CVE-2020-17087 — Windows Kernel Local Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
None
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems | 4586787 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 for x64-based Systems | 4586787 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems | 4586830 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems | 4586830 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1803 for 32-bit Systems | 4586785 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1803 for ARM64-based Systems | 4586785 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1803 for x64-based Systems | 4586785 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 4586793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems | 4586793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 4586793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1903 for 32-bit Systems | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1903 for ARM64-based Systems | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1903 for x64-based Systems | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for 32-bit Systems | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for ARM64-based Systems | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for x64-based Systems | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 2004 for 32-bit Systems | 4586781 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 2004 for ARM64-based Systems | 4586781 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 2004 for x64-based Systems | 4586781 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 20H2 for 32-bit Systems | 4586781 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 20H2 for ARM64-based Systems | 4586781 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 7 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 1 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows 7 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows 8.1 for 32-bit systems 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows 8.1 for x64-based systems 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows RT 8.1 | 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation) 4586807 (Monthly Rollup) 4586817 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580378 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586807 4586817 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation) 4586827 (Monthly Rollup) 4586805 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580345 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586827 4586805 Windows Server 2012 4598278 (Monthly Rollup) 4598297 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4592468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4598278 4598297 Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation) 4598278 (Monthly Rollup) 4598297 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4592468 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4598278 4598297 Windows Server 2012 R2 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation) 4586845 (Monthly Rollup) 4586823 (Security Only) Important Elevation of Privilege 4580347 Base: 7.8 Temporal: 7.2 Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C Yes 4586845 4586823 Windows Server 2016 | 4586830 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation) | 4586830 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 4586793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 4586793 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 1903 (Server Core installation) | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 1909 (Server Core installation) | 4586786 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 2004 (Server Core installation) | 4586781 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 20H2 (Server Core Installation) | 4586781 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
4586787 |
Security Update | Yes |
4586830 |
Security Update | Yes |
4586785 |
Security Update | Yes |
4586793 |
Security Update | Yes |
4586786 |
Security Update | Yes |
4586781 |
Security Update | Yes |
4586845 |
Monthly Rollup | Yes |
Patch Diff
Pool buffer overflow (CWE-190 integer truncation) in cng.sys IOCTL 0x390400 handling: cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock computes the output allocation as SrcLen*6 in 16-bit arithmetic but writes SrcLen*6 bytes of Unicode hex dump, giving a controlled-length linear NonPagedPoolNx overflow with a XX 00 XX 00 20 00 byte pattern. Reachable by any local user via DeviceIoControl on \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng (or BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty). Exploited ITW as the sandbox-escape stage of a Chrome chain (with CVE-2020-15999); full public technique via Segment Heap BlockSize attack + named-pipe DQE abuse + quota ProcessBilled decrement -> SeDebugPrivilege (PixiePoint). Patch (KB4586781, cng.sys 10.0.19041.630) replaces the inline multiply with new helper RtlUShortMult and rejects on overflow; VERIFIED 2026-07-22 via ghidriff + headless decompile (single code-changed function).
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock |
0x1c006245c (both builds) |
code (verified via headless decompile 2026-07-22) | 16-bit truncation: BCryptAlloc((USHORT)(SrcLen*6)) while the hex-format loop writes SrcLen*6 bytes -> NonPagedPoolNx linear overflow ('Cngb' tag), content pattern XX 00 XX 00 20 00. SrcLen>=0x2AAB triggers ((ushort)(0x2AAB*6)=2 allocated, 0x10002 written). Length also truncated to 16-bit at the CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation call site. Fix: RtlUShortMult(len,6,&out) with error-on-overflow before allocation + BCryptFree cleanup path. |
cng!RtlUShortMult |
|
added | Safe 16-bit multiply returning error on overflow; the entire fix |
cng!BCryptFree |
|
modified (no code changes) | metadata-only churn |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2020-17087 — Windows Kernel cng.sys IOCTL 0x390400 Pool Buffer Overflow
Summary
| Product | Microsoft Windows — cng.sys (Kernel Cryptography Next Generation driver) |
|---|---|
| Vendor | Microsoft Corporation |
| Severity | Important (MSRC) — CVSS v3.1 7.8 (High) |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (MSRC) |
| CVE Title | Windows Kernel Local Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (MSRC) |
| Affected Versions | Windows 10 2004 KB4579311 and previous (GP0 RCA); also Windows 7/8.1/Server per MSRC |
| Tested Version | Windows 10 2004/20H2 — cng.sys 10.0.19041.264 (pre-patch; unchanged through 19041.572 per winbindex) vs 10.0.19041.630 (post-patch) |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege — kernel pool overflow converted to arbitrary kernel read/write and SYSTEM (ITW: Chrome sandbox escape) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2020-17087 |
| CWE | CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (leading to CWE-787 out-of-bounds write) |
| PoC Available | Yes — GP0 issue 2104 crash trigger; blue-team trigger variant (poc_cve_2020_17087.c) derived from it |
| Exploit Available | Full exploit technique public (PixiePoint Security, Oct 2021 — Segment Heap BlockSize attack); exploited in the wild before patch, chained with Chrome 0day CVE-2020-15999 |
| Patch Available | Yes |
| Patch Date | November 10, 2020 — KB4586781 |
| Discovered | Mateusz Jurczyk & Sergei Glazunov (Google Project Zero); disclosed 2020-10-30 as ITW 0day |
Root Cause
cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock() formats a caller-controlled byte buffer
into a space-separated hex dump in Unicode. Each input byte becomes three
UTF-16 code units — high-nibble hex char, low-nibble hex char, space — i.e.
6 output bytes per input byte. The allocation size is computed as
SrcLen * 6 in 16-bit arithmetic, but the conversion loop iterates
SrcLen times:
// cng.sys 10.0.19041.264 — CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock @ 0x1c006245c (verified decompile)
uVar2 = param_2 * 6; // uVar2 is USHORT -> truncates!
puVar3 = (ushort *)BCryptAlloc((ulonglong)uVar2);
if (puVar3 != NULL) {
puVar4 = puVar3;
do { // loop count = full param_2
*puVar4 = (ushort)"0123456789abcdefT"[*param_1 >> 4];
puVar4[1] = (ushort)"0123456789abcdefT"[*param_1 & 0xf];
puVar4[2] = 0x20; // L' '
param_1++; puVar4 += 3;
} while (--uVar6 != 0);
}
For SrcLen = 0x2AAB: (USHORT)(0x2AAB * 6) = 2 bytes allocated,
0x2AAB * 6 = 0x10002 bytes written — a controlled-length linear overflow of
a NonPagedPoolNx allocation (tag Cngb), with overflow content constrained to
the pattern XX 00 XX 00 20 00 where XX ∈ [0x30–0x39, 0x61–0x66] (hex
digits + 'T'). Note the length also reaches the function truncated to 16
bits at the call site (movzx ecx, di in
CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation), bounding the effective input to
0x2AAB–0xFFFF.
The patch (verified via headless Ghidra decompile, 2026-07-22)
The post-patch build (cng.sys 10.0.19041.630) adds one function,
RtlUShortMult, and rewrites the allocation to use it — safe 16-bit
multiplication that returns an error on overflow instead of truncating.
The function bails out before any allocation when len * 6 exceeds 0xFFFF:
// cng.sys 10.0.19041.630 — same function @ 0x1c006245c (verified decompile)
lVar2 = RtlUShortMult(param_2, /* 6 */, local_res8);
if (lVar2 < 0)
return lVar2; // overflow -> reject, no alloc
puVar3 = (ushort *)BCryptAlloc((ulonglong)local_res8[0]);
(The decompiler renders the constant operand ambiguously; the unchanged
output-length bookkeeping — param_3[1] = out; param_3[0] = out - 2 — pins
the helper’s semantics to out = len * 6.) A BCryptFree cleanup path on
failure was added as well. ghidriff confirms this is the only function
with code changes across the whole driver (79% similarity), with
RtlUShortMult the single added function.
Complete Call Flow (userspace → vulnerable code)
[userspace, any integrity level]
Option A (raw): CreateFileA("\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\Cng", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE)
DeviceIoControl(hCng, 0x390400, inBuf, 0x1000 + DataBufferSize, ...)
Option B (API): BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty() (bcrypt.dll — documented Win32 API,
reaches the same CNG config IOCTL path)
[kernel]
KsecDispatch (ksecdd.sys → cng)
└─ cng!CngDispatch
└─ cng!CngDeviceControl // extracts IOCTL + buffers
└─ cng!ConfigIoHandler_Safeguarded // sanity checks, copies input,
// IoUnpack_SG_ParamBlock_Header
// (magic 0x1A2B3C4D required)
└─ cng!_ConfigFunctionIoHandler
└─ cng!CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation
│ param_9 = (USHORT)DataBufferSize ← truncation #1 (call site)
└─ cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock ← THE BUG
├─ BCryptAlloc((USHORT)(len*6)) ← truncation #2
└─ hex-dump loop writes len*6 bytes → POOL OVERFLOW
Relevant interfaces
| Layer | Interface |
|---|---|
| Device | \Device\Cng (open via \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng) — no special privileges needed |
| Win32 API (alt. route) | BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty (bcrypt.dll) |
| IOCTL | 0x390400 (CNG config “set function property” operation) |
| Kernel entry | cng!CngDispatch → cng!CngDeviceControl |
| Vulnerable sink | cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock → BCryptAlloc + hex-format loop |
IOCTL input layout (from the GP0 PoC / PixiePoint writeup)
| Offset | Size | Field |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | 4 | magic = 0x1A2B3C4D (required; any other value never reaches the bug) |
| 0x04 | 4 | 0x10400 |
| 0x08 | 4 | 1 |
| 0x10 | 8 | 0x100 |
| 0x18 | 4 | 3 |
| 0x20 | 8 | offset of context name → 0x200 (L"FUNCTION") |
| 0x28 | 8 | 0x300 |
| 0x30 | 8 | offset of property name → 0x400 (L"PROPERTY") |
| 0x38 | 4 | 0 |
| 0x40 | 8 | 0x500 |
| 0x48 | 8 | 0x600 |
| 0x50 | 4 | DataBufferSize — the overflow field (≥ 0x2AAB triggers) |
| 0x58 | 8 | offset of data buffer → 0x1000 |
| 0x60 | 8 | 0 |
Exploitation Scenario
ITW (Oct 2020): used as the kernel stage of a Chrome exploit chain — CVE-2020-15999 (FreeType heap overflow, Chrome RCE in renderer) → CVE-2020-17087 to escape the sandbox to SYSTEM. Per GP0, the ITW sample “uses the buffer overflow to establish an arbitrary read/write primitive in kernel space with the help of Named Pipe objects”.
Public technique (PixiePoint Security, tested Win10 1903–20H2): the
constrained overwrite (XX 00 XX 00 20 00) is turned into full kernel R/W
via the Segment Heap BlockSize attack:
- Groom VS-allocator subsegments (128 KB, 23 usable pages) with named-pipe
_NP_DATA_QUEUE_ENTRYsprays: groupsg3/g1, target chunks (BlockSize0x3E0), holes (0x7F0+ fill0x7B0). - Trigger with
DataBufferSize = 0x2BF9→ allocation0x7D6, write0x107D6; lands in a hole and overwrites a target chunk’s pool-header BlockSize0x3E → 0x64(“ghost chunk” now0x640bytes). - Enable dynamic lookaside for both sizes; free/realloc the ghost chunk to get a repeatable controlled linear overflow into the adjacent named pipe chunk.
- Corrupt
_NP_DATA_QUEUE_ENTRY.{QuotaInEntry, DataSize}→ OOB read withPeekNamedPipe; leak a valid root-queue pointer; flipDataEntryTypeto Unbuffered with a userland fake_IRP→ arbitrary kernel read. - Leak
npfsbase,nt!ExpPoolQuotaCookie,nt!RtlpHpHeapGlobals,nt!PsInitialSystemProcess; craft fake_EPROCESSobjects whoseQuotaBlockpoints intoToken.Privileges; use the Quota ProcessBilled overwrite for arbitrary decrement → flip onSeDebugPrivilege. - Inject into
winlogon.exe→ SYSTEM shell.
Pool-grooming caveat from the writeup: guard pages appear every ~0x10 pages, so the exploit needs a 128 KB subsegment layout to get a ≥ 64 KB overflow “runway” without touching a guard page.
Detection & Hunting (blue team)
High-signal telemetry
| Source | Indicator |
|---|---|
Crash dumps (C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP, minidumps) |
Bugcheck with stack through cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock / cng!CfgAdtReportFunctionPropertyOperation — on an unpatched host, a trigger PoC or exploit grooming failure shows exactly here (e.g. KERNEL_SECURITY_CHECK_FAILURE / BAD_POOL_HEADER 0xC2 / PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA in cng.sys) |
| Sysmon Event 1 / Security 4688 | Processes opening \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng (rare outside crypto libraries) that then die with the machine — EDR device-open telemetry |
| Handle/device audit | Non-system processes with a handle to \Device\Cng issuing IOCTL 0x390400 (ETW Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-IO / driver telemetry if available) |
| Behavioral | Massive named-pipe creation bursts (hundreds–thousands of pipes) from one process = pool-grooming signature of the PixiePoint/ITW technique |
| Post-exploitation | Processes unexpectedly gaining SeDebugPrivilege (token-privilege auditing, Sysmon EID 10 on winlogon.exe) |
Sigma rule (starter)
title: CVE-2020-17087 CNG Pool Overflow - Suspicious Named Pipe Grooming
id: 3f8a1c20-1708-74c2-9a10-020201708700
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
detection:
selection:
# Exploit sprays hundreds-thousands of pipes for Segment Heap grooming
PipeName|startswith: '\'
condition: selection
level: low # deploy as a correlation/counting rule: >200 pipe_created by one Image in <60s
title: CVE-2020-17087 CNG Pool Overflow - Direct CNG Device Access
id: 3f8a1c20-1708-74c2-9a10-020201708701
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation # pair with command-line / image-load hunting
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'GLOBALROOT\Device\Cng'
- 'Device\Cng'
condition: selection
level: high
YARA (PoC marker — IOCTL buffer constants)
rule CVE_2020_17087_PoC_marker {
meta:
description = "Detects cng.sys IOCTL 0x390400 overflow PoC tooling"
reference = "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2104"
strings:
$magic = { 4D 3C 2B 1A } // 0x1A2B3C4D message magic (LE)
$ioctl = { 00 04 39 00 } // IOCTL 0x390400 (LE)
$dev = "GLOBALROOT\\Device\\Cng" ascii
$sz1 = "DataBufferSize" ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and ($dev or ($magic and $ioctl)) or ($magic and $sz1)
}
Crash-dump triage (what a trigger looks like)
cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock+0x4e call cng!BCryptAlloc
; pool header of the victim allocation: Tag 'Cngb', BlockSize tiny
; overflow bytes on the page: "30 00 30 00 20 00 64 00 64 00 20 00 ..."
Remediation
- Apply KB4586781 (November 2020) or later; verify
cng.sys ≥ 10.0.19041.630(Win10 2004/20H2). Any currently supported Windows build is long patched — this package is for legacy/forensic work. - On legacy hosts, alert on the pipe-grooming + CNG-device patterns above.
- Crash dumps from unpatched hosts showing
cng!CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlockare near-conclusive evidence of trigger/exploit attempts — preserve them for IR.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2020-10-30 | Google Project Zero discloses the bug as an ITW 0day (issue 2104), chained with Chrome CVE-2020-15999 |
| 2020-11-10 | Microsoft November 2020 Patch Tuesday (KB4586781), CVE-2020-17087 assigned; fix = RtlUShortMult overflow check |
| 2021-02-04 | GP0 publishes the 0days-in-the-wild RCA |
| 2021-10-22 | PixiePoint Security publishes the full Segment Heap exploitation technique |
| 2026-07-22 | This analysis: blue-team package; fix verified via ghidriff + headless Ghidra decompilation (RtlUShortMult in CfgAdtpFormatPropertyBlock, single changed function) |
References
- Google Project Zero — 0days in the Wild RCA: CVE-2020-17087
- GP0 issue 2104 + crash PoC
- PixiePoint Security — Exploiting the CNG.sys IOCTL 0x390400 Pool Overflow
- MSRC — CVE-2020-17087
- OnlyFm252 diff report — cng_sys-kb4586781
Attack Path
Sandbox escape to SYSTEM via a 16-bit truncation in the cng.sys IOCTL property dump - the Windows half of a Chrome exploit chain
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
4 public PoCsUnverified third-party code
Public proof-of-concept repositories aggregated from PoC-in-GitHub. They are not reviewed and may be incomplete, non-functional, or malicious — inspect the code before running anything.
| Repository | Stars | Published | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| vp777/Windows-Non-Paged-Pool-Overflow-Exploitation | 264 | 2021-07-02 | Techniques based on named pipes for pool overflow exploitation targeting the most recent (and oldest) Windows versions demonstrated on CVE-2020-17087 and an off-by-one overflow |
| revengsh/CVE-2020-17087 | 4 | 2020-11-26 | A CVE-2020-17087 PoC. |
| ykg88/OHTS_IE6052-CVE-2020-17087 | 0 | 2021-05-27 | |
| raiden757/CVE-2020-17087 | 0 | 2023-05-13 |
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
Microsoft would like to thank Qualys for co-ordinated vulnerability disclosure on identifying a regression for the Windows Server 2012 version of this security update.
Mateusz Jurczyk and Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero