Important CVSS 7.4 EPSS 0.0041 🔬 Patch diffed 2025-09 archive

Executive Summary

Use after free in Windows Management Services allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.4
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Sep 9 2025
Last Updated Sep 9 2025
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.0041 — 0.34017 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.4 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
High
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
None
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.4

EPSS Score

0.0041
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.34017 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

11 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5065429 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5065429 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5065429 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5065429 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5065429 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5065429 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5065431 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5065431 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5065431 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5065431 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5065426 (Security Update) 5065474 (SecurityHotpatchUpdate) Important Elevation of Privilege 5063878 5064010 Base: 7.4 Temporal: 6.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.6584 10.0.26100.6508 Yes None Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5065426 (Security Update) 5065474 (SecurityHotpatchUpdate) Important Elevation of Privilege 5063878 5064010 Base: 7.4 Temporal: 6.4 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.26100.6584 10.0.26100.6508 Yes None Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5065425 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

3 patches
Article Type Restart
5065429 Security Update Yes
5065431 Security Update Yes
5065425 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · windows.management.service.dll (KB5065426)

Use-after-free (CWE-416, race-triggered) in the Windows Management Service windows.management.service.dll (Modern Deployment / Autopilot, runs as SYSTEM), local elevation of privilege to SYSTEM (Important, AV:L, AC:H race, CVSS 7.4). ModernDeployment::Autopilot::Core::AutopilotSurfaceHubHelper configures device properties via asynchronous operations ConfigurePropertiesAsync / ApplyPropertiesAsync that operate on a com_ptr_t<IDeviceManagementUtilities>. PRE (.5074): the async operation was built with MakeAsyncHelper / MakeOpLambda and the owning com_ptr to IDeviceManagementUtilities was released when the synchronous call returned - before the async continuation finished using it - so a concurrent teardown/completion could free the utilities object while the async operation still referenced it (race UAF). Because the service runs as SYSTEM and the operation is locally reachable, the freed-object reuse is a local EoP to SYSTEM. Diff of windows.management.service.dll 10.0.26100.5074 -> .6584 (Sep 9 2025, KB5065426) confirms the fix: gated behind CFR flag Feature_3628908857, both ConfigurePropertiesAsync and ApplyPropertiesAsync are reworked from MakeAsyncHelper+MakeOpLambda (non-owning; com_ptr destructed at scope exit) to MakeAsyncAction with an owning lambda (lambda_5875ca7f...) that has its own ctor/dtor and holds a strong com_ptr reference to the utilities object for the whole async action, keeping it alive until the operation completes.

Pre-patch version 10.0.26100.5074 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.26100.6584 Download
Function Address Change Note
AutopilotSurfaceHubHelper::ApplyPropertiesAsync code change code (async op now holds a strong com_ptr for its lifetime, CFR-gated) Pre: MakeAsyncHelper + MakeOpLambda; com_ptr_t<IDeviceManagementUtilities> released at synchronous scope exit while the async continuation still used it. Post (Feature_3628908857): MakeAsyncAction<WRL::AsyncCausalityOptions<&ApplyPropertiesAsync...>> with an owning lambda (lambda_5875ca7f...) that keeps a strong reference for the whole action.
AutopilotSurfaceHubHelper::ConfigurePropertiesAsync code change code (async op now holds a strong com_ptr for its lifetime, CFR-gated) Same fix as ApplyPropertiesAsync: switched from non-owning MakeOpLambda to an owning MakeAsyncAction lambda holding the IDeviceManagementUtilities com_ptr alive across the async operation.
MakeOpLambda / COperationLambdaVar / ~com_ptr_t<IDeviceManagementUtilities> code change code (async operation-lambda / object-lifetime machinery reworked) The operation-lambda helpers and the IDeviceManagementUtilities com_ptr destructor path were reworked to move ownership into the async action lambda.
Feature_3628908857 gate added (CFR gate) CFR flag gating the owning-lambda async lifetime; the original non-owning MakeOpLambda path still ships when the flag is disabled.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2025-54103 — Windows Management Service windows.management.service.dll Autopilot Async Property-Config Object Lifetime Race → Use-After-Free


Summary

Product Windows — windows.management.service.dll (Windows Management Service / Modern Deployment · Autopilot, runs as SYSTEM)
CVE ID CVE-2025-54103
Impact Elevation of Privilege (to SYSTEM)
MSRC severity Important
CVSS 7.4 / 6.4 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
CWE CWE-416: Use After Free (race-triggered)
Delivery Local — win a race against an async property-configuration operation
KB / Fixed build KB5065426 — windows.management.service.dll 10.0.26100.6584 (Win11 24H2 / Server 2025, x64)
Patch Date September 9, 2025 (2025-Sep)
Pre-patch binary windows.management.service.dll 10.0.26100.5074 — SHA256 2bb50af8651a79e17ed4ebc338e6054389d5633dfa48967589df073e9d55264c
Post-patch binary windows.management.service.dll 10.0.26100.6584 — SHA256 b1c4cbfa686cdada31dc0bb18fe2dbef0cd960758fe42141db43ba993970df86
Feature flag Feature_3628908857 — the fix is CFR-gated
Exploitability Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC)

Product Description

windows.management.service.dll implements the Windows Management Service (the Modern Deployment / MDM / Autopilot management component, running as SYSTEM). Its ModernDeployment::Autopilot::Core::AutopilotSurfaceHubHelper performs device-property configuration through asynchronous operations — ConfigurePropertiesAsync and ApplyPropertiesAsync — which operate on a device-management utilities object (com_ptr_t<IDeviceManagementUtilities>).


Vulnerability Summary

ConfigurePropertiesAsync / ApplyPropertiesAsync started an asynchronous action and its continuation referenced the IDeviceManagementUtilities object. Pre-patch, the async operation was built with MakeAsyncHelper / MakeOpLambda and the com_ptr_t<IDeviceManagementUtilities> was released when the synchronous call returned — before the asynchronous continuation had finished using it. A concurrent teardown/completion could therefore free the utilities object while the async operation still referenced it — a use-after-free (CWE-416), reached by winning the race (AC:H). Because the Management Service runs as SYSTEM and the operation is reachable locally, the freed-object reuse is a local elevation-of-privilege primitive to SYSTEM (per the MSRC FAQ).


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Local (AV:L, PR:N); AC:H — must win a race between an async property-config operation’s continuation and the release/teardown of the utilities object.
  • Result: the IDeviceManagementUtilities object is freed while the async operation still uses it.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The async property-configuration operations did not keep the IDeviceManagementUtilities object alive for the duration of the asynchronous work — the owning com_ptr was released at synchronous scope exit, so the async continuation could run against a freed object.

The patch (confirmed — diff, .5074 → .6584)

Gated behind Feature_3628908857, both ConfigurePropertiesAsync and ApplyPropertiesAsync are reworked from MakeAsyncHelper + MakeOpLambda (whose lambda did not own the object — the com_ptr_t<IDeviceManagementUtilities> was destructed at scope exit) to MakeAsyncAction with an owning lambda that constructs/destructs its captured state and holds a strong com_ptr reference to the utilities object for the whole async action:

// AutopilotSurfaceHubHelper::ApplyPropertiesAsync / ConfigurePropertiesAsync (10.0.26100.6584) — PATCHED (from the diff)
- MakeAsyncHelper<IAsyncAction, ...>( MakeOpLambda<0, CNoResult, <lambda_...>>( ... ) )   // pre: non-owning
-   ~com_ptr_t<IDeviceManagementUtilities>(...)                                            //      released at scope exit
+ MakeAsyncAction<Microsoft::WRL::AsyncCausalityOptions<&...ApplyPropertiesAsync...>>(
+     <lambda_5875ca7f...>( ... ))          // *** owning lambda: ctor/dtor manage a captured strong com_ptr ***

The new lambda (lambda_5875ca7f…) has its own constructor and destructor (lambda::lambda / lambda::~lambda), i.e. it owns the captured IDeviceManagementUtilities reference and keeps it alive until the async action completes, instead of the object being released when the synchronous call returned. With the object held by a strong reference for the operation’s lifetime, a concurrent free can no longer occur mid-operation, closing the race use-after-free.

Patch Completeness Assessment

CFR-gated behind Feature_3628908857. The owning-lambda async lifetime runs only when the flag is enabled; the original non-owning MakeOpLambda path still ships when disabled. Verify Feature_3628908857 is enabled to confirm the fix is live.


Detection Guidance

Behavioural. Use-after-free / heap-corruption crashes in the Windows Management Service (windows.management.service!ModernDeployment::Autopilot::Core::AutopilotSurfaceHubHelper::ConfigurePropertiesAsync / ApplyPropertiesAsync) on unpatched/flag-disabled builds, particularly under concurrent Autopilot/device-management property operations that race the utilities object’s lifetime within the SYSTEM service.

Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_3628908857 is enabled.


References

  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2025-54103 (Windows Management Service Elevation of Privilege), released 2025-09-09, KB5065426.
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/windows_management_service_dll-cve-2025-54103-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

A race frees the device-management utilities object while an Autopilot async property operation still uses it

Attack path for CVE-2025-54103 A race frees the device-management utilities object while an Autopilot async property operation still uses it 01 — ENTRY Local attacker drives an Autopilot property-configuration operation windows.management.service (SYSTEM) runs AutopilotSurfaceHubHelper::ConfigurePropertiesAsync / ApplyPropertiesAsync. AV:L / PR:N. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Wins a race against the async continuation AC:H - the attacker triggers a concurrent teardown/completion so the IDeviceManagementUtilities object is released while the async operation is still pending. 03 — MISSING CHECK Utilities object freed mid-operation (CWE-416) Pre-patch the owning com_ptr is released at synchronous scope exit, so the async continuation references a freed IDeviceManagementUtilities object. 04 — IMPACT Freed-object reuse -> SYSTEM The use-after-free in the SYSTEM management service is exploitable for local elevation of privilege to SYSTEM.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Taewoo (Tae_ω02)