Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.27358 ⚠️ Exploited in the wild 🔬 Patch diffed ✓ Verified attribution 2024-08 archive

Executive Summary

None

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Exploitation Detected
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Aug 13 2024
Last Updated Aug 13 2024
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Listed (added 2024-08-13)
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.27358 — 0.97885 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

Verified Attribution

Report-backed
Verified binaryafd.sys
FunctionAfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer / AfdRioDereferenceBuffer
WeaknessCWE-416
SourceExodusIntel (Luca Ginex)
NoteWinsock Registered I/O (RIO) use-after-free race -> SYSTEM. Patched Aug 2024. afd.sys IS in the curated collector.

Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Functional
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 7.2

EPSS Score

0.27358
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.97885 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

31 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems 5041782 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 for x64-based Systems 5041782 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5041773 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5041773 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5041578 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5041578 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5041580 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5041580 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5041580 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5041580 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5041580 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5041580 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5041592 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5041592 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5041585 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5041585 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5041585 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5041585 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5041571 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 24H2 for x64-based Systems 5041571 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5041850 (Monthly Rollup) 5041847 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5040499 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22825 Yes 5041850 5041847 Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5041850 (Monthly Rollup) 5041847 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5040499 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22825 Yes 5041850 5041847 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5041850 (Monthly Rollup) 5041847 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5040499 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22825 Yes 5041850 5041847 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5041850 (Monthly Rollup) 5041847 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5040499 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22825 Yes 5041850 5041847 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5041838 (Monthly Rollup) 5041823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5040497 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27277 Yes 5041838 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5041838 (Monthly Rollup) 5041823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5040497 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27277 Yes 5041838 Windows Server 2012 5041851 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5041851 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5041828 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5041828 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5041773 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5041773 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5041578 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5041578 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 5041160 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5041160 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5041573 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

11 patches
Article Type Restart
5041782 Security Update Yes
5041773 Security Update Yes
5041578 Security Update Yes
5041580 Security Update Yes
5041592 Security Update Yes
5041585 Security Update Yes
5041571 Security Update Yes
5041851 Monthly Rollup Yes
5041828 Monthly Rollup Yes
5041160 Security Update Yes
5041573 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff (VersionTrackingDiff, PDB symbols) · afd.sys (KB5041585)

Use-after-free in the Registered I/O (RIO) buffer cache (CVE-2024-38193, exploited ITW by Lazarus Group). Race condition between AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer (_InterlockedIncrement on RIOBuffer.RefCount during cache fill) and AfdRioDereferenceBuffer (non-atomic RefCount==1 check + ExFreePool). Patch: AfdRioDereferenceBuffer uses atomic decrement with underflow bugcheck, AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer calls new AfdRioReferenceBuffer for safe acquire, RIOBuffer.RefCount widened to 64-bit. All gated by CFR Feature_3168083257 + Feature_3695514937.

Pre-patch version 10.0.22621.3672 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.22621.4036 Download
Function Address Change Note
AfdRioDereferenceBuffer code (ratio 0.48, significant rewrite) Non-atomic RefCount==1 check replaced with atomic decrement + underflow guard (swi(0x29) bugcheck). RefCount widened to 64-bit. Gated by Feature_3168083257 / Feature_3695514937 (Feature_AfdRioCachedBuffer_IsEnabled).
AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer code (ratio 0.48, significant rewrite) Raw _InterlockedIncrement(&RefCount) replaced with call to new AfdRioReferenceBuffer — returns NULL if buffer already freed, eliminating the TOCTOU window.
AfdRioReferenceBuffer (added) added function New atomic reference-acquire: checks IsInvalid and atomically increments RefCount only if buffer is still alive, returns 0 on failure.
AfdRioGetCachedBuffer code Cache hit/miss dispatcher, calls AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer on miss.
AfdRioEvictCachedBuffer code (ratio 0.70) Cache eviction path updated to match new RIOBuffer layout.
AfdRioCreateRegisteredBuffer code (ratio 0.95) RIOBuffer allocation updated for wider structure (IsInvalid +0x18→+0x24, RefCount 32→64-bit at +0x18).
AfdRioInvalidateBuffer code (ratio 0.96) IsInvalid field access updated for new offset.
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis — CVE-2024-38193

Summary

Field Value
CVE CVE-2024-38193
Binary afd.sys (Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock)
Component Registered I/O (RIO) buffer cache
Bug Class Use-After-Free (CWE-416) via race condition (CWE-362)
Impact Elevation of Privilege → SYSTEM
CVSS 3.1 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Exploited ITW Yes — Lazarus Group (Gen Digital attribution)
Patch August 2024 Patch Tuesday (KB5041585 Win11 23H2, KB5041580 Win10 22H2)
Pre-patch version 10.0.22621.3672
Post-patch version 10.0.22621.4036

Vulnerability Overview

A use-after-free exists in the afd.sys Registered I/O (RIO) subsystem due to a race condition between buffer cache population and buffer deregistration. Two functions operate on the same RIOBuffer structure without adequate synchronisation:

  • AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer() — called on the send/receive path; increments RIOBuffer.RefCount with _InterlockedIncrement() (atomic increment only, no lock) and stores the pointer in the per-socket CachedBufferArrays[].
  • AfdRioDereferenceBuffer() — called on RIODeregisterBuffer(); checks RefCount == 1, and if true, frees the RIOBuffer via AfdRioCleanupBuffer().

If a thread calling RIODeregisterBuffer() checks RefCount == 1 and proceeds to free the buffer between the moment AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer() reads the ArrayBuffers[] pointer and the moment it executes _InterlockedIncrement(&v5->RefCount), the cache entry’s BufferPtr points to freed pool memory.

Affected Structures

RIOBuffer (0x20 bytes, non-paged pool, tag RIOb)

struct RIOBuffer {
    PMDL   AssociatedMDL;        // +0x00  MDL for user buffer
    QWORD  VirtualAddressBuffer; // +0x08  kernel VA of user buffer
    DWORD  LengthBuffer;         // +0x10  buffer size
    DWORD  RefCount;             // +0x14  reference count
    DWORD  IsInvalid;            // +0x18  0=active, 1=freed, 2=pending-free
    DWORD  Unknown;              // +0x1C  reserved
};

CachedBuffer

struct CachedBuffer {
    DWORD      IdBuffer;   // registered buffer ID
    DWORD      RefCount;   // cache-local refcount
    RIOBuffer *BufferPtr;  // → RIOBuffer (dangling after UAF)
};

Root Cause — Detailed Call Flow

Registration (normal path)

User: RIORegisterBuffer(buf, len)
  → afd!AfdRioCreateRegisteredBuffer
      Acquires write spinlock
      Finds free slot in ArrayBuffers[]
      ExAllocatePool2(NonPaged, 0x20, 'RIOb') → new RIOBuffer
      RIOBuffer.RefCount = 1
      Releases spinlock

Usage (send/receive path)

User: RIOSend(rq) or RIOReceive(rq)
  → afd!AfdRioValidateRequestBuffer
      → afd!AfdRioGetCachedBuffer(id)
          Cache hit? → return CachedBufferArrays[idx].BufferPtr
          Cache miss:
            → afd!AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer(id)
                [A] v5 = ArrayBuffers[id]           // read pointer
                [B] if (!v5 || v5->IsInvalid) return NULL
                [C] _InterlockedIncrement(&v5->RefCount)  // ← RACE WINDOW
                    AfdRioEvictCachedBuffer(slot)
                    slot->BufferPtr = v5
                    slot->IdBuffer = id
                    return v5

Deregistration (free path)

User: RIODeregisterBuffer(id)
  → afd!AfdRioDereferenceBuffer(fsctx, riobuf, id)
      [D] if (riobuf->RefCount == 1 ||
              _InterlockedExchangeAdd(&riobuf->RefCount, -1) == 1)
          {
              AcquireWriteLock
              ArrayBuffers[id] = NULL
              ReleaseWriteLock
      [E]     AfdRioCleanupBuffer(riobuf, 1)   // ExFreePool
          }

The Race

Thread 1 (send)              Thread 2 (deregister)
─────────────────            ──────────────────────
[A] v5 = ArrayBuffers[id]
    (v5 is valid, RefCount=1)
                             [D] RefCount == 1 → TRUE
                             [E] AfdRioCleanupBuffer → ExFreePool(v5)
                                 ArrayBuffers[id] = NULL
[C] _InterlockedIncrement(
      &v5->RefCount)          ← WRITES TO FREED MEMORY
    slot->BufferPtr = v5      ← DANGLING POINTER IN CACHE

After the race, CachedBufferArrays[slot].BufferPtr points to freed 0x20-byte non-paged pool. Subsequent RIOSend()/RIOReceive() calls will use the AssociatedMDL field from whatever now occupies that memory.

Exploitation Path (from Exodus Intel writeup)

  1. Heap spray: Fill non-paged pool with 0x20-byte named-pipe unbuffered entries (no header, exact size match for RIOBuffer).
  2. Create holes: Close selected pipes to leave gaps adjacent to spray blocks.
  3. Register RIO buffers: RIORegisterBuffer() allocations fill the holes.
  4. Trigger race: Two threads — one loops RIOSend()/RIOReceive(), the other loops RIODeregisterBuffer() across all registered buffer IDs.
  5. Reclaim freed RIOBuffer: Spray more unbuffered pipe entries to land in the freed slot. Attacker controls AssociatedMDL field.
  6. Arbitrary R/W: Craft a fake MDL in user-mode with MappedSystemVa pointing to _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES of the exploit process. RIOSend() copies FROM that address (arb read), RIOReceive() copies TO it (arb write).
  7. Privilege escalation: Overwrite _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES to grant SeDebugPrivilege + all privileges → SYSTEM.

Patch Analysis (ghidriff-verified)

The patch is gated behind two WIL CFR feature flags: Feature_3168083257 and Feature_3695514937 (via Feature_AfdRioCachedBuffer_IsEnabled). Three functions are changed:

1. AfdRioDereferenceBuffer (ratio 0.48 → significant rewrite)

Pre-patch (vulnerable):

// Non-atomic check enables TOCTOU race
if (a2->RefCount == 1 || _InterlockedExchangeAdd(&a2->RefCount, -1u) == 1)
{
    AfdRioCleanupBuffer(a2, 1);   // Free
}

Post-patch (fixed, when feature flag enabled):

// Atomic decrement with underflow guard
LOCK();
lVar5 = *plVar1;          // read RefCount (now 64-bit)
*plVar1 = *plVar1 - 1;    // atomic decrement
UNLOCK();
if (1 < lVar5) return;    // >1 means other refs exist, safe to return
if (lVar5 != 1) {
    swi(0x29);             // BugCheck — RefCount went below 1 (underflow)
    return;
}
// lVar5 == 1: we held the last ref, safe to free
AfdRioCleanupBuffer(a2, 1);

2. AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer (ratio 0.48 → significant rewrite)

Pre-patch: Raw _InterlockedIncrement(&v5->RefCount) — no check if buffer is being freed concurrently.

Post-patch (when feature flag enabled):

// New: call AfdRioReferenceBuffer instead of raw increment
cVar1 = AfdRioReferenceBuffer(lVar2);
if (cVar1 == '\0') goto LAB_0;  // Buffer already freed → return NULL
// else: ref acquired safely, proceed to cache

3. AfdRioReferenceBuffer (NEW function — added in patch)

This is the atomic reference-acquire that replaces the raw _InterlockedIncrement. It checks IsInvalid and atomically increments RefCount only if the buffer is still alive, returning 0 (fail) if the buffer has been freed or is being freed. This eliminates the TOCTOU window entirely.

RIOBuffer structure change

The RIOBuffer structure grew — IsInvalid moved from offset +0x18 to +0x24, and RefCount from +0x14 to a 64-bit field at +0x18 (offset +3 in qword terms). The wider RefCount allows the underflow guard (swi(0x29) on RefCount < 1).

Reachability

  • Attack vector: Local — requires code execution on the target
  • Privileges required: Low — any user can create Winsock RIO sockets
  • User interaction: None
  • API surface:
    • WSASocketA(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP, NULL, 0, WSA_FLAG_REGISTERED_IO)
    • WSAIoctl(SIO_GET_MULTIPLE_EXTENSION_FUNCTION_POINTER) → RIO function table
    • RIORegisterBuffer() / RIODeregisterBuffer() (the race pair)
    • RIOSend() / RIOReceive() (post-UAF primitive)
  • Device: \Device\Afd (opened implicitly by Winsock)
  • No special capabilities needed — standard user socket permissions suffice

Detection

YARA — Patched afd.sys Detection (CAS pattern)

rule CVE_2024_38193_Patched_AFD
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects patched afd.sys with CAS fix in AfdRioDereferenceBuffer"
        cve         = "CVE-2024-38193"
        author      = "OnlyFm252"

    strings:
        // _InterlockedCompareExchange(&RefCount, 0, 1) pattern
        // lock cmpxchg [reg+14h], ecx  where eax=1, ecx=0
        $cas_fix = { F0 0F B1 ?? 14 }  // lock cmpxchg [reg+0x14], reg

        // AfdRioCleanupBuffer call after successful CAS
        $cleanup = "AfdRioCleanupBuffer"

        // Pool tag
        $tag = "RIOb"

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        filesize > 500KB and filesize < 1MB and
        $cas_fix and $tag and $cleanup
}

YARA — Vulnerable afd.sys Detection

rule CVE_2024_38193_Vulnerable_AFD
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects pre-patch afd.sys with non-atomic RefCount check"
        cve         = "CVE-2024-38193"
        author      = "OnlyFm252"

    strings:
        // cmp dword ptr [reg+14h], 1  (non-atomic RefCount==1 check)
        $vuln_cmp = { 83 ?? 14 01 }

        // Followed by _InterlockedExchangeAdd(&RefCount, -1)
        // lock xadd [reg+14h], reg
        $xadd = { F0 0F C1 ?? 14 }

        $tag = "RIOb"

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        filesize > 500KB and filesize < 1MB and
        $vuln_cmp and $xadd and $tag and
        for any i in (1..#vuln_cmp): (@xadd[1] - @vuln_cmp[i] < 0x30)
}

Sigma — RIO UAF Exploitation Attempt

title: CVE-2024-38193 afd.sys RIO UAF Exploitation Indicators
id: f8a2c3d1-5e7b-4a9c-b6d0-8e3f1a2c4b5d
status: experimental
description: >
    Detects behavioral indicators of CVE-2024-38193 exploitation:
    rapid named pipe creation (heap spray) followed by socket activity.    
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/25
references:
    - https://blog.exodusintel.com/2024/12/02/windows-sockets-from-registered-i-o-to-system-privileges/
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38193
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
detection:
    selection_pipe_burst:
        EventType: CreatePipe
    filter_system:
        User|contains: 'SYSTEM'
    timeframe: 5s
    condition: selection_pipe_burst | count() > 500 and not filter_system
level: high
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2024.38193

Sigma — Suspicious RIO Socket + Named Pipe Pattern

title: CVE-2024-38193 Pre-exploitation Pattern
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: >
    Detects a process creating many named pipes AND loading afd.sys
    Winsock RIO functionality in a short window — consistent with
    heap spray + RIO race exploitation.    
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/25
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection_winsock:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\ws2_32.dll'
            - '\mswsock.dll'
    selection_afd:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\afd.sys'
    condition: selection_winsock and selection_afd
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068

Sysmon Configuration

<Sysmon schemaversion="4.90">
  <EventFiltering>
    <!-- Event 7: Detect Winsock RIO DLL loads by non-standard processes -->
    <ImageLoad onmatch="include">
      <ImageLoaded condition="end with">ws2_32.dll</ImageLoaded>
      <ImageLoaded condition="end with">mswsock.dll</ImageLoaded>
    </ImageLoad>

    <!-- Event 17/18: Named pipe burst detection (heap spray indicator) -->
    <PipeEvent onmatch="include">
      <EventType>CreatePipe</EventType>
    </PipeEvent>

    <!-- Event 1: Process creation with suspicious socket tool patterns -->
    <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
      <CommandLine condition="contains">WSA_FLAG_REGISTERED_IO</CommandLine>
    </ProcessCreate>
  </EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>

References

Attack Path

Use-after-free in the AFD Registered I/O buffer cache - a non-atomic refcount check races the cache-fill increment. Exploited in the wild by Lazarus Group.

Attack path for CVE-2024-38193 Use-after-free in the AFD Registered I/O buffer cache - a non-atomic refcount check races the cache-fill increment. Exploited in the wild by Lazarus Group. Attacker thread A RIO buffer cache RIOBuffer (0x20, 'RIOb') Attacker thread B RIORegisterBuffer(buf, len) - AfdRioCreateRegisteredBuffer 1 Acquires the write spinlock, finds a free slot in ArrayBuffers[], ExAllocatePool2(NonPaged, 0x20, 'RIOb'), sets RIOBuffer.RefCount = 1, releases the lock. Any unprivileged user; Winsock RIO needs no special rights. Thread A: RIOSend/RIOReceive -> AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer(id) on cache miss 2 [A] v5 = ArrayBuffers[id] [B] if (!v5 || v5->IsInvalid) return NULL 3 The pointer is read and the validity flag checked, but nothing holds a reference yet. Thread B: AfdRioDereferenceBuffer sees RefCount == 1 and calls ExFreePool 4 The pre-patch check is a plain read-compare, not an atomic decrement. It can observe 1 in the window between Thread A's [B] and [C] and free the buffer out from under it. [C] _InterlockedIncrement(&v5->RefCount) on the freed block 5 Thread A increments a refcount inside pool memory that Thread B has already returned. The buffer then stays in CachedBufferArrays[] and is used for subsequent send/receive. Freed 0x20-byte NonPaged 'RIOb' block used as a live buffer descriptor 6 Patch: AfdRioDereferenceBuffer uses an atomic decrement with an underflow bugcheck, AfdRioGetAndCacheBuffer acquires via the new AfdRioReferenceBuffer, and RefCount widens to 64-bit. Gated behind Feature_3168083257 and Feature_3695514937.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

1 public PoC
RepositoryStarsPublishedDescription
killvxk/CVE-2024-38193-Nephster 61 2024-12-03

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Luigino Camastra and Milánek with Gen Digital