CVE-2025-49677 — Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
Use after free in Microsoft Brokering File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Overview
Verified Attribution
Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5062552 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5062552 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5062552 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Use-after-free (CWE-416) in the Microsoft Brokering File System driver bfs.sys policy-entry reference lifecycle, local EoP to SYSTEM (race, AC:H). bfs.sys stores per-user/per-container policy entries (tag EsfB) reference-counted (RefNo) in an RTL_DYNAMIC_HASH_TABLE, driven from \Device\Bfs IOCTL 0x228004 (BfsDeviceIoControl -> BfsProcessSetPolicyRequest -> BfsInsertPolicyEntry/BfsGetPolicyEntry/BfsDereferencePolicyEntryEx). The policy-entry RefNo lifecycle was not consistently paired with hash-table membership/lookups, so an entry (the EsfB pool block) could be freed (via BfsInsertPolicyEntry -> ExFreePoolWithTag on a dropped refcount) while a concurrent BfsProcessSetPolicyRequest/BfsGetPolicyEntry still looked it up/used it -> UAF (reporter observed a steadily reproducible bugcheck whose freed block was the EsfB policy entry). Diff of bfs.sys 10.0.26100.4484 -> .4652 (Jul 8 2025, KB5062553) confirms the July fix reworks the policy-entry reference lifecycle across BfsInsertPolicyEntry, BfsDereferencePolicyEntryEx, BfsInsertNotPresentPolicyEntry and BfsCheckAndApplyPolicy, all newly gated by CFR flag Feature_3148938554, so an entry is not freed while still referenced/looked up. AppSilo token required (BfsIsApplicableToken/SeAppSiloSid). MSRC: exploitation requires winning a race; grants SYSTEM. Note: our diff shows Feature_3148938554 (build/arch); paired double-free is CVE-2025-49693.
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
BfsInsertPolicyEntry / BfsDereferencePolicyEntryEx / BfsInsertNotPresentPolicyEntry / BfsCheckAndApplyPolicy |
code change |
code (policy-entry reference lifecycle rework, CFR-gated) | Pre: EsfB policy-entry RefNo lifecycle not consistently paired with hash-table membership/lookups -> entry freed while concurrently referenced/looked up -> UAF. Post (Feature_3148938554): reference handling reworked so the entry is not freed while still referenced; local pointer copies nulled after ownership transfer (see CVE-2025-49693). |
Feature_3148938554 |
gate |
added (CFR gate) | CFR flag gating the policy-entry lifecycle rework; original path still ships when disabled. |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2025-49677 — Microsoft Brokering File System bfs.sys Policy-Entry Use-After-Free in the SetPolicy Path
Summary
| Product | Windows — bfs.sys (Microsoft Brokering File System; policy store) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2025-49677 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege (to SYSTEM) |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CVSS | 7.0 / 6.1 — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C |
| CWE | CWE-416: Use After Free (policy-entry reference lifecycle) |
| Delivery | Local — a SetPolicy request over \Device\Bfs IOCTL 0x228004 (race) |
| KB / Fixed build | KB5062553 — bfs.sys 10.0.26100.4652 (Win11 24H2 x64) |
| Patch Date | July 8, 2025 (2025-Jul) |
| Pre-patch binary | bfs.sys 10.0.26100.4484 — SHA256 0fb28e775b40c35f96ab4cb22df9c5ea5873fbaff012fa2268a253aa94361626 |
| Post-patch binary | bfs.sys 10.0.26100.4652 — SHA256 678c670cb8ba6b2a02260ccb27540f5894d5668b411404d07c16a262ab074411 |
| Feature flag | Feature_3148938554 — the fix is CFR-gated |
| Exploitability | Exploitation Less Likely; not publicly disclosed; not exploited (per MSRC) |
Product Description
bfs.sys (Microsoft Brokering File System) manages per-user / per-container policy
entries in a hash table (RTL_DYNAMIC_HASH_TABLE), each entry allocated with tag
EsfB and reference-counted (RefNo). The policy store is driven from
\Device\Bfs IOCTL 0x228004 (BfsDeviceIoControl → BfsProcessSetPolicyRequest
→ BfsInsertPolicyEntry / BfsGetPolicyEntry / BfsDereferencePolicyEntryEx), and
the entries back a config file under
\SystemRoot\System32\config\BFS\{usersid}\{containerid}.
Vulnerability Summary
The policy-entry reference lifecycle was mishandled, so an entry (the EsfB
pool block) could be freed while another code path still held / looked it up —
a use-after-free. The reporter observed a steadily reproducible bugcheck whose
freed block was the EsfB policy-entry pool, freed via
BfsInsertPolicyEntry → ExFreePoolWithTag and then still referenced when a
subsequent BfsProcessSetPolicyRequest / BfsGetPolicyEntry walked the policy
hash table:
nt!ExFreePoolWithTag
bfs!BfsInsertPolicyEntry // frees the EsfB policy entry (dropped refcount)
bfs!BfsGetPolicyEntry // later lookup finds/uses the freed entry
bfs!BfsProcessSetPolicyRequest
bfs!BfsDeviceIoControl
Because the hash-table slot / entry lifetime was not consistently synchronized with
the RefNo reference counting, a concurrent SetPolicy operation could free an entry
another thread was about to use (or double-drop its reference), yielding a
use-after-free of a kernel pool object (CWE-416). BFS runs in kernel and the SetPolicy
surface is reachable locally (from an AppSilo/AppContainer token), so the UAF is an
EoP-to-SYSTEM primitive; MSRC notes exploitation requires winning a race.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local (
PR:L,AV:L);AC:H— the attacker must win a race between SetPolicy operations on the policy hash table. - The BFS interface requires an AppSilo token (
BfsIsApplicableTokenchecks theSeAppSiloSidcapability); the reporter reached it via an AppContainer/AppSilo process. - Result: a freed policy entry is reused → kernel UAF → SYSTEM.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The EsfB policy-entry lifetime was governed by a RefNo reference count that was
not consistently paired with the hash-table membership and lookups, so an entry
could be dropped to zero and freed while still reachable/used by a concurrent
SetPolicy path.
The patch (confirmed — diff, .4484 → .4652)
Gated behind Feature_3148938554, the July 2025 update reworks the policy-entry
reference lifecycle across the SetPolicy path — our diff shows code changes in
BfsInsertPolicyEntry, BfsDereferencePolicyEntryEx, BfsInsertNotPresentPolicyEntry
and BfsCheckAndApplyPolicy, all newly gated by Feature_3148938554. The reference
handling is corrected so an entry is not freed while still referenced/looked up
(and the local pointer copies are nulled after ownership transfer — see the paired
double-free fix CVE-2025-49693), closing the race that freed a still-in-use policy
entry.
Patch Completeness Assessment
CFR-gated behind Feature_3148938554. The corrected lifecycle runs only when
the flag is enabled; the original path still ships when disabled. Verify
Feature_3148938554 is enabled to confirm the fix is live.
Detection Guidance
Behavioural. BFS SetPolicy requests (IOCTL 0x228004) from AppSilo/AppContainer
processes, especially concurrent ones on the same user/container; UAF / pool-
corruption bugchecks in bfs!BfsInsertPolicyEntry / BfsGetPolicyEntry /
BfsDereferencePolicyEntryEx (tag EsfB) on unpatched/flag-disabled builds.
Config. The fix is CFR-gated — confirm Feature_3148938554 is enabled.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2025-49677 (Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege), released 2025-07-08, KB5062553.
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/bfs_sys-cve-2025-49677-49693-ghidriff.md - Related same-KB BFS double-free: CVE-2025-49693.
Attack Path
A BFS policy entry is freed while a concurrent SetPolicy lookup still uses it, yielding a UAF to SYSTEM
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
ChenJian with Sea Security Orca Team