CVE-2022-41033 — Windows COM+ Event System Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
None
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems | 5018425 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 for x64-based Systems | 5018425 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5018411 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5018411 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5018419 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems | 5018419 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5018419 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 20H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 20H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H1 for 32-bit Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H1 for x64-based Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5018410 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5018418 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5018418 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5018427 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 Version 22H2 for x64-based Systems | 5018427 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 7 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 1 5018454 (Monthly Rollup) 5018479 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017361 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.26174 Yes 5018454 5018479 Windows 7 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5018454 (Monthly Rollup) 5018479 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017361 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.26174 Yes 5018454 5018479 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit systems 5018474 (Monthly Rollup) 5018476 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017367 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20625 Yes 5018474 5018476 Windows 8.1 for x64-based systems 5018474 (Monthly Rollup) 5018476 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017367 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20625 Yes 5018474 5018476 Windows RT 8.1 | 5018474 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5018450 (Monthly Rollup) 5018446 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017358 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21721 Yes 5018450 5018446 Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5018450 (Monthly Rollup) 5018446 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017358 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21721 Yes 5018450 5018446 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5018450 (Monthly Rollup) 5018446 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017358 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21721 Yes 5018450 5018446 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5018450 (Monthly Rollup) 5018446 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017358 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21721 Yes 5018450 5018446 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5018454 (Monthly Rollup) 5018479 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017361 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.26174 Yes 5018454 5018479 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5018454 (Monthly Rollup) 5018479 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017361 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.26174 Yes 5018454 5018479 Windows Server 2012 5018457 (Monthly Rollup) 5018478 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017370 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.2.9200.23920 Yes 5018457 5018478 Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5018457 (Monthly Rollup) 5018478 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017370 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.2.9200.23920 Yes 5018457 5018478 Windows Server 2012 R2 5018474 (Monthly Rollup) 5018476 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017367 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20625 Yes 5018474 5018476 Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5018474 (Monthly Rollup) 5018476 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5017367 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 6.8 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20625 Yes 5018474 5018476 Windows Server 2016 | 5018411 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5018411 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5018419 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5018419 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 | 5018421 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) | 5018421 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5018425 |
Security Update | Yes |
5018411 |
Security Update | Yes |
5018419 |
Security Update | Yes |
5018410 |
Security Update | Yes |
5018418 |
Security Update | Yes |
5018427 |
Security Update | Yes |
5018474 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5018421 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Exploited in-the-wild type confusion (CWE-843) in the Windows COM+ Event System service es.dll -> local EoP (LOCAL SERVICE + SeImpersonate -> SYSTEM). Any normal (non-sandboxed) user can CoCreateInstance(EventSystemTier2, CLSID 1be1f766-5536-11d1-b726-00c04fb926af), call IEventSystemTier2::CreateSubscription(name, TRUE) to get an IEventSubscriptionTier2, then IEventSubscriptionTier2::Store, reaching CSubscription2::Store -> InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag(Names, Values). PutPropertyBag treats Values as a vector of PROPVARIANTs (Values.capropvar.pElems) WITHOUT checking the PROPVARIANT vt field. Because PROPVARIANT is a union, an attacker passes a VT_BLOB whose fields alias CAPROPVARIANT (BLOB.cbSize<->cElems, BLOB.pBlobData<->pElems); the COM runtime validates the blob length but not that the bytes are real PROPVARIANTs, so the attacker's byte array is interpreted as a PROPVARIANT[] with a fake VT_UNKNOWN holding a bogus pointer. PropVariantCopy then dereferences that pointer for its vtable and calls IUnknown::AddRef - a controlled deref/vcall. IN-HOUSE ghidriff (Sep -> Oct 11 2022) confirms the fix: a new ValidatePropertyBag function (plus helper IsEmptyOrBSTR) is added and called at the start of InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag (68% match) and RegistryRegRow::PutPropertyBag (99% match); it requires Names.vt==(VT_VECTOR|VT_LPWSTR), Values.vt==(VT_VECTOR|VT_VARIANT) and matching cElems, else E_INVALIDARG - rejecting the VT_BLOB alias before any dereference. Unconditional fix. RCA: James Forshaw / Google Project Zero (0day ITW).
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
ValidatePropertyBag |
added |
added (type/size validation) | New function: returns S_OK only if Names.vt==(VT_VECTOR|VT_LPWSTR), Values.vt==(VT_VECTOR|VT_VARIANT), and Names.calpwstr.cElems==Values.capropvar.cElems; otherwise E_INVALIDARG. Rejects the VT_BLOB-aliased-to-CAPROPVARIANT type confusion. |
InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag |
68% match |
code (calls ValidatePropertyBag first) | The in-memory property-bag path (transient subscription) - the exploited sink. Post-patch validates the two PROPVARIANTs via ValidatePropertyBag before iterating Values.capropvar.pElems, so a faked array is refused. |
RegistryRegRow::PutPropertyBag |
99% match |
code (calls ValidatePropertyBag first) | Registry-backed property-bag path; gains the same ValidatePropertyBag call. P0 notes it may retain a lesser info-disclosure concern but the type confusion is closed. |
IsEmptyOrBSTR |
added |
added (helper) | Small helper added alongside the validation hardening. |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2022-41033 — Windows COM+ Event System Service es.dll Type Confusion in InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag (Exploited In-The-Wild)
Summary
| Product | Microsoft Windows — es.dll (COM+ Event System service) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2022-41033 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege (LOCAL SERVICE + SeImpersonate → SYSTEM) |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CWE | CWE-843: Type Confusion (access of resource using incompatible type) |
| Exploited ITW | Yes — Windows in-the-wild 0-day (Project Zero RCA) |
| Patch Date | October 11, 2022 |
| Pre-patch binary | es.dll 2001.12.10941.16384 (Sep 2022) — SHA256 a8240c2690b6ef5b8792e8f2baec6f282445073efea17d275d16f7a5079daf56 |
| Post-patch binary | es.dll 2001.12.10941.16384 (Oct 11 2022 fix) — SHA256 eb6fbbefd6b16ef0cd80356ce1ae6af87478bbabed8b09bf29356a138782bb5e |
| Fix gating | None — added validation function |
Product Description
es.dll implements the COM+ Event System service. The COM class
EventSystemTier2 (CLSID 1be1f766-5536-11d1-b726-00c04fb926af) is accessible to
any normal user (but not sandboxed processes) and auto-starts the service.
Calling IEventSystemTier2::CreateSubscription(name, TRUE, ...) (transient →
in-memory property bag) yields an IEventSubscriptionTier2; its Store method
reaches the vulnerable code. The service runs as LOCAL SERVICE with
SeImpersonatePrivilege — administrator-equivalent — so code execution in the
process is a full local privilege escalation.
Vulnerability Summary
InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag(PROPVARIANT& Names, PROPVARIANT& Values) builds
an IPropertyBag from two PROPVARIANTs expected to be a vector of strings and a
vector of PROPVARIANTs — but never checks the vt field:
HRESULT InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag(PROPVARIANT& Names, PROPVARIANT& Values) {
this->PropertyBag = CreatePropertyBag(Values.capropvar.cElems);
for (int i = 0; i < Values.capropvar.cElems; ++i) {
LPWSTR name = WStringCopy(Names.calpwstr.pElems[i]);
PROPVARIANT var;
PropVariantCopy(&var, &Values.capropvar.pElems[i]); // *** derefs attacker-shaped array ***
this->PropertyBag->Add(name, var);
}
}
Because PROPVARIANT is a union, an attacker passes a VT_BLOB whose fields
alias CAPROPVARIANT (BLOB.cbSize ↔ capropvar.cElems, BLOB.pBlobData ↔ capropvar.pElems). The COM runtime validates the blob length but not that the
bytes are real PROPVARIANTs, so the attacker supplies an arbitrary byte array
interpreted as a PROPVARIANT array — e.g. a fake VT_UNKNOWN holding a
bogus pointer. PropVariantCopy then dereferences that pointer to read its
vtable and call IUnknown::AddRef — a type confusion giving a controlled pointer
dereference / virtual call (P0’s crash: mov rax,[rcx] with rcx = 0x12345678).
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local, any normal (non-sandboxed) user — the
EventSystemTier2COM class grants Everyone/INTERACTIVE access and auto-starts the service. - Reach the sink via
IEventSystemTier2::CreateSubscription(name, TRUE, ...)→IEventSubscriptionTier2::Store(...), passing aVT_BLOBin theValuesvector that fakes aVT_UNKNOWNvariant with an attacker pointer. - Exploited in the wild; the controlled dereference/virtual-call is turned into code execution in the LOCAL SERVICE process, then SeImpersonate → SYSTEM.
Vulnerability Details
Call Chain
Normal user:
CoCreateInstance(EventSystemTier2) -> IEventSystemTier2::CreateSubscription(name, TRUE) -> IEventSubscriptionTier2
-> IEventSubscriptionTier2::Store(...)
-> es!CSubscription2::Store
-> es!InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag [*** type confusion ***]
PropVariantCopy(fake VT_UNKNOWN) -> deref attacker pointer -> AddRef vcall
Root Cause
PutPropertyBag trusts the PROPVARIANT union shape without checking vt. A
VT_BLOB aliases the capropvar array pointer, so attacker bytes are treated as
a PROPVARIANT[] and a fake VT_UNKNOWN pointer is dereferenced (CWE-843).
The patch (confirmed — diff)
The October build adds ValidatePropertyBag and calls it first in both
InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag and RegistryRegRow::PutPropertyBag:
HRESULT ValidatePropertyBag(const PROPVARIANT& Names, const PROPVARIANT& Values) {
if (Names.vt == (VT_VECTOR | VT_LPWSTR) &&
Values.vt == (VT_VECTOR | VT_VARIANT) &&
Names.calpwstr.cElems == Values.capropvar.cElems)
return S_OK;
return E_INVALIDARG; // wrong type/size -> whole operation fails
}
By requiring Names to be a VT_VECTOR|VT_LPWSTR, Values to be a
VT_VECTOR|VT_VARIANT, and the element counts to match, a VT_BLOB (or any
mismatched type) is rejected before any array is dereferenced — killing the
aliasing. Our diff shows ValidatePropertyBag and a helper IsEmptyOrBSTR added,
InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag reworked (68% match) to call it, and
RegistryRegRow::PutPropertyBag (99% match) gaining the same call.
Patch Completeness Assessment
Unconditional fix — a validation function is added and invoked before the sink
(2022, pre-CFR-gating). P0 notes RegistryRegRow::PutPropertyBag may retain a
lesser info-disclosure concern, but the exploitable type confusion is closed.
Detection Guidance
Behavioural. A non-sandboxed process instantiating EventSystemTier2
(CLSID 1be1f766-…) and calling CreateSubscription(transient=TRUE) then Store
with a Values vector containing a VT_BLOB in place of VT_VECTOR|VT_VARIANT —
anomalous; legitimate callers pass typed variant vectors.
Crash signature. Access violations in es!InMemoryRegRow::PutPropertyBag /
OLEAUT32!VariantCopy / combase!PropVariantCopy dereferencing a low/bogus
pointer, in the COM+ Event System (svchost/LOCAL SERVICE) process.
References
- Google Project Zero — CVE-2022-41033: Type confusion in Windows COM+ Event System Service (James Forshaw), 0-days In-The-Wild RCA.
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2022-41033
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/es_dll-cve-2022-41033-ghidriff.md
Attack Path
A VT_BLOB is aliased to a PROPVARIANT array, faking a VT_UNKNOWN pointer that the COM+ service dereferences
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
Anonymous