CVE-2020-0638 — Update Notification Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Executive Summary
An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in the way the Update Notification Manager handles files. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would first have to gain execution on the victim system. An attacker could then run a specially crafted application to elevate privileges. The security update addresses the vulnerability by correcting how the Update Notification Manager handles files.
Overview
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
EPSS Score
Affected Products
| Product | KB Article | Severity | Impact | Restart Required |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows 10 Version 1709 for 32-bit Systems | 4534276 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1709 for ARM64-based Systems | 4534276 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1709 for x64-based Systems | 4534276 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1803 for 32-bit Systems | 4534293 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1803 for ARM64-based Systems | 4534293 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1803 for x64-based Systems | 4534293 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems | 4534273 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems | 4534273 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems | 4534273 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1903 for 32-bit Systems | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1903 for ARM64-based Systems | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1903 for x64-based Systems | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for 32-bit Systems | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for ARM64-based Systems | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows 10 Version 1909 for x64-based Systems | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 | 4534273 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation) | 4534273 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 1803 (Server Core Installation) | 4534293 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 1903 (Server Core installation) | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
| Windows Server, version 1909 (Server Core installation) | 4528760 (Security Update) |
Important | Elevation of Privilege | Yes |
Patches
| Article | Type | Restart |
|---|---|---|
4534276 |
Security Update | Yes |
4534293 |
Security Update | Yes |
4534273 |
Security Update | Yes |
4528760 |
Security Update | Yes |
Patch Diff
Improper library-identity validation (CWE-59, link-following / library substitution) in the Windows Update Medic Service waasmedicsvc.dll (Update Notification Manager), local elevation of privilege to SYSTEM (Important, EoP, AV:L/PR:L/UI:N, CVSS 7.8; listed in CISA KEV, added 2022-05-23). The Medic service runs as SYSTEM and loads remediation plugin libraries via WaasMedic::CWaasRemediation::LoadPluginLibrary after a WaasMedic::IsTrustedLibrary check. PRE: IsTrustedLibrary validated only the Authenticode signature (WTGetSignatureInfo) and the load used LoadLibraryW(path); a local attacker who could redirect or substitute the resolved plugin file (link following, CWE-59) could get the SYSTEM service to load a library that passed the weak trust check, yielding code execution as SYSTEM. Diff of waasmedicsvc.dll (Dec 2019 -> Jan 2020, KB4528760, build .628) confirms the fix: IsTrustedLibrary now calls a NEW WaasMedic::ValidateOriginalFileName that reads the loaded file's version resource (\StringFileInfo\%04x%04x\OriginalFilename via VerQueryValueW, after \VarFileInfo\Translation) and requires it (_wcsicmp) to match the expected module name, binding the library's identity beyond its signature; and LoadPluginLibrary now loads with LoadLibraryExW(path, 0, 0x80 = LOAD_LIBRARY_REQUIRE_SIGNED_TARGET). No CFR feature flag (pre-velocity 2020 build). Note: the POST build 10.0.18362.628 (SHA-256 4236c7c7...23ea) is winbindex-confirmed as the Jan-2020 fix (KB4528760, which supersedes the Dec-2019 KB4530684 = build .535); the PRE binary is confirmed pre-fix by content (it lacks ValidateOriginalFileName), though ghidriff read its PE version string as 10.0.18362.1034 rather than the expected .535 - a symbol-server version-label ambiguity. Both SHA-256 values are recorded for verification.
| Function | Address | Change | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
WaasMedic::CWaasRemediation::LoadPluginLibrary |
code change |
code (load hardened to require a signed target) | Pre: after IsTrustedLibrary() the plugin was loaded with LoadLibraryW(path). Post: loads with LoadLibraryExW(path, 0, 0x80) where 0x80 = LOAD_LIBRARY_REQUIRE_SIGNED_TARGET (LoadLibraryW is retained only on the alternate state/flag path). ratio 0.69. |
WaasMedic::IsTrustedLibrary |
code change |
code (adds OriginalFilename identity check before the signature check) | Pre: called WTGetSignatureInfo (Authenticode) directly. Post: first calls ValidateOriginalFileName(path, &ok); the WTGetSignatureInfo check is retained. ratio 0.42. |
WaasMedic::ValidateOriginalFileName |
new function |
added (library-identity validation) | New. Reads the PE version resource \StringFileInfo\%04x%04x\OriginalFilename (VerQueryValueW, language/codepage from \VarFileInfo\Translation) and requires _wcsicmp(embedded OriginalFilename, expected) == 0, so a substituted/redirected library whose embedded OriginalFilename does not match is rejected before it is trusted and loaded. |
Root Cause Analysis
CVE-2020-0638 — Windows Update Medic Service waasmedicsvc.dll Plugin-Library Trust Bypass → Local EoP to SYSTEM
Summary
| Product | Windows — waasmedicsvc.dll (Windows Update Medic Service / “Update Notification Manager”) |
| CVE ID | CVE-2020-0638 |
| Impact | Elevation of Privilege (local — to SYSTEM) |
| MSRC severity | Important |
| CVSS | 7.8 / 7.0 — CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:O/RC:C |
| CWE | CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (“Link Following”) — via improper library-identity validation |
| Delivery | Local — attacker already has code execution on the host and abuses the SYSTEM service’s plugin load |
| KB / Fixed build | KB4528760 — waasmedicsvc.dll 10.0.18362.628 (Win10 1903/1909 x64) |
| Patch Date | January 14, 2020 (2020-Jan) |
| Pre-patch binary | waasmedicsvc.dll 10.0.18362.535 (KB4530684, Dec 2019) — SHA256 1f1c9f46caf56e938758af6a13a39150ceb8ef9b0c8c06c4327107bf84a304f9 |
| Post-patch binary | waasmedicsvc.dll 10.0.18362.628 (KB4528760, Jan 2020) — SHA256 4236c7c7d9827deb21b2d96073805f6b17924c1feb46a34a640f0dc6bb1b23ea |
| Feature flag | none — pre-velocity 2020 build (the fix is not CFR-gated) |
| Exploitability | MSRC: Exploitation “Proof-of-Concept” (E:P), not publicly disclosed, MSRC “not exploited”. Listed in CISA KEV (added 2022-05-23). |
Provenance note: the POST build
10.0.18362.628(SHA4236c7c7…) is winbindex-confirmed as the January-2020 fix (KB4528760, which supersedes the December-2019 KB4530684 = build.535). The PRE binary is confirmed pre-fix by content — it does not containValidateOriginalFileName— although ghidriff read its embedded PE version string as10.0.18362.1034rather than the expected.535(a symbol-server version-label ambiguity of the kind seen before). Both SHA-256 values are recorded above so the exact inputs can be verified.
Product Description
waasmedicsvc.dll implements the Windows Update Medic Service (WaaSMedicSvc), which runs as
SYSTEM and repairs the Windows Update stack. To do this it loads remediation plugin libraries
(CWaasRemediation::LoadPluginLibrary) after checking that each candidate library is “trusted”
(IsTrustedLibrary). Because the service is SYSTEM, anything it can be persuaded to load runs as SYSTEM.
Vulnerability Summary
Pre-patch, IsTrustedLibrary validated a candidate plugin only by its Authenticode signature
(WTGetSignatureInfo), and LoadPluginLibrary then loaded it with LoadLibraryW(path). There was no
check that the file’s identity matched the module the service intended to load. A local attacker who
can redirect or substitute the resolved plugin file — the classic link-following / file-substitution
primitive Microsoft classes as CWE-59 — could make the SYSTEM service load a different library that
still satisfied the weak signature-only check, gaining code execution as SYSTEM. Microsoft rates it
Important, 7.8; CISA later added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Prerequisites and Constraints
- Local, low-privileged code execution on the host (
AV:L,AC:L,PR:L,UI:N). - The attacker can influence the file the Medic service resolves as its plugin (path redirection / substitution — link following).
- The substituted library must satisfy the pre-patch trust check (signature), which does not bind the loaded file’s identity.
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The trust decision for a SYSTEM-loaded plugin relied on the file’s signature alone and did not verify
that the loaded file was actually the intended module. Combined with the ordinary LoadLibraryW load,
a redirected/substituted-but-acceptable library was loaded into a SYSTEM process.
The patch (confirmed — diff, .535 → .628)
The January 2020 build adds a library-identity binding and a signed-target load flag:
// WaasMedic::IsTrustedLibrary (10.0.18362.628) — PATCHED (from the diff)
DVar1 = ValidateOriginalFileName(param_1, local_res8); // *** NEW: identity check first ***
// ... Authenticode check retained:
DVar1 = WTGetSignatureInfo(param_1, hObject, 0x1803, &local_78, 0, 0);
// WaasMedic::ValidateOriginalFileName (NEW) — from the diff
VerQueryValueW(lpData, L"\\VarFileInfo\\Translation", &local_2e8, local_2f0);
swprintf_s(local_248, 0xfe, L"\\StringFileInfo\\%04x%04x\\OriginalFilename", /*lang, codepage*/);
VerQueryValueW(lpData, local_248, &local_2e0, local_2f0);
iVar6 = _wcsicmp(/* embedded OriginalFilename */, /* expected name */);
*local_2d8 = iVar6 == 0; // trusted only if the name matches
// WaasMedic::CWaasRemediation::LoadPluginLibrary (.628) — PATCHED
if ((iVar3 < 0) || ((local_248 & 0x200000000) == 0))
pHVar4 = LoadLibraryExW(local_238, (HANDLE)0x0, 0x80); // 0x80 = LOAD_LIBRARY_REQUIRE_SIGNED_TARGET
else
pHVar4 = LoadLibraryW(local_238);
ValidateOriginalFileName reads the candidate’s version-resource OriginalFilename (via
VerQueryValueW on \StringFileInfo\<lang><codepage>\OriginalFilename, with the language/codepage taken
from \VarFileInfo\Translation) and requires a case-insensitive match against the expected module name.
A substituted or redirected library whose embedded OriginalFilename does not match is rejected before
it is trusted. The load itself is additionally hardened with LOAD_LIBRARY_REQUIRE_SIGNED_TARGET
(0x80). Together these close the substitution: the loaded file must now be both correctly named and
signed.
Patch Completeness Assessment
Not CFR-gated (this is a 2020, pre-velocity build). The identity check and the signed-target load
flag ship unconditionally in .628. The fix binds the loaded library’s name identity in addition to
its signature; it does not, by itself, remove the attacker’s ability to attempt redirection — it
ensures a redirected target fails the trust check.
Detection Guidance
Behavioural. Unexpected module loads by svchost/WaaSMedicSvc hosting waasmedicsvc.dll,
especially of DLLs from user-writable locations; failures/rejections in the plugin trust path on patched
builds; junctions/symlinks or file substitutions targeting paths the Medic service resolves.
Config. Ensure the January 2020 (or later) cumulative update is installed — for 1903/1909, build
10.0.18362.628 (KB4528760) or newer. This CVE is in CISA KEV, so remediation is mandated for US
federal systems.
References
- MSRC advisory — CVE-2020-0638 (Update Notification Manager Elevation of Privilege), released 2020-01-14, KB4528760 (and per-SKU KBs KB4534273 / KB4534293 / KB4534276).
- CISA KEV — “Microsoft Update Notification Manager Privilege Escalation Vulnerability”, added 2022-05-23.
- Full binary diff:
/data/patch_diffs/waasmedicsvc_dll-cve-2020-0638-ghidriff.md
Attack Path
A local attacker redirects/substitutes the plugin library that the SYSTEM Update Medic Service loads; pre-patch only a signature was required
Derived from the patch delta: the checks added by the vendor identify which fields crossed a trust boundary unvalidated. Reachability and privilege are taken from the call chain in the RCA report.
Exploits & PoC
Detection Rules
Acknowledgments
Zhiniang Peng (@edwardzpeng) of Qihoo 360 Core Security and Jiadong Lu