Important CVSS 8.8 EPSS 0.05158 🔬 Patch diffed 2024-06 archive

Executive Summary

None

Overview

8.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Less Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Remote Code Execution
Released Jun 11 2024
Last Updated Jun 11 2024
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.05158 — 0.91692 percentile
NVD CVSS 8.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Adjacent_network
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
None
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 7.7

EPSS Score

0.05158
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.91692 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

28 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems 5039225 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 for x64-based Systems 5039225 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5039214 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5039214 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5039217 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems 5039217 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5039217 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5039211 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5039211 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5039211 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5039211 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5039211 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5039211 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5039213 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5039213 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5039212 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5039212 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5039212 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 23H2 for x64-based Systems 5039212 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5039245 (Monthly Rollup) 5039266 (Security Only) Important Remote Code Execution 5037800 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22720 Yes 5039245 5039266 Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5039245 (Monthly Rollup) 5039266 (Security Only) Important Remote Code Execution 5037800 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22720 Yes 5039245 5039266 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5039245 (Monthly Rollup) 5039266 (Security Only) Important Remote Code Execution 5037800 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22720 Yes 5039245 5039266 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5039245 (Monthly Rollup) 5039266 (Security Only) Important Remote Code Execution 5037800 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.22720 Yes 5039245 5039266 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5039289 (Monthly Rollup) 5039274 (Security Only) Important Remote Code Execution 5037780 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27170 Yes None Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5039289 (Monthly Rollup) 5039274 (Security Only) Important Remote Code Execution 5037780 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.27170 Yes None Windows Server 2012 5039260 (Monthly Rollup) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5039260 (Monthly Rollup) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 5039294 (Monthly Rollup) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5039294 (Monthly Rollup) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2016 5039214 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5039214 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2019 5039217 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5039217 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows Server 2022 5039227 (Security Update) 5039330 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Remote Code Execution 5037782 5037848 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.2527 10.0.20348.2522 Yes 5039227 Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) 5039227 (Security Update) 5039330 (Security Hotpatch Update) Important Remote Code Execution 5037782 5037848 Base: 8.8 Temporal: 7.7 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 10.0.20348.2527 10.0.20348.2522 Yes 5039227 Windows Server 2022, 23H2 Edition (Server Core installation) 5039236 (Security Update) Important Remote Code Execution Yes

Patches

9 patches
Article Type Restart
5039225 Security Update Yes
5039214 Security Update Yes
5039217 Security Update Yes
5039211 Security Update Yes
5039213 Security Update Yes
5039212 Security Update Yes
5039260 Monthly Rollup Yes
5039294 Monthly Rollup Yes
5039236 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · nwifi.sys (KB5039212)

Unauthenticated network-adjacent (over-the-air) OOB read/write (CWE-20) in the Native Wi-Fi driver nwifi.sys. On the receive path (Pt6Receive -> ExtSTARecvInitializeMSDUFromNBL -> ExtSTAReceivePacket -> ExtSTAReceiveDataPacket), Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket translates 802.11 frames to Ethernet in place. It validates the 8-byte LLC/SNAP header length, but when LLC type == 0x8100 (802.1Q VLAN) the extra 4-byte 802.1Q header follows and the pre-patch code did NOT verify those 4 bytes are present before reading them and deriving the Ethernet-header write offset - so a frame claiming VLAN with no VLAN payload reads the VLAN header OOB and (case 4: type 0x8100 && vlanid>=0x600, v17=LLC_off-0xE+4+8) writes the Ethernet header past the MDL buffer. Reachable from any device on the same Wi-Fi network (rogue AP / open net), no auth. IN-HOUSE ghidriff of nwifi.sys 10.0.22621.3527 -> .3733 (Jun 11 2024, the exact Crowdfense versions) confirms the fix: the 0x8100 branch adds `if (available < data_length + 0xc) goto bail` before reading the VLAN header, ensuring the extra 4 bytes fit. Length check reads unconditional (the Feature_1281542463 flag in the same build gates unrelated selective-translation work). Credit: aleksandr.k & voidsec (Crowdfense).

Pre-patch version 10.0.22621.3527 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.22621.3733 Download
Function Address Change Note
Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket code change code (802.1Q VLAN length check added) Pre: when LLC type == 0x8100 it read the 4-byte 802.1Q header and computed the Ethernet-header offset (case 4: LLC_off-0xE+4+8) without checking the 4 bytes were present -> OOB read then OOB write past the MDL buffer. Post: in the `if (uVar13 == 0x81)` (0x8100) branch adds `if (... available (lVar5+0x28) < *(uint*)(param_2+0xc) + 0xc) goto LAB_0` before reading the VLAN header, so the extra 4 bytes (0xC = 8 LLC + 4 VLAN) must fit.
Dot11CheckSelectiveTranslationTable code change code (co-changed selective-translation, Feature_1281542463) Also modified in this build; associated with the new Feature_1281542463 selective-translation work rather than the VLAN bounds fix.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2024-30078 — Windows Wi-Fi Driver nwifi.sys Out-of-Bounds Access via a Missing 802.1Q VLAN Length Check in Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket


Summary

Product Microsoft Windows — nwifi.sys (Native Wi-Fi / NDIS filter driver)
CVE ID CVE-2024-30078
Impact Remote Code Execution — unauthenticated, network-adjacent (over-the-air)
MSRC severity Important
CWE CWE-20: Improper Input Validation → out-of-bounds read/write
Patch Date June 11, 2024
Pre-patch binary nwifi.sys 10.0.22621.3527 (vulnerable) — SHA256 91c6281add525124de76e3cdf13c3ede455979eb9408c46ef51ff9af14bab4d9
Post-patch binary nwifi.sys 10.0.22621.3733 (Jun 11 2024 fix) — SHA256 b856587cf18c8417dec6a4ed56024e759015d6b093aea4dd603bb460f9663a37
Fix gating Length check appears unconditional (a new Feature_1281542463 exists in the diff but gates other selective-translation work)

Product Description

nwifi.sys is the Native Wi-Fi NDIS filter driver, sitting between the protocol and miniport drivers to translate inbound IEEE 802.11 frames into Ethernet frames. Its ReceiveNetBufferListsHandler (Pt6Receive) converts each received NET_BUFFER_LIST into an MSDU, then ExtSTAReceivePacket → ExtSTAReceiveDataPacket → Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket reformats the frame in place, building the Ethernet header in front of the payload. Because the frame comes off the air, this path processes attacker-controlled input from any device on the same Wi-Fi network — no authentication, network-adjacent (the RCE Microsoft rated Important).


Vulnerability Summary

Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket reads the 8-byte LLC/SNAP header after checking the buffer holds 8 bytes. When the LLC type is 0x8100 (802.1Q VLAN), an additional 4-byte IEEE 802.1Q header follows — but the pre-patch code did not check that those 4 bytes are present before reading them and before computing where to write the Ethernet header:

// Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket — VLAN offset selection (per Crowdfense)
// Case 4: LLC->type == 0x8100 && vlanid >= 0x600
//   v17 = LLC_offset - 0xE + 4 + 8   ->  Ethernet header written past the MDL buffer

With LLC->type == 0x8100 and no data after the 8-byte LLC, the driver reads the VLAN header out of bounds and, in “case 4”, the Ethernet-header write lands past the end of the _MDL-described buffer — an out-of-bounds read leading to an out-of-bounds write in kernel memory.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Network-adjacent, unauthenticated. The attacker must be on the same Wi-Fi network (e.g. a rogue AP the target associates to, or an open network); no credentials. Delivered as an 802.11 data frame.
  • The malicious frame sets LLC type 0x8100 and must satisfy the tpid / vlanid checks to reach the vulnerable offset (case 4).
  • Crowdfense assessed practical exploitation as constrained: the overwritten region (a 0x7800 adapter buffer) and lack of a paired info-leak limit impact to corrupting an adjacent packet — the fix is nonetheless a real OOB access.

Vulnerability Details

Call Chain

Over-the-air 802.11 data frame (unauthenticated, same Wi-Fi net):
  nwifi!Pt6Receive  (ReceiveNetBufferListsHandler)
    → ExtSTARecvInitializeMSDUFromNBL   (NBL -> MSDU)
      → ExtSTAReceivePacket → ExtSTAReceiveDataPacket
        → Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket   [*** OOB read/write ***]

Root Cause

The 802.11→Ethernet translation validates the 8-byte LLC header length but not the extra 4 bytes required when the LLC type is 0x8100 (VLAN). It then reads the VLAN header and derives the Ethernet-header write offset from it, so a frame that claims VLAN without carrying the 4 VLAN bytes reads/writes outside the frame buffer (CWE-20 → OOB).

The patch (confirmed — diff, .3527 → .3733)

The patched Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket adds the missing length check for the VLAN case — before reading the 802.1Q header it verifies the buffer holds the extra 4 bytes (LLC 8 + VLAN 4 = 0xC beyond the header offset), and bails if not:

// Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket (10.0.22621.3733) — PATCHED, from our diff
if (uVar13 == 0x81) {                                   // LLC type == 0x8100 (byte-swapped)
    if ((vlan_case) && (available < *(uint *)(param_2 + 0xc) + 0xc))
        goto LAB_0;                                      // *** not enough for the 4-byte 802.1Q -> bail ***
    vlan = *(ushort *)(buf + llc_off + 8);               // now safe to read the VLAN header
    ...
}

The added available < data_length + 0xc test ensures the VLAN header (and the Ethernet header that would be built from it) stays within the buffer, closing the out-of-bounds access.

Patch Completeness Assessment

The VLAN length check in the 0x8100 branch is applied on the receive path and reads as unconditional (the June 2024 fix; the Feature_1281542463 flag added in the same build gates unrelated selective-translation work, not this bounds check). Patch state is determined by file version.


Detection Guidance

Network / RF. Inbound 802.11 data frames whose SNAP/LLC type is 0x8100 (VLAN) but that carry no valid 802.1Q payload — anomalous for legitimate traffic. Rogue-AP / evil-twin monitoring on managed Wi-Fi.

Crash signature. Bugchecks in nwifi!Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket on Wi-Fi receive, correlated with association to an untrusted/open network.

Config. Prefer authenticated/enterprise Wi-Fi; avoid auto-connect to open SSIDs. File-version check suffices (fix not feature-gated).


References

  • Crowdfense — Windows Wi-Fi Driver RCE Vulnerability – CVE-2024-30078 (aleksandr.k, voidsec).
  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2024-30078
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/nwifi_sys-cve-2024-30078-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

An 802.11 frame claiming a VLAN header it doesn't carry makes nwifi read/write past the packet buffer while building the Ethernet header

Attack path for CVE-2024-30078 An 802.11 frame claiming a VLAN header it doesn't carry makes nwifi read/write past the packet buffer while building the Ethernet header 01 — ENTRY Unauthenticated attacker on the same Wi-Fi network sends an 802.11 data frame nwifi.sys (Native Wi-Fi NDIS filter) receives frames via Pt6Receive from any associated device - e.g. a rogue AP the target connects to, or an open network. No authentication; network-adjacent RCE. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Frame sets LLC/SNAP type 0x8100 (802.1Q VLAN) but omits the 4-byte VLAN payload The receive path converts the NBL to an MSDU and calls Dot11Translate80211ToEthernetNdisPacket to translate 802.11 -> Ethernet in place. 03 — PATH The translator validates the 8-byte LLC header, then reads the VLAN header and derives the Ethernet write offset For LLC type 0x8100 it reads the following 802.1Q header (tpid/vlanid) and picks an Ethernet-header offset based on it (case 4: LLC_off-0xE+4+8). 04 — MISSING CHECK No check that the extra 4 VLAN bytes are present Pre-patch only the 8-byte LLC length is validated; the 4-byte 802.1Q header is read without a bounds check, so a VLAN-claiming frame with no VLAN bytes reads out of bounds and the Ethernet-header write lands past the MDL buffer (CWE-20 -> OOB read/write). 05 — PRIMITIVE Kernel out-of-bounds read/write on the Wi-Fi receive buffer -> RCE (constrained) In case 4 the Ethernet header is written past the 0x7800 adapter buffer. Practical impact is constrained (adjacent-packet corruption, no paired info-leak), but it is a genuine OOB write. The Jun 2024 fix adds `available < data_length + 0xc -> bail` in the 0x8100 branch.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Wei in Kunlun Lab with Cyber KunLun