Important CVSS 7.8 EPSS 0.05431 ⚠️ Exploited in the wild 📢 Publicly disclosed 🔬 Patch diffed 2020-11 archive

Executive Summary

None

Overview

7.8
CVSS HIGH
Important
MS Severity
Exploited
MS Exploit Status
Exploitation Detected
MS Exploit Likelihood
Category Elevation of Privilege
Released Nov 10 2020
Last Updated Nov 10 2020
Publicly Disclosed Yes
CISA KEV Listed (added 2021-11-03)
Known Exploits None Known
EPSS Score 0.05431 — 0.92005 percentile
NVD CVSS 7.8 HIGH — matches MSRC

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C
ATTACK VECTOR
Local
ATTACK COMPLEXITY
Low
PRIVILEGES REQUIRED
Low
USER INTERACTION
None
SCOPE
Unchanged
CONFIDENTIALITY
High
INTEGRITY
High
AVAILABILITY
High
EXPLOIT CODE MATURITY
Functional
REMEDIATION LEVEL
Official Fix
REPORT CONFIDENCE
Confirmed
Temporal Score: 7.2

EPSS Score

0.05431
probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
0.92005 percentile - updated 2026-08-14
View on FIRST.org

Affected Products

30 affected products
Product KB Article Severity Impact Restart Required
Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems 4586787 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 for x64-based Systems 4586787 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems 4586830 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems 4586830 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1803 for 32-bit Systems 4586785 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1803 for ARM64-based Systems 4586785 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1803 for x64-based Systems 4586785 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems 4586793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems 4586793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems 4586793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1903 for 32-bit Systems 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1903 for ARM64-based Systems 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1903 for x64-based Systems 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1909 for 32-bit Systems 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1909 for ARM64-based Systems 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 1909 for x64-based Systems 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 2004 for 32-bit Systems 4586781 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 2004 for ARM64-based Systems 4586781 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 2004 for x64-based Systems 4586781 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 20H2 for 32-bit Systems 4586781 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 10 Version 20H2 for ARM64-based Systems 4586781 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows 7 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 1 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows 7 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit systems 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows 8.1 for x64-based systems 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows RT 8.1 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows Server 2012 4598278 (Monthly Rollup) 4598297 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4592468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4598278 4598297 Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 4598278 (Monthly Rollup) 4598297 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4592468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4598278 4598297 Windows Server 2012 R2 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows Server 2016 4586830 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) 4586830 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 4586793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) 4586793 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server, version 1903 (Server Core installation) 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server, version 1909 (Server Core installation) 4586786 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server, version 2004 (Server Core installation) 4586781 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes
Windows Server, version 20H2 (Server Core Installation) 4586781 (Security Update) Important Elevation of Privilege Yes

Patches

7 patches
Article Type Restart
4586787 Security Update Yes
4586830 Security Update Yes
4586785 Security Update Yes
4586793 Security Update Yes
4586786 Security Update Yes
4586781 Security Update Yes
4586845 Monthly Rollup Yes

Patch Diff

ghidriff + headless Ghidra decompile verification · cng.sys (KB4586781)

Pool buffer overflow (CWE-190 integer truncation) in cng.sys IOCTL 0x390400 handling: cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock computes the output allocation as SrcLen*6 in 16-bit arithmetic but writes SrcLen*6 bytes of Unicode hex dump, giving a controlled-length linear NonPagedPoolNx overflow with a XX 00 XX 00 20 00 byte pattern. Reachable by any local user via DeviceIoControl on \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng (or BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty). Exploited ITW as the sandbox-escape stage of a Chrome chain (with CVE-2020-15999); full public technique via Segment Heap BlockSize attack + named-pipe DQE abuse + quota ProcessBilled decrement -> SeDebugPrivilege (PixiePoint). Patch (KB4586781, cng.sys 10.0.19041.630) replaces the inline multiply with new helper RtlUShortMult and rejects on overflow; VERIFIED 2026-07-22 via ghidriff + headless decompile (single code-changed function).

Pre-patch version 10.0.19041.264 Download
Post-patch version 10.0.19041.630 Download
Function Address Change Note
cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock 0x1c006245c (both builds) code (verified via headless decompile 2026-07-22) 16-bit truncation: BCryptAlloc((USHORT)(SrcLen*6)) while the hex-format loop writes SrcLen*6 bytes -> NonPagedPoolNx linear overflow ('Cngb' tag), content pattern XX 00 XX 00 20 00. SrcLen>=0x2AAB triggers ((ushort)(0x2AAB*6)=2 allocated, 0x10002 written). Length also truncated to 16-bit at the CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation call site. Fix: RtlUShortMult(len,6,&out) with error-on-overflow before allocation + BCryptFree cleanup path.
cng!RtlUShortMult added Safe 16-bit multiply returning error on overflow; the entire fix
cng!BCryptFree modified (no code changes) metadata-only churn
View full diff report View RCA report Download PoC

Root Cause Analysis

CVE-2020-17087 — Windows Kernel cng.sys IOCTL 0x390400 Pool Buffer Overflow


Summary

Product Microsoft Windows — cng.sys (Kernel Cryptography Next Generation driver)
Vendor Microsoft Corporation
Severity Important (MSRC) — CVSS v3.1 7.8 (High)
CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (MSRC)
CVE Title Windows Kernel Local Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (MSRC)
Affected Versions Windows 10 2004 KB4579311 and previous (GP0 RCA); also Windows 7/8.1/Server per MSRC
Tested Version Windows 10 2004/20H2 — cng.sys 10.0.19041.264 (pre-patch; unchanged through 19041.572 per winbindex) vs 10.0.19041.630 (post-patch)
Impact Elevation of Privilege — kernel pool overflow converted to arbitrary kernel read/write and SYSTEM (ITW: Chrome sandbox escape)
CVE ID CVE-2020-17087
CWE CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (leading to CWE-787 out-of-bounds write)
PoC Available Yes — GP0 issue 2104 crash trigger; blue-team trigger variant (poc_cve_2020_17087.c) derived from it
Exploit Available Full exploit technique public (PixiePoint Security, Oct 2021 — Segment Heap BlockSize attack); exploited in the wild before patch, chained with Chrome 0day CVE-2020-15999
Patch Available Yes
Patch Date November 10, 2020 — KB4586781
Discovered Mateusz Jurczyk & Sergei Glazunov (Google Project Zero); disclosed 2020-10-30 as ITW 0day

Root Cause

cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock() formats a caller-controlled byte buffer into a space-separated hex dump in Unicode. Each input byte becomes three UTF-16 code units — high-nibble hex char, low-nibble hex char, space — i.e. 6 output bytes per input byte. The allocation size is computed as SrcLen * 6 in 16-bit arithmetic, but the conversion loop iterates SrcLen times:

// cng.sys 10.0.19041.264 — CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock @ 0x1c006245c (verified decompile)
uVar2 = param_2 * 6;                          // uVar2 is USHORT -> truncates!
puVar3 = (ushort *)BCryptAlloc((ulonglong)uVar2);
if (puVar3 != NULL) {
    puVar4 = puVar3;
    do {                                      // loop count = full param_2
        *puVar4   = (ushort)"0123456789abcdefT"[*param_1 >> 4];
        puVar4[1] = (ushort)"0123456789abcdefT"[*param_1 & 0xf];
        puVar4[2] = 0x20;                       // L' '
        param_1++; puVar4 += 3;
    } while (--uVar6 != 0);
}

For SrcLen = 0x2AAB: (USHORT)(0x2AAB * 6) = 2 bytes allocated, 0x2AAB * 6 = 0x10002 bytes written — a controlled-length linear overflow of a NonPagedPoolNx allocation (tag Cngb), with overflow content constrained to the pattern XX 00 XX 00 20 00 where XX ∈ [0x30–0x39, 0x61–0x66] (hex digits + 'T'). Note the length also reaches the function truncated to 16 bits at the call site (movzx ecx, di in CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation), bounding the effective input to 0x2AAB–0xFFFF.

The patch (verified via headless Ghidra decompile, 2026-07-22)

The post-patch build (cng.sys 10.0.19041.630) adds one function, RtlUShortMult, and rewrites the allocation to use it — safe 16-bit multiplication that returns an error on overflow instead of truncating. The function bails out before any allocation when len * 6 exceeds 0xFFFF:

// cng.sys 10.0.19041.630 — same function @ 0x1c006245c (verified decompile)
lVar2 = RtlUShortMult(param_2, /* 6 */, local_res8);
if (lVar2 < 0)
    return lVar2;                              // overflow -> reject, no alloc
puVar3 = (ushort *)BCryptAlloc((ulonglong)local_res8[0]);

(The decompiler renders the constant operand ambiguously; the unchanged output-length bookkeeping — param_3[1] = out; param_3[0] = out - 2 — pins the helper’s semantics to out = len * 6.) A BCryptFree cleanup path on failure was added as well. ghidriff confirms this is the only function with code changes across the whole driver (79% similarity), with RtlUShortMult the single added function.


Complete Call Flow (userspace → vulnerable code)

[userspace, any integrity level]
Option A (raw):  CreateFileA("\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\Cng", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE)
                 DeviceIoControl(hCng, 0x390400, inBuf, 0x1000 + DataBufferSize, ...)
Option B (API):  BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty()  (bcrypt.dll — documented Win32 API,
                 reaches the same CNG config IOCTL path)

[kernel]
KsecDispatch (ksecdd.sys → cng)
  └─ cng!CngDispatch
       └─ cng!CngDeviceControl                 // extracts IOCTL + buffers
            └─ cng!ConfigIoHandler_Safeguarded // sanity checks, copies input,
                                               // IoUnpack_SG_ParamBlock_Header
                                               //   (magic 0x1A2B3C4D required)
                 └─ cng!_ConfigFunctionIoHandler
                      └─ cng!CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation
                           │  param_9 = (USHORT)DataBufferSize   ← truncation #1 (call site)
                           └─ cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock     ← THE BUG
                                ├─ BCryptAlloc((USHORT)(len*6))  ← truncation #2
                                └─ hex-dump loop writes len*6 bytes → POOL OVERFLOW

Relevant interfaces

Layer Interface
Device \Device\Cng (open via \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng) — no special privileges needed
Win32 API (alt. route) BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty (bcrypt.dll)
IOCTL 0x390400 (CNG config “set function property” operation)
Kernel entry cng!CngDispatch → cng!CngDeviceControl
Vulnerable sink cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock → BCryptAlloc + hex-format loop

IOCTL input layout (from the GP0 PoC / PixiePoint writeup)

Offset Size Field
0x00 4 magic = 0x1A2B3C4D (required; any other value never reaches the bug)
0x04 4 0x10400
0x08 4 1
0x10 8 0x100
0x18 4 3
0x20 8 offset of context name → 0x200 (L"FUNCTION")
0x28 8 0x300
0x30 8 offset of property name → 0x400 (L"PROPERTY")
0x38 4 0
0x40 8 0x500
0x48 8 0x600
0x50 4 DataBufferSize — the overflow field (≥ 0x2AAB triggers)
0x58 8 offset of data buffer → 0x1000
0x60 8 0

Exploitation Scenario

ITW (Oct 2020): used as the kernel stage of a Chrome exploit chain — CVE-2020-15999 (FreeType heap overflow, Chrome RCE in renderer) → CVE-2020-17087 to escape the sandbox to SYSTEM. Per GP0, the ITW sample “uses the buffer overflow to establish an arbitrary read/write primitive in kernel space with the help of Named Pipe objects”.

Public technique (PixiePoint Security, tested Win10 1903–20H2): the constrained overwrite (XX 00 XX 00 20 00) is turned into full kernel R/W via the Segment Heap BlockSize attack:

  1. Groom VS-allocator subsegments (128 KB, 23 usable pages) with named-pipe _NP_DATA_QUEUE_ENTRY sprays: groups g3/g1, target chunks (BlockSize 0x3E0), holes (0x7F0 + fill 0x7B0).
  2. Trigger with DataBufferSize = 0x2BF9 → allocation 0x7D6, write 0x107D6; lands in a hole and overwrites a target chunk’s pool-header BlockSize 0x3E → 0x64 (“ghost chunk” now 0x640 bytes).
  3. Enable dynamic lookaside for both sizes; free/realloc the ghost chunk to get a repeatable controlled linear overflow into the adjacent named pipe chunk.
  4. Corrupt _NP_DATA_QUEUE_ENTRY.{QuotaInEntry, DataSize} → OOB read with PeekNamedPipe; leak a valid root-queue pointer; flip DataEntryType to Unbuffered with a userland fake _IRP → arbitrary kernel read.
  5. Leak npfs base, nt!ExpPoolQuotaCookie, nt!RtlpHpHeapGlobals, nt!PsInitialSystemProcess; craft fake _EPROCESS objects whose QuotaBlock points into Token.Privileges; use the Quota ProcessBilled overwrite for arbitrary decrement → flip on SeDebugPrivilege.
  6. Inject into winlogon.exe → SYSTEM shell.

Pool-grooming caveat from the writeup: guard pages appear every ~0x10 pages, so the exploit needs a 128 KB subsegment layout to get a ≥ 64 KB overflow “runway” without touching a guard page.


Detection & Hunting (blue team)

High-signal telemetry

Source Indicator
Crash dumps (C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP, minidumps) Bugcheck with stack through cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock / cng!CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation — on an unpatched host, a trigger PoC or exploit grooming failure shows exactly here (e.g. KERNEL_SECURITY_CHECK_FAILURE / BAD_POOL_HEADER 0xC2 / PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA in cng.sys)
Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688 Processes opening \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng (rare outside crypto libraries) that then die with the machine — EDR device-open telemetry
Handle/device audit Non-system processes with a handle to \Device\Cng issuing IOCTL 0x390400 (ETW Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-IO / driver telemetry if available)
Behavioral Massive named-pipe creation bursts (hundreds–thousands of pipes) from one process = pool-grooming signature of the PixiePoint/ITW technique
Post-exploitation Processes unexpectedly gaining SeDebugPrivilege (token-privilege auditing, Sysmon EID 10 on winlogon.exe)

Sigma rule (starter)

title: CVE-2020-17087 CNG Pool Overflow - Suspicious Named Pipe Grooming
id: 3f8a1c20-1708-74c2-9a10-020201708700
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: pipe_created
detection:
  selection:
    # Exploit sprays hundreds-thousands of pipes for Segment Heap grooming
    PipeName|startswith: '\'
  condition: selection
level: low   # deploy as a correlation/counting rule: >200 pipe_created by one Image in <60s
title: CVE-2020-17087 CNG Pool Overflow - Direct CNG Device Access
id: 3f8a1c20-1708-74c2-9a10-020201708701
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation   # pair with command-line / image-load hunting
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng'
      - 'Device\Cng'
  condition: selection
level: high

YARA (PoC marker — IOCTL buffer constants)

rule CVE_2020_17087_PoC_marker {
    meta:
        description = "Detects cng.sys IOCTL 0x390400 overflow PoC tooling"
        reference = "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2104"
    strings:
        $magic  = { 4D 3C 2B 1A }                        // 0x1A2B3C4D message magic (LE)
        $ioctl  = { 00 04 39 00 }                        // IOCTL 0x390400 (LE)
        $dev    = "GLOBALROOT\\Device\\Cng" ascii
        $sz1    = "DataBufferSize" ascii
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and ($dev or ($magic and $ioctl)) or ($magic and $sz1)
}

Crash-dump triage (what a trigger looks like)

cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock+0x4e   call cng!BCryptAlloc
; pool header of the victim allocation: Tag 'Cngb', BlockSize tiny
; overflow bytes on the page: "30 00 30 00 20 00 64 00 64 00 20 00 ..."

Remediation

  1. Apply KB4586781 (November 2020) or later; verify cng.sys ≥ 10.0.19041.630 (Win10 2004/20H2). Any currently supported Windows build is long patched — this package is for legacy/forensic work.
  2. On legacy hosts, alert on the pipe-grooming + CNG-device patterns above.
  3. Crash dumps from unpatched hosts showing cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock are near-conclusive evidence of trigger/exploit attempts — preserve them for IR.

Timeline

Date Event
2020-10-30 Google Project Zero discloses the bug as an ITW 0day (issue 2104), chained with Chrome CVE-2020-15999
2020-11-10 Microsoft November 2020 Patch Tuesday (KB4586781), CVE-2020-17087 assigned; fix = RtlUShortMult overflow check
2021-02-04 GP0 publishes the 0days-in-the-wild RCA
2021-10-22 PixiePoint Security publishes the full Segment Heap exploitation technique
2026-07-22 This analysis: blue-team package; fix verified via ghidriff + headless Ghidra decompilation (RtlUShortMult in CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock, single changed function)

References


Attack Path

Sandbox escape to SYSTEM via a 16-bit truncation in the cng.sys IOCTL property dump - the Windows half of a Chrome exploit chain

Attack path for CVE-2020-17087 Sandbox escape to SYSTEM via a 16-bit truncation in the cng.sys IOCTL property dump - the Windows half of a Chrome exploit chain 01 — ENTRY Any local user, including code inside a browser sandbox, opens the CNG device DeviceIoControl on \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng, IOCTL 0x390400, or the same path via BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty. No privileges required - this is what made it usable as a Chrome sandbox escape. 02 — CONTROLLED INPUT Attacker chooses SrcLen so that SrcLen * 6 exceeds 16 bits The source length is fully caller-controlled through the IOCTL input buffer. 03 — PATH The IOCTL handler formats the property block as a Unicode hex dump cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock computes the output allocation and then writes the dump into it. 04 — MISSING CHECK The allocation size is computed as SrcLen * 6 in 16-bit arithmetic, the write is not The multiply truncates to 16 bits for the allocation, but the formatting loop writes the full SrcLen * 6 bytes. CWE-190 integer truncation. The patch widens the size computation. 05 — PRIMITIVE Controlled-length linear NonPagedPoolNx overflow with a fixed byte pattern Overflow bytes follow the XX 00 XX 00 20 00 hex-dump pattern. Public technique pairs a Segment Heap BlockSize attack with named-pipe data queue entries. Chained with CVE-2020-15999 in the wild.

Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.

Exploits & PoC

4 public PoCs
RepositoryStarsPublishedDescription
vp777/Windows-Non-Paged-Pool-Overflow-Exploitation 264 2021-07-02 Techniques based on named pipes for pool overflow exploitation targeting the most recent (and oldest) Windows versions demonstrated on CVE-2020-17087 and an off-by-one overflow
revengsh/CVE-2020-17087 4 2020-11-26 A CVE-2020-17087 PoC.
ykg88/OHTS_IE6052-CVE-2020-17087 0 2021-05-27
raiden757/CVE-2020-17087 0 2023-05-13

Detection Rules

Acknowledgments

Microsoft would like to thank Qualys for co-ordinated vulnerability disclosure on identifying a regression for the Windows Server 2012 version of this security update.
Mateusz Jurczyk and Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero