CVE-2022-24521 — Windows Common Log File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
None
Overview
Verified Attribution
Binary/function confirmed from a public vendor or researcher report; this pin overrides the keyword heuristic.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems | 5012653 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 for x64-based Systems | 5012653 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 5012596 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 5012596 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 5012647 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems | 5012647 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 5012647 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for 32-bit Systems | 5012591 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for ARM64-based Systems | 5012591 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for x64-based Systems | 5012591 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 20H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 20H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H1 for 32-bit Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H1 for ARM64-based Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H1 for x64-based Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for 32-bit Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 21H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 5012592 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 11 version 21H2 for x64-based Systems | 5012592 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 7 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 1 5012626 (Monthly Rollup) 5012649 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011552 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.25924 Yes 5012626 5012649 Windows 7 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5012626 (Monthly Rollup) 5012649 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011552 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.25924 Yes 5012626 5012649 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit systems 5012670 (Monthly Rollup) 5012639 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011564 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20337 Yes 5012670 5012639 Windows 8.1 for x64-based systems 5012670 (Monthly Rollup) 5012639 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011564 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20337 Yes 5012670 5012639 Windows RT 8.1 | 5012670 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 5012658 (Monthly Rollup) 5012632 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011534 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21446 Yes 5012658 5012632 Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5012658 (Monthly Rollup) 5012632 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011534 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21446 Yes 5012658 5012632 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 5012658 (Monthly Rollup) 5012632 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011534 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21446 Yes 5012658 5012632 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 5012658 (Monthly Rollup) 5012632 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011534 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.0.6003.21446 Yes 5012658 5012632 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 5012626 (Monthly Rollup) 5012649 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011552 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.25924 Yes 5012626 5012649 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 5012626 (Monthly Rollup) 5012649 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011552 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.1.7601.25924 Yes 5012626 5012649 Windows Server 2012 5012650 (Monthly Rollup) 5012666 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011535 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.2.9200.23679 Yes 5012650 5012666 Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 5012650 (Monthly Rollup) 5012666 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011535 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.2.9200.23679 Yes 5012650 5012666 Windows Server 2012 R2 5012670 (Monthly Rollup) 5012639 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011564 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20337 Yes 5012670 5012639 Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 5012670 (Monthly Rollup) 5012639 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 5011564 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C 6.3.9600.20337 Yes 5012670 5012639 Windows Server 2016 | 5012596 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 5012596 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 5012647 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 5012647 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 | 5012604 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2022 (Server Core installation) | 5012604 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 20H2 (Server Core Installation) | 5012599 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
5012653 |
Security Update | Yes |
5012596 |
Security Update | Yes |
5012647 |
Security Update | Yes |
5012591 |
Security Update | Yes |
5012599 |
Security Update | Yes |
5012592 |
Security Update | Yes |
5012670 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
5012604 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Logical-error EoP (ITW 0-day): _CLFS_CONTAINER_CONTEXT->pContainer lives in the base log record and is round-tripped through ClfsEncodeBlock/ClfsDecodeBlock. A crafted .blf overlapping the signatures array (SignaturesOffset) with a container context lets encode/decode resurrect attacker bytes over the kernel-zeroed pContainer; RemoveContainer then performs two indirect calls through it -> kernel RIP control. Patch adds CClfsBaseFile::ValidateRgOffsets (new) called from LoadContainerQ behind Feature_Servicing_38197809: sorts record object offsets (qsort/CompareOffsets), validates CLFS_NODE_IDs, and rejects any record whose context objects cross SignaturesOffset (STATUS_LOG_METADATA_INVALID 0xC01A000D). Secondary hardening: CClfsLogFcbVirtual::Open now KeBugCheckEx-es on internal inconsistency. 2,836/2,838 functions matched; 2 added, 8 code-changed.
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
CClfsBaseFile::ValidateRgOffsets |
1c00274bc |
added (new function) | 267 bytes; calls OffsetToAddr + qsort; called only from LoadContainerQ; the CVE-2022-24521 fix |
Feature_Servicing_38197809__private_IsEnabled |
1c000c8d4 |
added (new function) | 94 bytes; WIL CFR flag gating the new validation block |
CClfsBaseFilePersisted::LoadContainerQ |
1c0036a90 -> 1c0036ba0 |
code, length, address, calling, called | 2927 -> 3160 bytes, b_ratio 0.85; new flag-gated ValidateRgOffsets call; now calls ValidateRgOffsets + Feature_Servicing_38197809__private_IsEnabled |
CClfsLogFcbVirtual::Open |
1c0042b40 -> 1c0042d40 |
code, length, address, called | 974 -> 1046 bytes, ratio 0.99; new KeBugCheckEx call (secondary hardening) |
`CClfsBaseFilePersisted::LoadContainerQ'::__l1::fin$0 |
|
code, length, address, called | ratio 0.98; SEH funclet updated to clean up new 0x11f0 scratch buffer |
Feature_Servicing_37529451__private_IsEnabled |
|
code | ratio 0.91; pre-existing WIL flag accessor, recompiled (state-cache layout shift) |
wil_details_FeatureReporting_RecordUsageInCache |
|
code | ratio 0.97; WIL telemetry plumbing for new flag |
wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToServiceDirect |
|
code | ratio 0.90; WIL telemetry plumbing |
wil_details_FeatureReporting_IncrementUsageInCache |
|
code | ratio 0.98; WIL telemetry plumbing |
wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToService |
|
code | ratio 0.87; WIL telemetry plumbing |
OffsetToAddr |
|
calling (no code changes) | referenced by new ValidateRgOffsets |
CompareOffsets |
|
no code changes | qsort comparator used by new ValidateRgOffsets |
NTOSKRNL.EXE::qsort |
|
calling (no code changes) | referenced by new ValidateRgOffsets |
operator_new / operator_delete |
|
no code changes | scratch-buffer alloc/free in patched LoadContainerQ |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2022-24521 — Windows CLFS clfs.sys EoP via Indirect-Call on Attacker-Controlled pContainer (Signatures/Context Overlap Logical Error)
Summary
| Product | Microsoft Windows — clfs.sys (Common Log File System kernel driver) |
|---|---|
| Vendor | Microsoft Corporation |
| Severity | High (exploited in the wild as a 0-day) |
| Affected Versions | Windows 7 / 8.1 / 10 / 11 and Server 2008–2022, before the April 12, 2022 security updates |
| Tested Version | Windows 11 21H2 — clfs.sys 10.0.22000.556 (pre-patch, KB5011493) vs 10.0.22000.613 (post-patch, KB5012592) |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege — arbitrary kernel indirect call → RIP control → SYSTEM |
| CVE ID | CVE-2022-24521 |
| CWE | CWE-822 (Untrusted Pointer Dereference) / logical error: lack of indirect-call validation |
| Bug class | Logical error — attacker-controlled kernel pointer restored through encode/decode cycle, then called |
| PoC Available | Trigger PoC below (crafted .blf generator) — blue-team/detection grade |
| Exploit Available | Exploited ITW (NSA + CrowdStrike report); no public full exploit |
| Patch Available | Yes — April 12, 2022 (KB5012592 on Win11 21H2; KB5012599/KB5012647 etc. on other SKUs) |
| Diff-verified | ghidriff: 2 added (CClfsBaseFile::ValidateRgOffsets @ 0x1c00274bc, Feature_Servicing_38197809__private_IsEnabled @ 0x1c000c8d4), 8 code-changed; LoadContainerQ 2,927→3,160 bytes |
| RCA source | Project Zero 0-days-in-the-wild RCA (Sergey Kornienko, PixiePoint Security) |
CVSS 3.1 Detailed Scoring
Base Score: 7.8 (HIGH)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Local | Attacker must run code / place a crafted .blf and open it |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Deterministic once the BLF layout trick is built; no race |
| Privileges Required (PR) | Low | Any standard user may create/open CLFS logs |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | — |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged | Kernel driver runs in the victim’s own security scope |
| Confidentiality (C) | High | Full kernel memory disclosure achievable post-exploitation |
| Integrity (I) | High | Arbitrary kernel write via the call primitive |
| Availability (A) | High | BSOD possible; exploit yields full control |
Product Description
clfs.sys implements the Windows Common Log File System — a high-performance
transactional logging engine used by TxF/TxR, Active Directory, MSDTC,
EventLog, and user apps through the clfsw32.dll API. A CLFS log consists of
a Base Log File (.blf) holding control records, metadata blocks, client
and container contexts, plus container files holding the actual log
stream.
The .blf is a file format parsed by the kernel, and its metadata blocks
are protected by a sector-signature scheme: when a block is written,
ClfsEncodeBlock lifts two bytes out of every 512-byte sector into a
signatures array (located at _CLFS_LOG_BLOCK_HEADER->SignaturesOffset,
header +0x68); when read back, ClfsDecodeBlock writes them back into the
sectors. Because both the signatures array and the contexts it may overlap
come from attacker-controlled file bytes, any field the kernel temporarily
stores inside the image and later trusts is fair game — and that is
exactly what happens with _CLFS_CONTAINER_CONTEXT->pContainer (+0x18).
CLFS has been one of the most exploited Windows components: CVE-2022-24521, CVE-2022-37969, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2023-23376, and more.
Vulnerability Summary
When a base log file is opened, CClfsBaseFilePersisted::LoadContainerQ
walks the container contexts embedded in the base log record. For each
context marked for removal (cidContainer == -1), the kernel — aware that
pContainer is file-controlled — defensively zeroes
containerContext->pContainer before calling
CClfsBaseFilePersisted::RemoveContainer. The intent: a user can never
supply a fake pContainer for the indirect calls inside RemoveContainer.
The defense is defeated by the encode/decode cycle inside
RemoveContainer’s own FlushImage → WriteMetadataBlock path:
FlushImagesnapshots every valid context’spContainerinto a side array (this + 0x1C0 + i*8) and zeroes the in-image field.ClfsEncodeBlockruns — if the attacker placed the signatures array so it overlaps the container context, encoding copies attacker bytes from the signature slots into the zeroedpContainerregion (the bytes were copied out of the sectors at encode time and land in the array; the attacker pre-arranged those sector bytes to be their fake pointer, so the decode in step 3 restores them over the zeroed field).- After the sector write,
ClfsDecodeBlockrestores sector bytes from the signatures array — repopulatingpContainerwith the attacker value. - Back in
FlushImage, the restore loop tries to put the real saved pointer back viaCClfsBaseFile::AcquireContainerContext— but if the attacker makes that call fail (trivial: corrupt a field the acquire validates), the real pointer is never restored and the fake one survives. - Execution returns to
RemoveContainer, which now performs:
pContainer = containerContext->pContainer; // attacker-controlled
containerContext->pContainer = 0;
(*(void (**)(ULONG64))(*(ULONG64 *)pContainer + 0x18))(pContainer); // vtbl[+0x18] remove
(*(void (**)(ULONG64))(*(ULONG64 *)pContainer + 0x08))(pContainer); // vtbl[+0x08] release
A fully attacker-controlled this pointer and a fully
attacker-controlled virtual-call target → direct RIP control in kernel
context (with KASLR/CFG considerations handled by standard techniques —
ITW exploit reportedly used pipe-attribute pool grooming + an arbitrary
read built from a module gadget, per the P0 RCA).
Root cause: the signatures array offset (SignaturesOffset) was never
validated against the context objects it can overlap; a field the kernel
deliberately zeroed as a security measure could be silently resurrected by
the block encode/decode machinery.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local authenticated session, standard user (no admin needed)
- CLFS is present on every Windows install — no optional feature required
- Attacker must write a crafted
.blfto a user-writable path, then open it as a CLFS log - The BLF must be crafted so that:
- container context and the signatures array are adjacent/overlapping,
such that copying context bytes to
SIG_0..SIG_Xand the encode/decode round-trip does not corrupt the context (format-level trick — see P0 RCA) - one container context has
cidContainer == -1to armRemoveContainer - a field that
CClfsBaseFile::AcquireContainerContextvalidates is corrupted so the stage-3 restore fails
- container context and the signatures array are adjacent/overlapping,
such that copying context bytes to
- No race condition; no special hardware; works from low-IL processes
Vulnerability Details
Reaching the bug from userspace (the “hint”)
The load path is reached by simply opening the crafted base log file —
no exotic IOCTL crafting needed. Userspace APIs (all clfsw32.dll):
| API | Role |
|---|---|
CreateLogFile(L"LOG:\\path\\evil.blf", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, ...) |
Opens the .blf; kernel parses the base log record → reaches LoadContainerQ — this is the trigger |
AddLogContainer / RemoveLogContainer |
Alternative paths that manipulate container contexts (useful while building a valid baseline BLF before corrupting it) |
WriteLogRestart / ReserveAndAppendLog |
Force metadata flushes (exercise the same FlushImage/WriteMetadataBlock encode path) |
IOCTL layer: CreateLogFile on a LOG:-prefixed path ends in an IRP to the
CLFS device; metadata-flush IOCTLs such as 0x8007681F/0x80076828-family
(CLFS flush/scan) exercise FlushImage on an already-open log. The bug,
however, fires during the open/load itself, before any of those are
needed.
Complete kernel call flow
User mode (clfsw32.dll):
CreateLogFile("LOG:\\C:\\Users\\user\\evil.blf", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, 0)
│ NtCreateFile → I/O manager → CLFS device
▼
Kernel mode (clfs.sys):
CClfsDriver::LogIoDispatch .................. IRP_MJ_CREATE / device dispatch
→ ClfsDispatchIoRequest ................... builds CClfsRequest
→ CClfsRequest::Dispatch ................ routes open/create
→ CClfsLogFcbPhysical::OpenLogFile .... opens FCB for the .blf
→ CClfsBaseFilePersisted::LoadImage . reads control record + base log record
→ CClfsBaseFilePersisted::LoadContainerQ [*** BUGGY FUNCTION ***]
│ for each container context in the base log record:
│ if (context->cidContainer == -1) {
│ context->pContainer = NULL; // intended defense
│ RemoveContainer(this, idx);
│ }
├──→ CClfsBaseFilePersisted::RemoveContainer
│ → CClfsBaseFilePersisted::FlushImage
│ │ for i in 0..0x3FF:
│ │ AcquireContainerContext(i,&ctx) // succeeds
│ │ saved[i] = ctx->pContainer; // snapshot
│ │ ctx->pContainer = 0; // zero in-image
│ ├──→ WriteMetadataBlock
│ │ → ClfsEncodeBlock *** attacker bytes land in
│ │ signatures array slots that OVERLAP the
│ │ container context ***
│ │ → CClfsContainer::WriteSector
│ │ → ClfsDecodeBlock *** pContainer region is
│ │ repopulated with attacker value ***
│ │ for i in 0..0x3FF: // stage [3]
│ │ if (saved[i] &&
│ │ AcquireContainerContext(i,&ctx) >= 0) // ← attacker
│ │ ctx->pContainer = saved[i]; // makes this FAIL
│ └── (fake pContainer survives)
│ pContainer = context->pContainer; // ATTACKER VALUE
│ context->pContainer = 0;
│ (*pContainer->vtbl[0x18])(pContainer); // ← RIP control #1 (remove)
│ (*pContainer->vtbl[0x08])(pContainer); // ← RIP control #2 (release)
▼
Surrounding functions worth reviewing beyond the diff (ghidriff may omit
context): LoadContainerQ’s caller LoadImage, the whole
FlushImage/WriteMetadataBlock pair, ClfsEncodeBlock/ClfsDecodeBlock
(they define why the overlap works), AcquireContainerContext (defines
how to make stage 3 fail), and CClfsBaseFile::OffsetToAddr (used by the
new validator).
The patch (ghidriff-verified)
LoadContainerQ (0x1c0036a90 → 0x1c0036ba0, 2,927 → 3,160 bytes) gains a
validation gate behind Feature_Servicing_38197809 (Win11 21H2 flag name as
verified in the diff; the P0 RCA shows the same check as
Feature_Servicing_38197806 on another build):
// post-patch LoadContainerQ — actual Ghidra decompilation (abridged)
_Src = BaseLogRecord + 0x328; // rgContainers[]
uVar10 = CClfsBaseFile::ContainerCount(this);
uVar25 = count_non_zero(_Src, 0x400);
...
else if (uVar25 == uVar10) {
if (!Feature_Servicing_38197809__private_IsEnabled()) {
// legacy path (flag off)
scratch = operator_new(0x1000, PagedPool);
memcpy(scratch, _Src, 0x1000);
status = CClfsBaseFile::ValidateContainerOffsets(this, scratch, 0x1000);
} else {
// NEW CVE-2022-24521 validation (flag on)
scratch = operator_new(0x11f0, PagedPool); // 0x1000 + 0x1f0
memcpy(scratch, _Src, 0x1000);
// copy 0x1f0 bytes of the record's object-offset extension
// from BaseLogRecord + 0x138 into scratch + 0x1000 (unrolled)
status = CClfsBaseFile::ValidateRgOffsets(this, scratch, 0x1000); // NEW
operator_delete(scratch);
}
// fail load with STATUS_LOG_METADATA_INVALID (0xC01A000D) on error
}
ValidateRgOffsets (new function @ 0x1c00274bc, 267 bytes, called only
from LoadContainerQ): sorts the record’s object offsets with
qsort(..., CompareOffsets), resolves each with OffsetToAddr, validates
CLFS_NODE_ID (0xC1FDF007 container context → span 0x88;
0xC1FDF008 client context → span 0x30), checks consecutive-object range
consistency, and enforces every context object’s span must end at or below
LogBlock + SignaturesOffset — the signatures array may no longer
intersect any context object, so encode/decode can never write attacker
bytes into pContainer. Violations return 0xC01A000D
(STATUS_LOG_METADATA_INVALID).
The same update also hardens CClfsLogFcbVirtual::Open
(0x1c0042b40 → 0x1c0042d40, +72 bytes), which now calls KeBugCheckEx on
an internal consistency failure — defense-in-depth shipped alongside the
CVE fix (moderate confidence it is related hardening, not a second CVE).
Exploitation Scenario (from P0 RCA, no ITW sample available)
- Craft
evil.blf: container context adjacent to/overlapping the signatures array; sector bytes pre-arranged so encode → decode restores a fake kernel pointer intopContainer; one context hascidContainer = -1; acquire-validation field corrupted so stage-3 restore fails. - Groom the paged pool with pipe objects /
PipeAttributeentries (SSTIC 2020 “Scoop the Windows 10 pool” technique). - Leak kernel addresses with
NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation) — pipe object addresses + a gadget-module base. CreateLogFileonevil.blf→ the indirect call hits a stack/gadget pivot; build an arbitrary-read, then overwrite the exploit process token (second trigger) → SYSTEM.
Trigger PoC
See poc/poc_cve_2022_24521.c.
It generates a structurally-crafted BLF (signatures array overlapping
container context, cidContainer = -1, sabotaged acquire-validation field,
fake pContainer = 0x4141414141414141) and opens it with CreateLogFile:
- Pre-patch (vulnerable) system:
RemoveContainerdereferences0x4141414141414141→KMODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLEDbugcheck in a test VM. Run only inside a snapshotted VM. - Patched system:
ValidateRgOffsetsrejects the file withSTATUS_LOG_METADATA_INVALID(0xC01A000D) andCreateLogFilefails cleanly — no crash.
This is a detector/validator for blue teams (YARA/Sigma/Sysmon tuning), not a weaponized exploit.
Detection Rules
YARA — crafted BLF / PoC artifacts
rule CVE_2022_24521_CLFS_Crafted_BLF {
meta:
description = "Detects crafted CLFS base log files targeting CVE-2022-24521 (signatures array overlapping container context)"
author = "OnlyFm252"
date = "2026-07-19"
cve = "CVE-2022-24521"
tlp = "white"
strings:
// CLFS control record / base log record magic
$blf_magic = { 0E 00 00 C1 F5 F0 D0 C1 } // CLFS_CONTROL_RECORD-ish header bytes
// Container context node id 0xC1FDF007 appearing with cidContainer = -1 nearby
$container_ctx = { 07 F0 FD C1 }
$client_ctx = { 08 F0 FD C1 }
// PoC marker fake pointer
$fake_ptr = { 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 }
$marker = "CVE-2022-24521" ascii wide
condition:
uint32(0) != 0 and filesize < 16MB and
($container_ctx and ($fake_ptr or $marker)) or
($marker and $client_ctx)
}
rule CVE_2022_24521_CLFS_PoC_Binary {
meta:
description = "Detects compiled PoC tooling for CVE-2022-24521"
author = "OnlyFm252"
date = "2026-07-19"
cve = "CVE-2022-24521"
strings:
$api1 = "CreateLogFile" ascii wide
$api2 = "AddLogContainer" ascii wide
$api3 = "RemoveLogContainer" ascii wide
$api4 = "WriteLogRestart" ascii wide
$log = "LOG:\\" ascii wide nocase
$blf = ".blf" ascii wide nocase
$ctx = { 07 F0 FD C1 }
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and filesize < 1MB and
$api1 and ($api2 or $api4) and ($log or $blf) and $ctx
}
Sigma — suspicious CLFS log open from user-writable paths
title: Suspicious CLFS Base Log File Creation or Open (CVE-2022-24521)
id: 7c1f2a90-2452-1cde-9ab1-202204120001
status: experimental
description: >
Detects creation of or access to .blf base log files in user-writable
locations by non-system processes. CVE-2022-24521 is triggered by
opening a crafted .blf with CreateLogFile; legitimate CLFS logs are
almost always created by system components under system directories.
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/19
references:
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-24521
- https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-24521.html
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith: '.blf'
filter_system:
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
condition: selection_ext and not filter_system
falsepositives:
- CLFS-aware backup software
- Custom applications using the CLFS API legitimately
level: high
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- cve.2022.24521
Sigma — crash signature of a failed exploit attempt
title: CLFS Driver Bugcheck After User-Context Log Open (CVE-2022-24521)
id: 8d2a3b01-2452-2def-8bc2-202204120002
status: experimental
description: >
Correlates a user-mode process opening a .blf followed by a system
bugcheck (Event 1001/41) referencing clfs.sys — the signature of a
CVE-2022-24521 attempt hitting a mitigated or partially-crafted trigger.
author: OnlyFm252
date: 2026/07/19
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1001
Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-WER-SystemErrorReporting'
keywords:
- 'clfs.sys'
- 'KMODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED'
condition: selection and keywords
level: critical
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- cve.2022.24521
Sysmon configuration
<!-- Sysmon rules for CVE-2022-24521 detection -->
<RuleGroup name="CVE-2022-24521" groupRelation="or">
<!-- .blf creation outside system dirs -->
<FileCreate onmatch="include">
<Rule name="CLFS_BLF_UserDir" groupRelation="and">
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.blf</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="excludes">C:\Windows\</TargetFilename>
</Rule>
</FileCreate>
<!-- clfsw32.dll loaded by non-system processes -->
<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
<Rule name="CLFS_DLL_Load" groupRelation="and">
<ImageLoaded condition="end with">clfsw32.dll</ImageLoaded>
<Image condition="excludes">C:\Windows\</Image>
<Image condition="excludes">C:\Program Files\</Image>
<Image condition="excludes">C:\Program Files (x86)\</Image>
</Rule>
</ImageLoad>
<!-- File open of .blf (Event 11/23) by non-system image -->
<FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="include">
<Rule name="CLFS_BLF_Stream" groupRelation="and">
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.blf</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="excludes">C:\Windows\</TargetFilename>
</Rule>
</FileCreateStreamHash>
</RuleGroup>
Remediation
- Apply the April 2022 cumulative update (KB5012592 Win11 21H2;
KB5012599/KB5012647/KB5012591 etc. per SKU). Verify
clfs.sys ≥ 10.0.22000.613(or the equivalent per build). - Deploy the Sysmon/Sigma rules above — the
.blfin user-writable paths +clfsw32.dllload heuristics catch the whole CLFS bug class, not just this CVE. - Block or alert on
.blfattachments in mail/web gateways. - Enable kernel mitigations (HVCI, Kernel-mode CFG) — raises the bar for turning the indirect-call primitive into code execution.
- Hunt: sweep endpoints for
.blffiles outside known system locations created before the patch date.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2022-04-12 | Microsoft patches CVE-2022-24521 (April 2022 Patch Tuesday) — ITW 0-day |
| 2022-2023 | Project Zero publishes 0-days-in-the-wild RCA |
| 2026-07-19 | This analysis: ghidriff diff of Win11 21H2 .556 → .613 + blue-team package |
References
- Project Zero — 0-days in the Wild RCA: CVE-2022-24521
- PixiePoint Security — Analysing and Exploiting the CLFS Logical-Error Vulnerability
- MSRC — CVE-2022-24521
- SSTIC 2020 — Scoop the Windows 10 pool! (pipe pool grooming)
- clfsw32 API — CreateLogFile
- OnlyFm252 diff report — clfs_sys-kb5012592
Attack Path
Kernel RIP control - encode/decode round-tripping resurrects attacker bytes over a kernel-zeroed container pointer
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
1 public PoCUnverified third-party code
Public proof-of-concept repositories aggregated from PoC-in-GitHub. They are not reviewed and may be incomplete, non-functional, or malicious — inspect the code before running anything.
| Repository | Stars | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| uname1able/CVE-2022-24521 | 0 | 2026-02-19 | CVE-2022-24521 poc |
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
Adam Podlosky and Amir Bazine of Crowdstrike
National Security Agency