Executive Summary

Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
More Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Apr 8 2025
Last Updated Apr 8 2025
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.00933 — 0.57647 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

Verified Attribution

Report-backed
Verified binarymsi.dll
FunctionCMsiConfigurationManager::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter / CleanupTempPackages
WeaknessCWE-269
SourceExodusIntel (Endri Domi)
NoteWindows Installer COM arbitrary folder delete as SYSTEM via TempPackages. Patched Apr 2025. msi.dll IS in the curated collector.

Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 6.8

EPSS Score

0.00933
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.57647 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

31 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems 5055547 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 for x64-based Systems 5055547 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5055521 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5055521 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5055519 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5055519 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5055518 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5055518 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5055518 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5055518 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5055518 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5055518 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5055528 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5055528 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5055528 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5055528 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5055523 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5055523 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5055609 (Monthly Rollup) 5055596 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5053888 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23220 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5055609 (Monthly Rollup) 5055596 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5053888 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23220 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5055609 (Monthly Rollup) 5055596 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5053888 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23220 Yes None Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5055609 (Monthly Rollup) 5055596 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5053888 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.23220 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5055561 (Monthly Rollup) 5055570 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5053620 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27670 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5055561 (Monthly Rollup) 5055570 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5053620 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27670 Yes None Windows Server 2012 5055581 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5055581 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5055557 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5055557 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5055521 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5055521 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5055519 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5055519 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5055526 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5055526 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5055527 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 5055523 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2025 (Server Core installation) 5055523 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

10 patches
Article Type Restart
5055547 Security Update Yes
5055521 Security Update Yes
5055519 Security Update Yes
5055518 Security Update Yes
5055528 Security Update Yes
5055523 Security Update Yes
5055581 Monthly Rollup Yes
5055557 Monthly Rollup Yes
5055526 Security Update Yes
5055527 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff (PDB symbols resolved from Microsoft symbol server) · msi.dll (KB5055523)

Logic vulnerability — TempPackages registry trust boundary violation in Windows Installer (msi.dll). CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter unconditionally calls ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete without feature flag check, writing attacker-controlled paths to TempPackages registry. CleanupTempPackagesInternal runs as SYSTEM and calls FDeleteFolder on every TempPackages entry with recursive deletion. Exploitation: C:\Config.Msi delete → NULL DACL re-creation → .rbs rollback script swap → SYSTEM code execution. Patch: Feature_1997029688 check prevents ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete call.

Pre-patch version 5.0.26100.3323 Download
Post-patch version 5.0.26100.3775 Download
Function Address Change Note
CMsiConfigurationManager::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter 18018ba10 code COM entry point. IsAdmin() check, CreateFileW with DELETE (0x10000), FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT (0x200000), calls CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter
CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter 18018bb90 code VULNERABLE — unconditionally calls ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete without Feature_1997029688 check in pre-patch. Post-patch adds feature flag gate.
ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete 1801af264 code CElevate(true), opens TempPackages registry key, writes folder-delete entry via SetValue (vtable 0x30)
CleanupTempPackagesInternal 180186c6c code CElevate(true), enumerates TempPackages, calls FDeleteFolder for entries with folder flag (& 2)
FDeleteFolder 1801b29ac code FindFirstFileW/FindNextFileW loop, DeleteFileW for files, recursive for subdirs, RemoveDirectoryW, LockdownPath + SetFileAttributesW(0) fallback
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis — CVE-2025-27727

Overview

Field Value
CVE CVE-2025-27727
Binary msi.dll (Windows Installer)
Patch Date April 8, 2025
KB KB5055523 (Windows 11 24H2)
Pre-patch Version 5.0.26100.3323
Post-patch Version 5.0.26100.3775
CVSS 7.8 (Important)
CWE CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (‘Link Following’)
Impact Elevation of Privilege — Low-privileged user → SYSTEM
Reference Exodus Intelligence Blog

Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2025-27727 is a logic vulnerability in the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe, running as SYSTEM) exposed through the CMsiConfigurationManager COM interface in msi.dll. The vulnerability allows a low-privileged user to cause the MSI service to delete an arbitrary folder by scheduling its path in the TempPackages registry key via the SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter() COM method. The service does not validate that the folder being deleted was actually created by the installer — it blindly trusts whatever paths are stored in TempPackages.

The folder-deletion primitive can be chained into full SYSTEM code execution by:

  1. Deleting C:\Config.Msi (the MSI rollback folder)
  2. Re-creating it with a NULL DACL
  3. Swapping legitimate rollback scripts (.rbs) with malicious ones during a failing MSI install
  4. The MSI service executes the attacker-controlled rollback scripts as SYSTEM

Ghidra-Verified Call Flow (Pre-Patch, msi.dll 5.0.26100.3323)

User-mode COM client (any privilege level)
  │
  ├─► CoCreateInstance(CLSID {000C101C-...}) → CreateMsiServer @ 0x180116420
  │     └─ Instantiates CMsiConfigurationManager COM object
  │
  ├─► CMsiConfigurationManager::MsiBeginTransactionW (vtable offset 0xA0)
  │     └─ CMsiTransaction::CreateTransaction() → creates global transaction object
  │
  ├─► CMsiConfigurationManager::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter @ 0x18018ba10 (vtable offset 0xC8)
  │     ├─ EnterCriticalSection(&g_csServerInterfaceLock)
  │     ├─ Reads CMsiTransaction::m_pMsiTransaction (global transaction)
  │     ├─ IsAdmin() check
  │     │   └─ If NOT admin:
  │     │       ├─ StartImpersonating() — impersonates calling user
  │     │       ├─ CreateFileW(param_1, 0x10000 [DELETE], 1 [FILE_SHARE_READ],
  │     │       │              NULL, 3 [OPEN_EXISTING],
  │     │       │              0x2200000 [FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT],
  │     │       │              NULL)
  │     │       │   └─ Verifies caller has DELETE permission on folder
  │     │       │   └─ FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT prevents following junctions
  │     │       └─ StopImpersonating()
  │     │
  │     └─► CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter @ 0x18018bb90  [VULNERABLE]
  │           ├─ IsValidCaller(this) — verifies calling thread is transaction owner
  │           ├─ StringCchCopyW(this+0xa4, 0x104, param_1) — copies attacker path
  │           ├─ *(this+0xa0) = param_2 — stores filter flags
  │           │
  │           └─► CMsiTransaction::ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete @ 0x1801af264  [VULNERABLE]
  │                 ├─ CElevate(true) — elevates to SYSTEM
  │                 ├─ OpenRegistryKey(HKLM, "Software\Microsoft\Windows\
  │                 │                  CurrentVersion\Installer\TempPackages")
  │                 ├─ MsiString(param_1) — wraps user-supplied path
  │                 ├─ If folder (param_2=true): builds "#2" flag string
  │                 ├─ CMsiRegKey::SetValue(path_string, "#2")
  │                 │   └─ Writes: HKLM\...\TempPackages\"C:\Config.Msi" = REG_DWORD 0x2
  │                 └─ NO VALIDATION that path was created by MSI service
  │
  └─► CMsiConfigurationManager::CleanupTempPackages @ 0x180184b90 (vtable offset 0x50)
        └─► CleanupTempPackagesInternal @ 0x180186c6c
              ├─ CElevate(true) — elevates to SYSTEM
              ├─ OpenRegistryKey(HKLM, "Software\Microsoft\Windows\
              │                  CurrentVersion\Installer\TempPackages")
              ├─ Enumerate all registry values
              │   ├─ GetIntegerValue() — checks if numeric (folder flag)
              │   ├─ MsiString::Remove(str, 3, 0x23) — strips "#" prefix
              │   ├─ GetInteger() → parses flag value
              │   └─ If (flag & 2) != 0: FOLDER deletion path
              │
              └─► FDeleteFolder @ 0x1801b29ac  [RUNS AS SYSTEM]
                    ├─ FindFirstFileW(path\*.*)
                    ├─ Loop: FindNextFileW
                    │   ├─ Files: DeleteFileW(child_path)
                    │   │   └─ If fails: LockdownPath() → SetFileAttributesW(0) → DeleteFileW()
                    │   └─ Subdirs: FDeleteFolder(child_path) [recursive]
                    ├─ RemoveDirectoryW(param_1)
                    │   └─ If fails: LockdownPath() → SetFileAttributesW(0) → RemoveDirectoryW()
                    └─ NO VALIDATION of path origin — blindly deletes

Root Cause

The vulnerability is a trust boundary violation in the TempPackages registry mechanism:

  1. CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter (@ 0x18018bb90) copies an attacker-supplied folder path and unconditionally calls ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete, which writes the path to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\TempPackages as a folder-delete entry (flag 0x2).

  2. CleanupTempPackagesInternal (@ 0x180186c6c) enumerates TempPackages and calls FDeleteFolder as SYSTEM on every entry with the folder flag set. It does not validate that the paths were created by the MSI service — it blindly trusts the registry contents.

  3. The only access check is the CreateFileW call in CMsiConfigurationManager::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter (@ 0x18018ba10) which verifies the caller has DELETE permission on the folder. This is trivially satisfied for C:\Config.Msi because:

    • Any user can create folders at the root of C:\
    • User-created folders inherit permissive ACLs from the user
    • FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT prevents junction following, but this is irrelevant when the target is C:\Config.Msi itself
  4. FDeleteFolder (@ 0x1801b29ac) recursively deletes all contents and the folder itself. If RemoveDirectoryW fails (restrictive ACLs), it calls LockdownPath to override ACLs and retries — meaning even folders with restrictive DACLs can be deleted.

Exploitation Chain (C:\Config.Msi Delete → SYSTEM)

The folder-delete primitive becomes a full EoP via rollback script injection:

Phase 0 — Register C:\Config.Msi for deletion:

  • Create C:\Config.Msi with permissive ACLs
  • Open handle with DELETE permission
  • Call MsiBeginTransactionW() → SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter("C:\\Config.Msi") → CleanupTempPackages()
  • C:\Config.Msi is deleted as SYSTEM via FDeleteFolder

Phase 1 — Prepare Config.Msi with a locked rollback file:

  • Install a crafted .msi to create C:\Config.Msi with rollback data
  • During uninstall, the installer moves the installed file into C:\Config.Msi as an .rbf
  • Lock the .rbf to prevent the uninstaller from cleaning up
  • Delete the .rbf via FileDispositionInfo after the uninstaller gives up
  • C:\Config.Msi is now empty but registered in HKLM\...\Installer\Folders

Phase 2 — Trigger the SYSTEM folder delete:

  • Call CleanupTempPackages() to delete C:\Config.Msi as SYSTEM
  • The Folders registry entry persists

Phase 3 — Plant malicious rollback scripts:

  • Re-create C:\Config.Msi with NULL DACL (any user can create root folders)
  • Open a WRITE_DAC handle (NULL DACL grants full access)
  • Start a failing MSI install — installer recognizes folder via Folders registry, writes .rbs
  • Installer sets restrictive DACL, but exploit’s handle retains WRITE_DAC (checked at open time)
  • Re-apply NULL DACL via NtSetSecurityObject
  • Swap .rbs with malicious rollback script
  • Installer executes attacker’s rollback script as SYSTEM

Mitigations

The MSI service process (msiexec.exe) has RedirectionGuard enabled (EnforceRedirectionTrust: True), which blocks NTFS junction/symlink traversal by unprivileged users. This prevents generic junction-based attacks but does NOT mitigate the C:\Config.Msi attack path, since the attacker creates a real folder (not a junction) and the exploit operates on the folder’s contents directly.

Patch Analysis

Microsoft patched by adding a feature flag check in CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter:

Pre-patch (vulnerable):
  IsValidCaller(this)
  StringCchCopyW(this+0xa4, 0x104, param_1)
  *(this+0xa0) = param_2
  ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete(this, this+0xa4, true)  ← ALWAYS CALLED

Post-patch (fixed):
  IsValidCaller(this)
  StringCchCopyW(this+0xa4, 0x104, param_1)
  *(this+0xa0) = param_2
  if (Feature_1997029688::IsEnabled())               ← NEW CHECK
    return 0;                                         ← SUCCESS, but NO registry write
  else
    ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete(this, this+0xa4, true) ← kill-switch path only

The feature flag Feature_1997029688 gates the call to ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete. When enabled (default in patched builds), SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter returns success (0) without writing the folder path to TempPackages. This breaks the exploit chain at its root — CleanupTempPackages will never find an attacker-controlled path.

The kill-switch path (feature disabled) preserves the old behavior for controlled rollback capability — same gradual deployment pattern used in CLFS.sys and mqac.sys patches.

Detection Rules

YARA — Vulnerable msi.dll Binary Detection

rule CVE_2025_27727_Vulnerable_MSI_DLL
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects pre-patch msi.dll vulnerable to CVE-2025-27727 (missing Feature_1997029688 check in SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter)"
        author = "OnlyFm252 Blue Team"
        date = "2025-04-08"
        cve = "CVE-2025-27727"
        reference = "https://blog.exodusintel.com/2026/07/06/microsoft-windows-installer-folder-delete-privilege-escalation/"

    strings:
        // "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\TempPackages"
        $reg_temppackages = "TempPackages" wide

        // SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter string reference
        $eeui_debug = "EEUI Directory path does not have a delete permissions by client process" wide

        // FDeleteFolder debug strings
        $fdel_file = "FDeleteFolder: Deleting file" wide
        $fdel_folder = "FDeleteFolder: Deleting folder" wide

        // CreateFileW with DELETE access (0x10000) + OPEN_EXISTING (3) + flags (0x2200000)
        // In vulnerable binary: no feature flag check before ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete
        $delete_access = { 00 00 01 00 }  // 0x10000 = DELETE

        // Windows Installer description
        $description = "Windows Installer" wide

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        filesize > 2MB and filesize < 8MB and
        $description and
        $reg_temppackages and
        $eeui_debug and
        ($fdel_file or $fdel_folder) and
        $delete_access
}

YARA — CVE-2025-27727 Exploit Artifact Detection

rule CVE_2025_27727_Exploit_Artifact
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects potential CVE-2025-27727 exploit tools targeting MSI TempPackages folder delete"
        author = "OnlyFm252 Blue Team"
        date = "2025-04-08"
        cve = "CVE-2025-27727"

    strings:
        // COM CLSID for MSI server
        $clsid = { 1C 10 0C 00 00 00 00 00 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 46 }

        // MsiBeginTransactionW API
        $api_begin = "MsiBeginTransactionW" ascii wide

        // SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter
        $api_eeui = "SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter" ascii wide

        // CleanupTempPackages
        $api_cleanup = "CleanupTempPackages" ascii wide

        // Target path
        $config_msi = "C:\\Config.Msi" ascii wide nocase
        $config_msi2 = "Config.Msi" ascii wide nocase

        // TempPackages registry path
        $reg_path = "Installer\\TempPackages" ascii wide nocase

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        ($clsid or $api_begin) and
        ($api_eeui or $api_cleanup) and
        ($config_msi or $config_msi2 or $reg_path)
}

Sigma — CVE-2025-27727 Exploitation Indicators

title: CVE-2025-27727 MSI Installer Folder Delete Exploitation
id: 8c3d4e2a-1f7b-4a9c-b6d5-e8f2a3c71094
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects indicators of CVE-2025-27727 exploitation where a low-privileged
    user leverages the MSI COM interface to delete C:\Config.Msi as SYSTEM,
    then plants malicious rollback scripts for SYSTEM code execution.    
references:
    - https://blog.exodusintel.com/2026/07/06/microsoft-windows-installer-folder-delete-privilege-escalation/
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-27727
author: OnlyFm252 Blue Team
date: 2025/04/08
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1574
    - attack.t1546
    - cve.2025.27727
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_temppackages:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\TempPackages'
        Details|contains: 'Config.Msi'
    condition: selection_temppackages
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate MSI installations that use C:\Config.Msi (however, the TempPackages
      registry value name should be an MSI-generated temp path, not C:\Config.Msi)
level: high
---
title: CVE-2025-27727 C:\Config.Msi Folder Recreation with Weak DACL
id: 9d4e5f3b-2a8c-4b0d-c7e6-f9a3b4d82105
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects creation of C:\Config.Msi folder by a non-SYSTEM process,
    which may indicate Phase 3 of CVE-2025-27727 exploitation where
    the attacker re-creates the folder with a NULL DACL.    
author: OnlyFm252 Blue Team
date: 2025/04/08
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1574
    - cve.2025.27727
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_configmsi:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Config.Msi'
    filter_system:
        User|contains:
            - 'SYSTEM'
            - 'TrustedInstaller'
    filter_msiexec:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    condition: selection_configmsi and not (filter_system or filter_msiexec)
falsepositives:
    - Third-party MSI wrappers that pre-create C:\Config.Msi
level: high
---
title: CVE-2025-27727 Suspicious MSI COM Interface Abuse
id: ae5f6a4c-3b9d-4c1e-d8f7-0ab4c5e93216
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a low-privileged process loading msi.dll and performing COM
    calls to the MSI server interface, potentially exploiting CVE-2025-27727.    
author: OnlyFm252 Blue Team
date: 2025/04/08
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1559.001
    - cve.2025.27727
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_msi_load:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\msi.dll'
    filter_legitimate:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\MsiExec.exe'
            - '\setup.exe'
            - '\installer.exe'
            - '\wusa.exe'
            - '\TiWorker.exe'
            - '\TrustedInstaller.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\dism.exe'
    condition: selection_msi_load and not filter_legitimate
falsepositives:
    - Custom application installers
    - System management tools
    - Software deployment agents
level: medium

Sysmon Configuration

<!-- CVE-2025-27727: MSI Installer Folder Delete EoP -->

<!-- Rule 1: Monitor TempPackages registry writes -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2025-27727" groupRelation="or">
  <RegistryEvent onmatch="include">
    <!-- Event ID 12/13/14: Registry key/value create/modify -->
    <TargetObject condition="contains">Installer\TempPackages</TargetObject>
  </RegistryEvent>
</RuleGroup>

<!-- Rule 2: Monitor C:\Config.Msi file/folder operations by non-SYSTEM -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2025-27727-ConfigMsi" groupRelation="or">
  <FileCreate onmatch="include">
    <TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Config.Msi</TargetFilename>
  </FileCreate>
</RuleGroup>

<!-- Rule 3: Monitor DACL changes on C:\Config.Msi -->
<!-- Requires Windows Security Audit: Object Access → File System -->
<!-- Event ID 4670 (Permissions on an object were changed) -->

<!-- Rule 4: Monitor msi.dll loading by suspicious processes -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2025-27727-DLLLoad" groupRelation="or">
  <ImageLoad onmatch="include">
    <ImageLoaded condition="end with">\msi.dll</ImageLoaded>
  </ImageLoad>
  <ImageLoad onmatch="exclude">
    <Image condition="end with">\msiexec.exe</Image>
    <Image condition="end with">\svchost.exe</Image>
    <Image condition="end with">\TiWorker.exe</Image>
    <Image condition="end with">\TrustedInstaller.exe</Image>
    <Image condition="end with">\dism.exe</Image>
    <Image condition="end with">\wusa.exe</Image>
  </ImageLoad>
</RuleGroup>

<!-- Rule 5: Monitor for suspicious .rbs/.rbf file creation in C:\Config.Msi -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2025-27727-Rollback" groupRelation="or">
  <FileCreate onmatch="include">
    <TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Config.Msi</TargetFilename>
    <TargetFilename condition="end with">.rbs</TargetFilename>
  </FileCreate>
  <FileCreate onmatch="include">
    <TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Config.Msi</TargetFilename>
    <TargetFilename condition="end with">.rbf</TargetFilename>
  </FileCreate>
</RuleGroup>

Key Addresses (Pre-Patch msi.dll 5.0.26100.3323)

Function Address Role
CreateMsiServer 0x180116420 COM server instantiation
CMsiConfigurationManager::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter 0x18018ba10 COM entry point (vtable 0xC8) — DELETE permission check
CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter 0x18018bb90 Vulnerable — calls ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete without feature flag
CMsiTransaction::ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete 0x1801af264 Writes attacker path to TempPackages registry
CMsiConfigurationManager::CleanupTempPackages 0x180184b90 COM entry point (vtable 0x50)
CleanupTempPackagesInternal 0x180186c6c Enumerates TempPackages, calls FDeleteFolder as SYSTEM
FDeleteFolder 0x1801b29ac Recursive folder deletion with LockdownPath fallback
LockdownPath 0x18000319c Overrides ACLs to force deletion
CleanupTempPackagesOnTransactionCompletion 0x1801b10f4 Alternative trigger path

References

Attack Path

Arbitrary folder deletion as SYSTEM by planting paths into the Windows Installer TempPackages registry list

Attack path for CVE-2025-27727 Arbitrary folder deletion as SYSTEM by planting paths into the Windows Installer TempPackages registry list 01 — ENTRY Local user reaches the Windows Installer COM entry point CMsiConfigurationManager::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter. It performs an IsAdmin() check and opens the target with DELETE (0x10000) and FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT (0x200000). 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Attacker supplies the directory path that gets recorded The path is written into the TempPackages registry list without validation of who supplied it. 03 — PATH CMsiTransaction::SetEEUIDirectoryAndFilter schedules the deletion It calls ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete unconditionally in the pre-patch build, crossing the trust boundary between a user-supplied path and a SYSTEM-processed work list. 04 — MISSING CHECK No feature-flag gate on the schedule call, so the trust boundary is never enforced Post-patch adds a Feature_1997029688 check around ScheduleFileOrFolderDelete. Pre-patch the write to TempPackages is unconditional. 05 — PRIMITIVE CleanupTempPackagesInternal runs as SYSTEM and recursively deletes every listed entry FDeleteFolder is applied to each TempPackages path. Chains with the C:\Config.Msi junction and MSI rollback technique for full SYSTEM code execution - same terminal step as CVE-2025-21420.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments