Executive Summary

None

Overview

8.4
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Not Exploited
MS Exploit Status
More Likely
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Jun 13 2023
Last Updated Jun 13 2023
Publicly Disclosed No
CISA KEV Listed (added 2024-02-29)
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.22133 — 0.97458 percentile
NVD CVSS 8.4 HIGH — matches MSRC

Verified Attribution

Report-backed
Verified binarymskssrv.sys
FunctionMmProbeAndLockPages (MSKSSRV framebuffer lock)
WeaknessCWE-822
ExploitationCISA KEV
SourceDEVCORE 'Streaming Vulnerabilities / Proxying to Kernel' writeup (devco.re)
NoteAccessMode not set when locking user-supplied framebuffer -> a kernel address is mapped to user space -> arbitrary kernel write. Synacktiv Pwn2Own 2023.

Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
None
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Unproven
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 7.3

EPSS Score

0.22133
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.97458 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

19 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 5027219 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 5027219 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 5027222 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems 5027222 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 5027222 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems 5027215 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5027215 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5027215 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for 32-bit Systems 5027215 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5027215 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5027215 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5027223 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 version 21H2 for x64-based Systems 5027223 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems 5027231 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems 5027231 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 5027219 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 5027219 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 5027222 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 5027222 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

5 patches
Article Type Restart
5027219 Security Update Yes
5027222 Security Update Yes
5027215 Security Update Yes
5027223 Security Update Yes
5027231 Security Update Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff · mskssrv.sys (KB5027231)

Patch diff 10.0.22621.1 -> 10.0.22621.1848 (single-function fix: FsAllocAndLockMdl MmProbeAndLockPages PreviousMode)

Pre-patch version 10.0.22621.1
Post-patch version 10.0.22621.1848
Function Address Change Note
FsAllocAndLockMdl 1c0001650 code, length, sig similarity 0.9
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis — CVE-2023-29360

Summary

Field Value
CVE CVE-2023-29360
Binary mskssrv.sys (Microsoft Streaming Service Proxy Driver)
Component FsAllocAndLockMdl — MDL allocation and page locking
Bug Class Untrusted Pointer Dereference / Improper Access Control (CWE-822)
Impact Elevation of Privilege → SYSTEM
CVSS 3.1 8.4 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Exploited ITW Yes
Patch June 2023 Patch Tuesday (KB5027231 Win11 22H2)

Vulnerability Overview

The Microsoft Streaming Service driver (mskssrv.sys) processes kernel streaming data for devices such as cameras. The driver exposes a device interface that accepts IOCTLs from user-mode. When processing IOCTL 0x2F0408 (PublishTx), the driver allocates an MDL (Memory Descriptor List) using a user-supplied address and size, then calls MmProbeAndLockPages with AccessMode=KernelMode(0). This skips the user/kernel address boundary validation, allowing a user-mode process to lock and subsequently map arbitrary kernel memory pages, yielding a full kernel read/write primitive.

Root Cause — Incorrect AccessMode in MmProbeAndLockPages

The Vulnerable Code (pre-patch)

__int64 FsAllocAndLockMdl(void *address, ULONG size, _MDL **mdl_object)
{
    if (!address || !size || !mdl_object)
        return 0xC000000D;  // STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER

    // Allocate MDL with user-controlled address and size
    PMDL Alloc_Mdl = IoAllocateMdl(address, size, 0, 0, NULL);
    if (!Alloc_Mdl)
        return 0xC000009A;  // STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES

    // BUG: AccessMode = KernelMode(0) — skips address validation
    MmProbeAndLockPages(Alloc_Mdl, 0, IoWriteAccess);

    *mdl_object = Alloc_Mdl;
    return 0;
}

The Address Validation Skip

Inside MmProbeAndLockPages → MiProbeAndLockPages → MiProbeAndLockPrepare:

// Address validated ONLY when AccessMode == UserMode(1)
if (AccessMode) {
    if (address + size > 0x7FFFFFFF0000 || address >= address + size) {
        return STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION;
    }
}
// With AccessMode == KernelMode(0), this check is SKIPPED entirely

When AccessMode is KernelMode(0), any address — including kernel space addresses above 0xFFFF800000000000 — is accepted without validation. The MDL locks the physical pages backing that kernel virtual address, and these pages can then be mapped into user space.

Call Chain to Vulnerable Function

User-mode application
  → DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x2F0408, inputBuffer, ...)
    → SrvDispatchIoControl
      → FSRendezvousServer::PublishTx
        → FSStreamReg::PublishTx
          → FSFrameMdl::AllocateMdl  (copies user data, picks address/size)
            → FsAllocAndLockMdl  *** VULNERABLE ***
              → IoAllocateMdl(user_addr, user_size)
              → MmProbeAndLockPages(mdl, KernelMode, IoWriteAccess)  *** BUG ***

Attacker Control

What How
MDL address inputBuffer+0x48 (Addr1) and inputBuffer+0x60 (Addr2) passed to FsAllocAndLockMdl
MDL size inputBuffer+0x5C (Size1) and inputBuffer+0x6C (Size2)
Map flag inputBuffer+0x70 byte value controls which code path in FSFrameMdl::AllocateMdl (1, 4, or 8)

IOCTL State Machine

The vulnerability requires specific driver state setup via three preliminary IOCTLs:

Step 1: IOCTL 0x2F0400 — FSInitializeContextRendezvous

Creates the FSRendezvousServer global object. Required once before any other operations.

Step 2: IOCTL 0x2F0404 — InitializeStream (handle A)

Creates an FSStreamReg object and stores it in FileObject->FsContext2. Sets FsStreamReg+0x28 = 1. Uses the “client” handle.

Step 3: IOCTL 0x2F0420 — RegisterStream (handle B)

Must use a different handle (new CreateFile call) because RegisterStream checks that FileObject->FsContext2 is NULL ([12]). Sets FsStreamReg+0x2C = 1. Both flags at +0x28 and +0x2C must be non-zero for ConsumeTx to proceed.

Step 4: IOCTL 0x2F0408 — PublishTx (handle A) ← VULNERABILITY TRIGGER

Sends the crafted buffer with kernel address. FsAllocAndLockMdl locks the kernel pages into an MDL, which is stored in the published list.

Step 5: IOCTL 0x2F0410 — ConsumeTx (handle A) ← MAP KERNEL MEMORY

Takes the MDL from the published list, calls FSFrameMdl::MapPages to map it into the calling process’s address space. Returns the mapped user-mode address in the output buffer at offset +0x48. The attacker now has direct read/write access to kernel memory.

Exploitation Path

From Arbitrary R/W to SYSTEM

  1. Leak kernel addresses: NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation) leaks EPROCESS and token object addresses
  2. Lock+Map token pages: Use the vulnerability to create an MDL over the current process token’s physical pages
  3. Enable privileges: Modify the _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES structure in the mapped token to enable SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE and other powerful privileges
  4. Process injection: With SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE, open a SYSTEM process (e.g., winlogon.exe) and inject a DLL for code execution as SYSTEM

Alternative exploitation: directly overwrite the token pointer in EPROCESS for a full token swap (similar to CVE-2024-21338).

Patch Analysis

The patch is a single-byte change in FsAllocAndLockMdl:

// Pre-patch:
MmProbeAndLockPages(Alloc_Mdl, 0, IoWriteAccess);  // KernelMode

// Post-patch:
MmProbeAndLockPages(Alloc_Mdl, 1, IoWriteAccess);  // UserMode

With AccessMode=UserMode(1), MmProbeAndLockPages validates that the address falls within user address space (< 0x7FFFFFFF0000). Kernel addresses are rejected with STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION.

In BinDiff, FsAllocAndLockMdl shows a similarity of ~0.98 — the only change is the immediate operand from 0 to 1 in the MmProbeAndLockPages call.

Patched binary versions (mskssrv.sys):

  • Win10 19041: patched in build 19041.3086+
  • Win10 19045 (22H2): patched in KB5027215
  • Win11 22621 (22H2): patched in KB5027231

Reachability

  • Attack vector: Local — requires code execution on the target
  • Privileges required: None (the device is accessible from medium integrity)
  • User interaction: None
  • Prerequisites:
    • mskssrv.sys driver must be loadable (present on all Windows 10/11 systems)
    • The device interface {3c0d501a-140b-11d1-b40f-00a0c9223196} must be present
    • Camera/streaming device subsystem registered

Detection

YARA — Exploit Artifacts

rule CVE_2023_29360_Exploit_Indicators
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects compiled exploit artifacts for CVE-2023-29360 mskssrv.sys"
        cve         = "CVE-2023-29360"
        author      = "OnlyFm252"

    strings:
        $device = "{3c0d501a-140b-11d1-b40f-00a0c9223196}" ascii wide nocase
        $device2 = "{96E080C7-143C-11D1-B40F-00A0C9223196}" ascii wide nocase
        $ioctl_publish = { 08 04 2F 00 }
        $ioctl_consume = { 10 04 2F 00 }
        $ioctl_init    = { 00 04 2F 00 }
        $ntqsi = "NtQuerySystemInformation" ascii

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        ($device or $device2) and
        2 of ($ioctl_*) and
        $ntqsi
}

YARA — Vulnerable mskssrv.sys Binary

rule CVE_2023_29360_Vulnerable_MSKSSRV
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects pre-patch mskssrv.sys with KernelMode AccessMode in FsAllocAndLockMdl"
        cve         = "CVE-2023-29360"
        author      = "OnlyFm252"

    strings:
        $func = "FsAllocAndLockMdl" ascii
        $driver = "mskssrv" ascii wide nocase

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        filesize < 200KB and
        $func and $driver
}

Sigma — Suspicious Streaming Service Driver Access

title: CVE-2023-29360 MSKSSRV Streaming Driver Exploitation Indicators
id: b1c2d3e4-f5a6-7890-abcd-ef0123456789
status: experimental
description: >
    Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2023-29360 via suspicious access to the
    Microsoft Streaming Service driver device interface.    
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/26
references:
    - https://theori.io/blog/chaining-n-days-to-compromise-all-part-3-windows-driver-lpe-medium-to-system
    - https://github.com/Nero22k/cve-2023-29360
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-29360
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: driver_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\mskssrv.sys'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection | count() > 2
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2023.29360

Sysmon Configuration

<Sysmon schemaversion="4.90">
  <EventFiltering>
    <!-- Event 7: Detect mskssrv.sys driver load -->
    <DriverLoad onmatch="include">
      <ImageLoaded condition="end with">\mskssrv.sys</ImageLoaded>
    </DriverLoad>

    <!-- Event 1: Detect suspicious processes spawned after exploitation -->
    <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
      <IntegrityLevel condition="is">System</IntegrityLevel>
      <ParentIntegrityLevel condition="is">Medium</ParentIntegrityLevel>
    </ProcessCreate>

    <!-- Event 10: Detect SYSTEM process access from medium-integrity (DLL injection) -->
    <ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
      <TargetImage condition="end with">\winlogon.exe</TargetImage>
      <GrantedAccess condition="is">0x1F0FFF</GrantedAccess>
    </ProcessAccess>
  </EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>

References

Attack Path

Local EoP via an MDL built over a user address but probed as KernelMode in mskssrv.sys

Attack path for CVE-2023-29360 Local EoP via an MDL built over a user address but probed as KernelMode in mskssrv.sys 01 — ENTRY Attacker opens the streaming service device and issues the publish IOCTL DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x2F0408). mskssrv.sys is present on all Windows 10/11 systems and the camera/streaming interface is reachable without elevation. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Supplies the buffer address and size that the MDL will be built over FSFrameMdl::AllocateMdl copies the user request and passes the attacker-chosen address and length straight into the allocation helper. 03 — PATH The publish path descends into MDL allocation and page locking SrvDispatchIoControl -> FSRendezvousServer::PublishTx -> FSStreamReg::PublishTx -> FSFrameMdl::AllocateMdl -> FsAllocAndLockMdl. 04 — MISSING CHECK MmProbeAndLockPages is called with KernelMode on a user-supplied address IoAllocateMdl(user_addr, user_size) followed by MmProbeAndLockPages(mdl, KernelMode, IoWriteAccess). KernelMode skips the user-space range check entirely, so a kernel address passes validation. The patch probes as UserMode. 05 — PRIMITIVE Kernel memory locked and written through as if it were the caller's buffer Any kernel address can be mapped writable into the request, giving a controlled kernel write and a path to SYSTEM.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

3 public PoCs
RepositoryStarsPublishedDescription
Nero22k/cve-2023-29360 152 2023-09-24 Exploit for CVE-2023-29360 targeting MSKSSRV.SYS driver
0xDivyanshu-new/CVE-2023-29360 11 2024-08-31 POC for CVE-2023-29360
Scottman625/CVE-2023-29360 0 2025-10-12

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Thomas Imbert (@masthoon) from Synacktiv (@Synacktiv) Working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative