Critical CVSS 8.8 EPSS 0.08176 🔬 Patch diffed 2023-09 archive

Executive Summary

None

Overview

8.8
CVSS HIGH
Critical
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
More Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Remote Code Execution
Released Sep 12 2023
Last Updated Sep 12 2023
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Not Listed
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.08176 — 0.94357 percentile
NVD CVSS 8.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Adjacent_network
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
None
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 7.7

EPSS Score

0.08176
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.94357 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

10 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5030211 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5030211 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5030211 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5030211 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5030211 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5030211 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5030217 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5030217 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5030219 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5030219 (Security Update) Critical Remote Code Execution Yes

Patches

3 patches
Article Type Restart
5030211 Security Update Yes
5030217 Security Update Yes
5030219 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · ipnathlp.dll (KB5030219)

Pre-auth stack buffer overflow (CWE-121) in the Windows Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) service ipnathlp.dll, reachable network-adjacent on the ICS DHCP server (UDP/67) with no authentication. The DHCP message processors parse the BOOTP/DHCP header whose hardware-address-length field (hlen, decompiled as param_2[0xe6]) is fully client-controlled. Downstream, DhcpAddArpEntry does memcpy(Row.PhysicalAddress, Src, hlen) where Row is a stack MIB_IPNET_ROW2 (0xA8 bytes) whose PhysicalAddress field is only 32 (0x20) bytes (IF_MAX_PHYS_ADDRESS_LENGTH). Pre-patch, Dhcp[V2]ProcessMessage only LOGGED when hlen > 0x20 and kept processing, so an attacker hlen up to 0xFF reached the memcpy and overran the stack -> controlled stack overflow -> RCE in the ICS service. IN-HOUSE ghidriff of 10.0.22621.963 -> .2283 (Sep 12 2023) confirms the fix: both DhcpProcessMessage and V2DhcpProcessMessage are restructured to `if (hlen < 0x21)` - process only when hlen <= 0x20, otherwise bail before DhcpAddArpEntry. Unconditional fix (no feature flag). Credit: Anonymous; Jarvis_1oop (@baixia4).

Pre-patch version 10.0.22621.963 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.22621.2283 Download
Function Address Change Note
V2DhcpProcessMessage 87% match code (hardware-address-length bound added, unconditional) Pre: `if (0x20 < (byte)param_2[0xe6]) { ...trace... }` then continued processing regardless. Post: gated on `if ((byte)param_2[0xe6] < 0x21)` - process only when hlen <= 0x20 (BOOTP if < 0x11, else 0x11..0x20), and hlen > 0x20 falls through to the error path (goto LAB_0) before DhcpAddArpEntry. param_2[0xe6] is the DHCP header hardware-address-length.
DhcpProcessMessage changed code (same hlen bound added) Same restructuring as V2DhcpProcessMessage: pre-patch `0x20 < hlen` only logged; post-patch gates the whole path on `hlen < 0x21` so oversized hardware-address lengths never reach the DhcpAddArpEntry memcpy sink.
DhcpAddArpEntry vulnerable sink (not modified) memcpy(Row.PhysicalAddress, Src, hlen) into a 32-byte field of the 0xA8 stack MIB_IPNET_ROW2. The fix is upstream (bound hlen in the message processors), so this sink is unchanged.
View full diff report View RCA report

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2023-38148 — Windows ICS ipnathlp.dll Pre-Auth Stack Overflow via the DHCP Hardware-Address-Length Field


Summary

Product Microsoft Windows — ipnathlp.dll (Internet Connection Sharing / ICS, NAT helper)
CVE ID CVE-2023-38148
Impact Remote Code Execution — pre-authentication (network-adjacent)
MSRC severity Critical
CWE CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
Patch Date September 12, 2023
Pre-patch binary ipnathlp.dll 10.0.22621.963 (Aug 2023) — SHA256 ff29257cad0e53545286174fd7f04a819bb3989d09a6bcbea5a0f06b50b2a191
Post-patch binary ipnathlp.dll 10.0.22621.2283 (Sep 12 2023 fix) — SHA256 108a9bd863741f51f104c928f075bc5297fc98f9b4ed21bb1140b5c800599a3b
Fix gating None — unconditional length check (no CFR/KIR flag)

Product Description

ipnathlp.dll implements Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) — the Windows NAT helper. When ICS is enabled, the service opens a DHCP server on UDP/67 (plus DNS/53 and 68) to hand out addresses to the shared network. Those DHCP listeners parse untrusted packets from any host on the shared segment, pre-authentication — which is what makes a parsing bug here a Critical, network-reachable RCE. ICS is not on by default, but is widely enabled for hotspot / connection-sharing setups.


Vulnerability Summary

The ICS DHCP server parses the fixed BOOTP/DHCP header, whose hardware address length (hlen) byte the client fully controls. The message processor validated hlen weakly, then a downstream ARP-table update memcpy’d hlen bytes of the client hardware address into a fixed-size field of a stack MIB_IPNET_ROW2:

// DhcpAddArpEntry (from the public analysis) — the sink
MIB_IPNET_ROW2 Row;                        // stack struct, 0xA8 bytes
...
Row.PhysicalAddressLength = hlen;          // hlen = DHCP header hardware-addr-length (attacker byte)
memcpy(Row.PhysicalAddress, Src, hlen);    // *** PhysicalAddress is 32 (0x20) bytes ***
CreateIpNetEntry2(&Row);

MIB_IPNET_ROW2.PhysicalAddress is IF_MAX_PHYS_ADDRESS_LENGTH = 32 (0x20) bytes. hlen is a single header byte (up to 0xFF). Pre-patch, Dhcp[…]ProcessMessage only logged when hlen > 0x20 and kept processing, so an attacker-chosen hlen up to 0xFF reached the memcpy and overran the PhysicalAddress field on the stack — a controlled stack buffer overflow in the ICS service.


Prerequisites and Constraints

  • Network-adjacent, unauthenticated. Any host that can send UDP to the ICS host’s DHCP port (UDP/67) on the shared segment. No credentials.
  • ICS must be enabled on the target (the DHCP listener only exists then).
  • The overflow bytes are attacker-controlled (the client hardware address), making this a controlled stack overflow suitable for exploitation, not just a crash.

Vulnerability Details

Call Chain

Network-adjacent attacker (no auth), UDP/67:
  crafted BOOTP/DHCP packet with hardware-address-length (hlen) > 0x20
        ↓
ICS service (ipnathlp.dll):
  DhcpProcessMessage / V2DhcpProcessMessage   [weak hlen check]
    → Dhcp(…)ProcessBootpMessage
      → DhcpAddArpEntry                        [*** stack overflow ***]
           memcpy(Row.PhysicalAddress[0x20], Src, hlen)   // hlen up to 0xFF
           CreateIpNetEntry2(&Row)

Root Cause

hlen (DHCP header offset — param_2[0xe6] in the decompilation) is used as a memcpy length into a 32-byte stack field without being bounded to that size. The pre-patch processor’s only hlen > 0x20 handling was a trace-log, not a rejection, so oversized values flowed through to the copy (CWE-121).

The patch (confirmed — diff, .963 → .2283)

Both DhcpProcessMessage and V2DhcpProcessMessage are restructured to reject hlen > 0x20 before processing:

// V2DhcpProcessMessage (10.0.22621.2283) — PATCHED, from our diff
// param_2[0xe6] == hlen
if ((byte)param_2[0xe6] < 0x21) {           // *** only process when hlen <= 0x20 ***
    ... ExtractOptions ...
    if ((byte)param_2[0xe6] < 0x11) {
        V2DhcpProcessBootpMessage(...);     // BOOTP path
        goto LAB_1;
    }
    if (0x10 < (byte)param_2[0xe6]) {        // 0x11..0x20 handled, then bail out cleanly
        ...trace...
        goto LAB_0;
    }
}
// hlen > 0x20 now falls through to the error path — never reaches DhcpAddArpEntry

Pre-patch the guard was if (0x20 < hlen) { …log… } followed by continued processing; post-patch the whole message path is gated on hlen < 0x21, so an oversized hardware-address length is refused before the memcpy sink. The same change is applied to DhcpProcessMessage.

Patch Completeness Assessment

Unconditional fix — no CFR/KIR flag (WPP_GLOBAL_Control references are just ETW/WPP tracing, not a gate). As with the other 2022–2023 fixes in this corpus (npfs CVE-2022-22715, DHCPv6 CVE-2023-28231), the length check is always-on and patch state is determined by file version.


Detection Guidance

Network. On an ICS host, DHCP/BOOTP packets to UDP/67 whose hardware address length (hlen) field exceeds 0x20 (32) — no legitimate client sets it above 6 (Ethernet) / 16. That single field over 0x20 is the direct exploit indicator.

Crash signature. Stack-corruption bugchecks / __security_check_cookie failures (/GS) in the ICS host process, stacks through ipnathlp!DhcpAddArpEntry / DhcpProcessMessage / V2DhcpProcessMessage.

Exposure. Inventory hosts with ICS enabled (DHCP listener on UDP/67) and ensure the shared segment is not reachable by untrusted devices. Disabling ICS where not required removes the listener entirely.


References

  • VictorV — Windows Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) CVE-2023-38148 分析. v-v.space/2023/09/13/ics_CVE-2023-38148-readme/
  • MSRC advisory — CVE-2023-38148 (Internet Connection Sharing Remote Code Execution)
  • Full binary diff: /data/patch_diffs/ipnathlp_dll-cve-2023-38148-ghidriff.md

Attack Path

A DHCP hardware-address-length byte over 0x20 drives a memcpy past a 32-byte stack field in the ICS DHCP server

Attack path for CVE-2023-38148 A DHCP hardware-address-length byte over 0x20 drives a memcpy past a 32-byte stack field in the ICS DHCP server 01 — ENTRY Network-adjacent attacker sends a DHCP/BOOTP packet to the ICS DHCP server (UDP/67) When Internet Connection Sharing is enabled, ipnathlp.dll runs a DHCP server on UDP/67 that parses untrusted packets pre-authentication. Any host on the shared segment can send to it. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Sets the DHCP header hardware-address-length (hlen) field greater than 0x20 hlen is a single client-controlled header byte (up to 0xFF). Legitimate clients use 6 (Ethernet); the attacker sets it large. 03 — PATH Dhcp/V2DhcpProcessMessage processes the message and reaches DhcpAddArpEntry The message processor validates hlen only weakly (pre-patch it merely logged hlen > 0x20 and continued), then DhcpAddArpEntry builds a stack MIB_IPNET_ROW2 and copies the client hardware address in. 04 — MISSING CHECK hlen used as a memcpy length into a 32-byte stack field, unbounded memcpy(Row.PhysicalAddress, Src, hlen) where PhysicalAddress is 0x20 bytes. With hlen up to 0xFF, the copy overruns the field on the stack (Row is 0xA8; the copy runs past PhysicalAddress) - CWE-121. 05 — PRIMITIVE Controlled stack buffer overflow in the ICS service -> pre-auth RCE Attacker-controlled hardware-address bytes overwrite the stack of the ICS process, giving remote code execution (Critical). The Sept 2023 fix bounds hlen to <= 0x20 in both message processors before the sink; unconditional, no feature flag.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Anonymous
Jarvis_1oop