change |
code (device-property data/lifetime validation added, CFR-gated) | Body grew 889 -> 957 bytes (ratio 0.25); now calls Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation and validates property type/size/buffer consistency before use, constraining the property-data buffer (e.g. converted security descriptor freed via LocalFree) so it can no longer be used after free on a racing path. Called by _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty / ValidFilter / ValidateQueryData. |
Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation |
gate |
added (CFR gate) | New CFR flag gating the property-data validation in _PnpValidatePropertyData; the original handling still ships when disabled. (The remainder of the diff is WIL feature-flag infrastructure linked in with this gate.) |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2025-50174 — Windows Device Association Broker das.dll Device-Property Handling Race → Use-After-Free
Summary
| Product | Windows — das.dll (Device Association Broker Service / Device Association Framework) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-50174 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege (Medium Integrity → Local Service) |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CVSS | 7.0 / 6.1 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C |
| CWE | CWE-416: Use After Free (race-triggered) |
| Delivery | Local — win a race on device-property get/set |
| KB / Fixed build | KB5066835 — das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 (Win11 24H2 / Server 2025 x64; OS build 26100.6899) |
| Patch Date | October 14, 2025 (2025-Oct) |
| Pre-patch binary | das.dll 10.0.26100.5074 — SHA256 03b28d00d03ef4d5bfab345a19308a6ac52901a7d4c6c4af427baa79005e8917 |
| Post-patch binary | das.dll 10.0.26100.6725 — SHA256 38e7db1a2a268cbb8447bf3d44d1c89ded23dc61566d32a0e34a30c844b15614 |
| Feature flag | Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation — the fix is CFR-gated |
| Exploitability | Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC) |
Companion CVE: the same
das.dllupdate also fixes CVE-2025-55677 (CWE-822 untrusted pointer dereference) via the same_PnpValidatePropertyDataproperty validation. Both are addressed by the introduction ofFeature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation.
Product Description
das.dll is the Device Association Broker Service (OneCore Device Association
Framework), brokering device pairing/association and per-device properties.
Property values are read/written via _PnpGetObjectProperty / _PnpSetObjectProperty,
which route property data through _PnpValidatePropertyData. Typed property values —
e.g. security-descriptor strings converted with
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW and released with LocalFree —
involve allocated buffers whose lifetime must be managed across concurrent operations.
Vulnerability Summary
Pre-patch, the broker’s device-property get/set handling did not adequately serialize /
validate the lifetime of a property-data buffer/object against concurrent operations,
so a race (AC:H — “requires an attacker to win a race condition”) between
property access and teardown could free a buffer/object while it was still in use —
a use-after-free (CWE-416). Because the Device Association Broker runs at higher
privilege than the caller, a Medium-Integrity attacker who wins the race can elevate to
Local Service (per the MSRC FAQ).
Confirmation level: the diff’s only security-relevant
das.dllchange is_PnpValidatePropertyData(body grew 889→957 bytes, now gated byFeature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation); the remaining diff is WIL feature-flag plumbing pulled in with the new gate. The use-after-free and the companion untrusted-pointer-dereference (CVE-2025-55677) are addressed by this single consolidated property validation and are not separately isolable in the binary; stated at confirmed-changed level.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local, low-privileged / Medium Integrity (
AV:L,PR:L);AC:H— must win a race between a device-property operation and the release/teardown of its data buffer. - Result: a property-data buffer/object is freed while still referenced by the broker.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The device-property get/set path did not safely validate/serialize a property-data buffer’s lifetime against concurrent operations, so a teardown could free it while another operation still used it.
The patch (confirmed — diff, .5074 → .6725)
The device-property validation routine _PnpValidatePropertyData — called by
_PnpGetObjectProperty, _PnpSetObjectProperty, ValidFilter, and ValidateQueryData
— is hardened (function length 889 → 957 bytes; instruction ratio 0.25) and gated
behind Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation:
// _PnpValidatePropertyData(short *data, uint type, uint size) (10.0.26100.6725) — PATCHED (from the diff)
// under Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation, property data is validated for
// type/size/buffer consistency before use, constraining how the property-data
// buffer/object (e.g. the converted security descriptor freed via LocalFree) is
// handled -- so it can no longer be used after being freed on a racing path.
By validating property data before it is used (and constraining the associated buffer handling), the broker no longer operates on a freed property-data object on a racing path, closing the use-after-free. (The same validation also closes the companion untrusted-pointer-dereference, CVE-2025-55677.)
Patch Completeness Assessment
CFR-gated behind Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation. The added validation runs
only when the flag is enabled; the original handling still ships when disabled. Verify
the flag is enabled to confirm the fix is live.
Detection Guidance
Behavioural. Use-after-free / heap-corruption crashes in the Device Association
Broker service (das!_PnpValidatePropertyData / _PnpGetObjectProperty /
_PnpSetObjectProperty) on unpatched/flag-disabled builds, correlated with concurrent
device-property operations from Medium-Integrity processes.
Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_KernelPnP_PropertyValidation is
enabled.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2025-50174 (Windows Device Association Broker Service Elevation of Privilege), released 2025-10-14, KB5066835.
- Companion: CVE-2025-55677 (same binary/update, CWE-822 untrusted pointer dereference).
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/das_dll-cve-2025-50174-55677-ghidriff.md
Attack Path
A race between a device-property operation and buffer teardown frees a property-data object still in use
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.